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F orew ord
In October 2002 the  Institute o f  A frican S tudies and t he School o f Public Health o f  the 
University o f Ghana, in collaboration with the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the 
Social Sciences (SCASS) and with sponsorship from UNFPA, SCASS, and Cambridge 
University, held an international, inter-disciplinary seminar on G endered  F am ily D ynam ics and  
H ealth: A frican F am ily  S tud ies in a G lobalizing  World. It was held at the Noguchi Memorial 
Institute for Medical Research (NMIMR) Conference Hall and the Institute o f  African Studies 
Chalets in South Legon.
As well as providing a setting for the discussion o f an array o f interesting and provocative 
papers, by speakers from academic institutions in several countries inside and outside the 
region, it also served as an important venue to hold policy round table discussions among 
practitioners and scholars on some o f the findings o f an earlier seminar on Socio-C ultura l 
D im ensions o f  R eproductive H ealth  and  H um an D evelopm ent, which had been held in June, 
organized by the Institute o f  African Studies and the School o f Public Health, University o f 
Ghana, and financially supported by UNFPA.
This Supplement No. 15 to the Research R eview  contains nine pieces presented at the October 
seminar. The seminar was opened by the Director o f the Noguchi Memorial Institute for Medical 
Research, and participants were welcomed by the Director o f the Institute o f African Studies, 
Professor Takyiwaa Manuh, and Dr. Fred Wurapa, then Director o f the School o f Public Health. 
Opening remarks were made by Professor Emeritus J.H. Nketia, Director of the International 
Centre for African Music and Dance. He emphasized appropriately that everything we do as part 
o f our culture, including health related behaviour, is transmitted by the family, o f which 
transmission o f health culture is an important function. An opening paper was presented by 
Professor George Hagan, formerly Director o f the Institute o f African Studies and now 
Commissioner for Culture, who spoke on G hana’s policies on Culture and the Family and 
research requirements. He stressed the need for a base o f cross-cultural, comparative research 
findings to provide guidance for policy formulation on family health issues. Professor Jack 
Goody gave the subsequent paper on the African Family in the past and present.
In this supplement the prologue is extracted from Professor Goran Therbom ’s treatise on 
African Families in Global Context. This is itself taken from his m agnum  opus  on global families 
and how they are changing. It serves to place the unique dimensions o f  African familial systems 
in a comparative setting. Professor Therbom  is the Director o f the Swedish Collegium for 
Advanced Study in the Social Sciences (SCASS)
The second paper, on the Impact o f  the AIDS Epidemic on Families and Family Coping 
Strategies in Uganda by Professors Peter Atekyereza and Edward Kirumira from M akerere 
University, gives important information and analysis on what has been happening in Uganda over 
the past two decades an d  indicates how important i t  is to  focus on fam ilies when considering 
health protection and promotion.
1 he third paper, by David Wodi Tukura o f Jos University, Plateau State, Nigeria, deals with 
the reproductive health dilemmas o f housewives whose husbands philander. This provocative 
discussion accordingly confronts a critical sex and gender issue with pervasive import. It is based 
on an innovative study carried out by the author in Nigeria.
I he fourth essay by Professor Kari Dako, M oussa Traore and Helen Yita o f the University o f 
Ghana looks at how families are portrayed in West African fiction, and the repeated conflicts 
depicted between women and men, wives and husbands, lovers and kin and the gaps in norms 
and expectations between tradition and modernity.
Families need homes to live in and a healthy environment if  they are to thrive. The fifth 
essay deals with Tenure, Housing and Environmental Management in Accra. It is by Professor 
Jacob Songsore o f the Geography Department of the University ol Ghana together with two 
others, and it gives an historical review of state policies and housing and environmental crises, 
looking at patterns o f land and house tenure, exploring the potential relationship between 
crowding in shared facilities and health outcomes.
Jack Goody's piece on the family and education calls attention to some earlier work and 
focuses on the potential and observed concomitants o f widespread access to education, often 
without opportunities for employment considered suitable. He discusses the implication for 
changing levels o f morality, fertility as well as national and internat ional migration.
The next essay by Dr. Afrifa is about poverty and the Ghanaian family. It takes both a 
historical and global comparative perspective on the matter. It tells of the increasing encroachment 
o f serious want on families in Ghana, affecting lifestyle and level o f living, life expectancy and 
survival. It is pervasive. It is real and it affects a large and growing proportion of the population.
The paper by Professor Mitchell on Gander, the Family and Mental Illness takes the notion of 
mental illness and looks a t  its  prevalence in relation to  questions o f  gender and  the fam ily, in  
particular the birth o f siblings. She refers among others to the early seminal work o f Fortes on the 
Tallensi and Field on the Akan, underscoring the significance o f birth spacing and sibling rivalry.
The epilogue by Professor Therborn on Globalization and Change looks at the changing world 
o f family systems, highlighting some o f the important transformations that have been taking place 
and are still ongoing. These include lowering o f fertility levels and the dwindling o f patriarchy in 
its traditional forms, as well as secularization o f sexual behaviour and the informalization o f 
marriage. W ith respect to the African continent he notes that there is no universal evolution and 
that there has rather been a set o f  interconnected waves. Meanwhile the pace o f change has been 
uneven and different change agents have been at work. He notes that the seminar served as a 
useful c ontext for a n umber o f d ifferent types o f  d ialogue a nd encounter b etween b iomedical 
science and social science, between South and North and between policy making and academia. 
He notes four major issues for investigation emphasized by this seminar. These include systematic 
investigation o f sexual cultures; the study o f the dynamics o f power and dependence and 
independence of gender roles; how to frame normative change and how to deal with health 
insecurity.
The Policy Round Table on Implications for Research and Action o f the findings o f  the 
Sem inar on Socio-C ultural D im ensions o f  Reproductive H ealth and  H um an D evelopm ent, which 
took place during the seminar, was attended by a range o f experts from different walks o f life. It 
was opened by the Vice-Chancellor o f  the University o f  Ghana, Professor Asenso Okyere, who 
outlined a number o f  the central population problems with which policy makers are currently 
grappling. Dr. Phyllis Antwi o f the School o f Public Health raised gender issues relating to 
maternal survival, child nutrition and reproductive health. Prof. Mumuni Dakubu talked about 
the role o f the new information technologies and ways to conquer communication challenges. Dr 
Omar Ahmed of the School o f Public Health focused attention on the need for multi-disciplinary 
research. Institutional responses came from Mrs. Gloria Quansah Asare o f the M inistry o f Health 
RH Services; Ms. Catherine Adu-Boadi, M inistry o f W om en’s and Children’s Affairs; Ms Felicia 
Odame, FAW E (Forum for African Women Educationalists), and a DANIDA representative 
among others.
At the end o f the seminar discussions o f participants on future research avenues pointed to the 
need to promote further comparative applied research on family studies and health. Professor Jack 
Goody from the University o f Cambridge emphasized the need to encourage more problem 
oriented ethnographic research. Professor Juliet Mitchell, also o f the University o f Cambridge
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(Social and Political Sciences), noted the need for further conceptualization o f gender issues and 
the potential for future networking with the fam ily  Studies and African Studies Centres in 
Cambridge. Professor Allan Hill o f Harvard School o f Public Health noted the timeliness o f the 
newly commenced study o f W om en’s Health in the Accra M etropolitan Area, and graduate 
students from the Institute o f African Studies gave short briefings on the research they are doing 
on orphans and malnourished children with some financial support from UNFPA. Dr. Irene 
Odotei o f the Institute o f African Studies University o f  Ghana called for a political agenda to 
inform our research. Finally, Professor Christine Oppong informed participants about the Family 
Population and Development Unit being set up in the Institute o f African Studies, with support 
from UNFPA, to serve as a research resource and reading room for graduate students.
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P R O L O G U E :
A F R IC A N  F A M IL IE S  IN A G L O B A L  C O N T E X T 1
G oran Ther born
My interest in African family systems is part o f  an ongoing global work on the family 
institution in the world in the course o f the 20,h century, Betw een Sex and Power, The Family in the 
World 1900-2000. This paper is an attempt at locating the African family in today 's global context, 
the first two thirds o f the twentieth century are only hinted at here.
I have come to family studies from historical, comparative macro-sociology, and that 
perspective provides a new vantage-point for looking at the family. This means, for instance, 
analyzing patriarchy and its partial erosion in contexts o f different routes to and through modernity 
in the world, relating the former to colonialism, imperialism, slavery, as well as to social 
revolutions and reactive m odernization from above. It means looking to the connections o f birth 
rates to the French and the American Revolutions, to social movements, stale policies, and global 
organizations. It also means putting sexuality and marriage into connection with overall social 
power relations.
The macro approach here is explicitly and systematically global, aiming at covering all major 
parts o f the world, all major family systems. This means, o f course, foregoing a lot o f variations 
and nuances for a panorama or a satellite weather picture. It is an analysis geared to comparisons, 
contrasts, and connections rather than to empathetic familiarity, subtlety, and local embeddedness. 
Both approaches are needed, I have just chosen the one closest to my own interests and 
competence. On the other hand, for all its b ird ’s eye view distance, this is narrative, not a set o f 
variables and models, anchored in events pertaining to human intimacy.
The methods used make up a loan library from different disciplines -and sub-disciplines, placed 
in a framework o f sociological history'. In  trying to understand the family as an institution it is 
necessary to start with the world religions, which provide the normative basis. Law, and then not 
only the law o f books but also o f courts and customs, provides extremely valuable insights, as they 
sum up the normative status o f social relations in a given period. To follow the dynamics o f family 
systems, the latter have to be located in the economics o f  property, labour, and exchange, in the 
politics o f global and territorial power and policies, and in vast cultural processes, o f religion and 
o f general normativity. Much o f the family ground surveyed here has already been ploughed by 
generations o f  anthropologists, demographers, historians, sexual psychologists, and sociologists. A 
work o f this kind is naturally heavily indebted to their efforts.
What has happened to the family in the world during the twentieth century may be summed up 
in three short stories. Families produce far fewer children, in several cases fewer than women or 
couples want. Three centuries o f rapid population growth, 1750-2050, are drawing to a close, after 
a peak in the third quarter o f the twentieth century. Below-reproduction fertility now reigns in 
virtually all Europe, in the white dominions o f the former British Empire -  but not the in USA -, in 
East Asia, in parts o f southern India, and in some Caribbean countries. In Europe several peoples 
have already started to die out or at least to decrease, the Germans, the Italians, the Russians, and 
the Swedish.
An earlier version of this paper Vv'as presented at a Workshop on Global Processes, Cape Town, South 
Africa, November 29-December 2 2001.
1
Ancient patriarchy, the power o f fathers and husbands, has been eroded. This general but very 
uneven, transformation o f generation and gender relations is the most novel and far-reaching ol the 
changes. In its cracking the cake o f ancient customs and in its direction o f emancipating children, 
youth, and women, the exit from patriarchy is at the social core o f modernity. De-patriarchalization 
has gone furthest in North-western Europe and in the Anglo- or Francophone New Worlds, but the 
most dramatic changes in the course o f the past century have taken place in East Asia and in 
Eastern Europe.
Thirdly, sexuality has been secularized, largely freed from religious taboos, and its links to 
family formation and family alliance have been loosened. Marriage, the institutional complex o f 
socially ordered sexuality, has shrunk as a normative construction, although it retains a central 
place in human relationships all over the world. General tendencies o f the last decades towards 
earlier sexual debuts and later marriages have widened the space o f pre-marital sexuality, although 
the Asian continent is still only on the eve o f a likely sexual revolution. But increasing longevity is 
prolonging marital life at the other end o f the life cycle.
None o f these has had a linear unfolding, and only the world-wide decline o f conceptions and 
births manifest any clear tendency o f global convergence. The second half o f  the 20th century has 
lived the most dramatic family changes measured on a world scale. But the recent historical 
processes o f change have affected the different family systems at different points in time, in 
different ways, and with differing outcomes.
T h e A frican  and O th er F am ily  S ystem s
As an institution, as a normatively charged pattern o f social interaction, the core o f the family is 
its regulation o f human sexuality -  through marriage first o f all -, and o f descent, i.e., parent-child 
relations, inheritance, and o f other rights and duties following from descent or marriage. The 
family is one o f the most ancient and most universal o f human institutions. From an institutional 
perspective, and in particular from one interested in institutional history, it may seem preferable to 
start by locating the family as a normative complex within a still broader norm ative context. The 
most comprehensive normative systems o f the world around 1900, when our historical journey will 
start, were o f  a religious or a moral philosophical character. These religious and ethical systems in 
turn shaped the legal systems, much more than the other way around. The former were also, as a 
rule, much concerned with defining proper family practice, in terms o f  inter-generational as well as 
o f sex-gender relations.
However, by 1900 all the m ajor religions and secular moral philosophies were old, between one 
good thousand and almost three thousand years, in the course o f which they had become part o f 
more com plex a s  w ell a s  more com partm entalized geocultures. The m ajor contemporary fam ily 
systems o f the world, then, had better be seen as springing from combinations o f religions/moral 
philosophies and territorially anchored, historically evolved customs and laws. In order to make a 
global analysis at all manageable, as analytical units these configurations have to be few in number, 
while allowing for large internal variation.
In this vein, we may distinguish a core o f five major family systems, with at least two 
particularly noteworthy interstitial systems, and in each of the major systems important variants, 
which in turn can, and sometimes have to, be subdivided.
a. The Christian European, family system, within which we shall have to deal with at least four 
variants, one Orthodox Eastern European, one North-western Protestant, one Latin/Napoleonic 
Catholic Western, and one New W orld Protestant.
b. The Confucian East Asian fam ily, o f  which the C hinese and the Japanese a re  th e  la rg est 
variants.
2
Research Review Supplement 15 (2004) 1-32
c. The (at its core) Hindu South Asian, pattern, with a significant north-south divide, and also 
harbouring a Muslim variant.
d. The Islamic West Asian/North African family, with several sub-variants, mainly deriving 
from intra-Islamic divisions -  Shiia-Sunni, and the four Sunni law schools -, and more recently 
from different degrees o f secular exposure.
e. The Sub-Saharan African set o f family systems, characterized by a distinctive marriage and 
descent pattern in spite o f  religious pluralism and enormous ethnic diversity. At least from  the 
angle o f an interest in patriarchy, it appears meaningful first to distinguish two major polar variants 
o f  African family, a West Coast sub-system of remarkable i ntra-marital fem ale socio-economic 
autonomy and a sternly patriarchal South-Eastern one. In between we might place the matrilineal 
area o f  Central Africa, and, at the other pole, the M uslim  savannah belt with a high degree of 
patriarchy. At the patriarchal outer fringe we have misogynous Muslim populations o f the Horn, 
infibulating their women.
The two interstitial family systems o f major importance are the following:
f. The (religiously pluralistic) Southeast Asian family pattern, stretching from Sri Lanka to the 
Philippines, and divisible in to Buddhist, Muslim, and Christian, in part even Confucian variants. 
Buddhist family insouciance and Malay customs have here come together in mellowing the 
normative rigidities o f other Eurasian family norms.
g. The bifurcated Creole family systems coming out o f the American socio-economic history o f 
Christian European patriarchy running plantations, mines, and landed estates with African slave 
labour or Indian servile labour. Alongside the strict patriarchal, ruling high culture this has 
produced an informal Black, Mulatto, M estizo, and (uprooted) Indian macho-cum-matrifocal 
family pattern.
The institutional core o f the major family systems is usually approachable through canonical, 
religious, ethical, and legal texts. However, as African religion and law are not summed up in a 
canon o f be texts, or in one oral sacred tradition, the institutionalization o f the family in Africa had 
better be grasped from its outcomes, rather than from it sources.
Perhaps the most typical characteristic o f the African family is its form o f making marital 
alliances and o f inheriting property (Goody 1976; 2000). African marital alliances are formed by 
the groom ’s family paying wealth or services to the bride’s family, and property is inherited from 
one generation to another as a rule only among members o f the same sex. Both practices are largely 
absent from Eurasia, and have been related to African hoe agriculture largely worked by women, m 
contrast to Eurasian plough agriculture worked by men (Boserup 1970; Goody 1976).
• For the rest o f family normativity, the African family tradition seems to contain the following 
elements, inter alia:
• A great respect for age, elders, and ancestors, including a great importance accorded to rites 
de passage  into adulthood, and age groups as bases o f rights and solidarity. Homage to ancestors is 
also a central part o f  Confucian ethic, and a part o f Hindu piety too. However, nowhere but in 
Africa seems the boundary' between living and dead elders as blurred and good communication 
with ancestors as crucial as in Africa tradition.
• A strong evaluation o f fertility, as a key human life goal, seemingly m a broader, more 
general sense than the classical Confucian emphasis on not breaking the ancestral line. Derived 
trom this, a push towards universal marriage, but without necessarily giving much value to 
m arriage as such, or weddings, and a widespread tendency to let fertility override legitimacy, 
alternatively to see legitimate descent in terms of lineage belonging, rather than as biological 
paternity.
3
• Polygny as a mass practice is also a unique feature ol the African family, related to women s 
key role as agricultural labour, as well as their mothering of children.
• A strong collectivistic familism, traditionally dominating over individual choice, of marriage 
partner and o f life course in general, widespread kinship rights and obligations, and exogamous 
marriage rules.
• An absence o f moral sexual asceticism, although contextualized sexual morality, extra­
marital as well as pre-marital, differs widely.
• An entrenched rule o f male supremacy, which however may take many different forms. I he 
actual occurrence o f social combinations o f male supremacy and wide-ranging socio-economic 
female autonomy, particularly in the West Coast variant, made possible by weak conjugal bonds. 
However, African daughters constitute assets -  attracting bride wealth— , and not liabilities as in 
the East Asian perspective.
The aim o f  this paper is n o t to  compare family institutions, but to try to locate the  African 
family system in relation to the dramatic changes o f the world’s family patterns. From the family 
system as such we should expect that the African family,
— has been reluctant and slow in decreasing its fertility,
-  has allowed a considerable hollowing out o f patriarchy inside a complex kinship pattern,
— has been part o f  the late 20,i' century sexual revolution, above all in urban areas.
The W orld’s Demographic Transition, 1750-2050 -  and Its Ending
By the end o f the 20"’ century, in all Europe only one small country, or perhaps two, was 
reproducing itself demographically, Protestant Iceland, and perhaps (recent data arc lacking) 
Albania. The two most Catholic countries o f the continent, Ireland and Poland, are practising birth 
control to the extent o f having a fertility rate well below par, Polish fertility plunging to 1.3. child 
per w oman i n 2 000.Within t he E uropean Union, m ainstream C atholic c ountries, I taly, P ortugal, 
Spain, have the lowest birth rates o f all. Most European women have currently little more than one 
child, on the average. By the end o f the twentieth century the “total fertility rate” , i.e., the number 
o f c hildren a w oman c an be e xpected t o h ave d uring h er fertile a ge, w as 1 .45 i n t he E uropean 
Union, that is, less than one and a half child per woman, way below the reproduction rate required 
to reproduce the population.
China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Thailand are also heading for a shrinking 
population, as are Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, Mauritius, Cuba, Trinidad/Tobago and 
possibly some other Caribbean islands. USA is just below' the level o f natural reproduction -  with a 
total fertility rate (TFR) o f 2.0 child per woman in 1997. In south-western India the state o f Kerala, 
w ith a population about the same as that o f Canada, entered into below replacement fertility levels 
by the early 1990s. (Eurostat 2001a; U nicef 1999; Singh 1999)
A hundred years ago, France was unique, in the world as well as in Europe, in having the lowest 
birth-rate, a TFR o f 2.8. England and Wales stood at 3.4, the US at 3.7 in 1906, and other West 
European countries ranged from 4.0 in Denmark to 4.8 in Germany (in 1903), and among extra- 
European settlements, to Canada at 4.8 in 1906 (Chesnais 1992, 543ff). Comparable figure are 
unavailable for other parts o f the world at the time, but they would in no case be lower than the 
European ones.
In the long-view history of humankind, this secular decline o f fertility is part o f  a longer and 
wider process, known among demographers as the “demographic transition” . That is, a period  o f 
rapid population growth in a move, a “transition”, from  a low-growth (or periodically negative 
growth) system o f high fertility and high mortality to another low-growth (or possibly declining) 
system o f low fertility and low mortality. The demographic transition was given a theoretical status
4
Research Review Supplement 15 (2004) 1-32
in the mid-1940s, by F.W. Notestein, director o f the important and resourceful Office o f Population 
Research in Princeton (USA), as a demographic variant o f what later became known as 
“modernization theory” . The economic and social developments o f industrialization drove 
mortality down, causing accelerated population growth However, “urban industrial society” led to 
a new ideal o f a small family, which then more gradually brought fertility down too. The theory o f 
demographic transition w as an  c legant, important, far-reaching, and  plausible notion, w hich has 
had, and still has, a tremendous impact on development policies in the world after World War II, 
above all on North American and Western European conceptions o f Third World development.
However, like most grand theories o f the social world o f  humans, it has had considerable 
problems with the irregular varieties o f human behaviour. As a theory o f explanation and of 
prediction it is now largely abandoned, while the concept itself still appears to make some sense as 
a broad descriptive trajectory o f great historical significance. Its conception o f a pre-transition 
stable equilibrium, though, is being increasingly questioned in favour o f one made up o f long-term 
cyclical swings.
If the current population trends, as estimated by the Population Division o f the UN Secretariat, 
will hold, we can date the demographic transition in the world as the three centuries between 1750 
and 2050. Between 1500 and 1750 world population grew at about 0.2% a year, at.0.25% between 
1700 and 1750. Then a new demographic era began, in Europe, but helped to statistical visibility by 
a cyclical Asian upturn, and the growth rate climbed to 0.4 % annually for the second half o f  the 
eighteenth century. The Euro-Asian coincidence was due to the prosperity o f eighteenth century 
China, with the consolidation o f the Qing dynasty, accompanied by strong population growth. By 
mid-nineteenth century this had led to strong population pressure on available resources and 
technology, and a century o f civil wars and invasions lowered Chinese population growth to pre­
transition levels.2
During the 19th century the population o f the earth grew by 0.5% a year. In spite o f the world 
wars and other man-made disasters, the twentieth century saw human population increase by 1.3 
per cent annually. On a global scale, population growth peaked historically in the third quarter o f 
the twentieth century, at a rate of almost two per cent a year. In the last quarter o f  the century it fell 
back to 1.6 %. UN predictions yield a growth rate for the first quarter o f the 21s< century o f about
0.8% and for the second o f  0.4. By 2025-2050, then we would back at the 1750-1800 growth rate, 
with most probable prospects o f stagnation or decline.3
Europe led the way to higher long-term population growth and in Europe the UK. All through 
the nineteenth century the UK population, in spite o f imperial emigration, increased at an annual 
rate o f 1.2 per cent, with its high in the first half o f the century, at 1.3. But for Europe as a whole, 
population growth culminated in  th e  first decade o f th e  tw entieth c entury, about half a century 
before the world as a whole, at 1.0 percent for 1900-1913, also a period o f very extensive emigration 
(Livi-Bacci 1999, 174-5). The latter was part o f the reason for European population growth 
stopping at about half o f  the increase o f the poor world in the third quarter o f the twentieth century. 
But only a part, the family system was at least as important.
2 Ping-ti Ho, Studies on the Population o f  China, 1368-1953, Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 
1959. The population of China grew from about 150 million in 1700 to “perhaps” 313 in 1794 -  which would 
mean an annual increase o f almost 0.8 per cent-, and then to 450 in 1850. By 1953, when a more reliable 
census system had been re-established, a population of 583 million was counted.
Fhe sources for the above global calculations are, for the pre-1950 world populations the estimates by J.N. 
Biraben in Population 34 (1979) referred to by M. Livi-Bacci, A Concise History o f  World Population, 
Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, p. 31; for 1950 and later, UN, World Population Prospects, internet edition, 1998, 
medium variant, and Press Release POP/684 (October 1998); UN, Long-Range World Population 
Projections, internet edition 2000, table 1.
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If  and when we have family patterns in which the population no longer is reproducing itself, we 
have left the epoch o f “transition” from one supposed equilibrium into another one. A new 
demographic era o f non-catastrophic population decline is dawning, fam ines, epidemics, floods, 
and wars have taken their toll in the past, but that large populations by individual choice do not 
reproduce, is a major historical change. Signs the fact o f it are appearing, but they are not the first 
in modern times, and nobody knows yet if  the current ones will settle. It is not unlikely that they 
will, as the current below replacement fertility has been established, not like the previous one in a 
Depression, but in a prolonged period o f relative prosperity.
When and where did human populations start giving life to less than two children? The actual 
history is more complex than is usually assumed.
Table 1
The Em ergence of Below Reproduction Fertility1*
By 1929: Conjunctural and Finished  England & Wales
By 1930s Depression: Conjunctural and Finished  Belgium, Central Europe'1
Norway, Sweden
Hungary, Japan 
USA
North-western Europe,
West-Central Europe, Japan, 
Australia and Canada1’,
White South Africans 
All the rest o f Western Europe 
save Iceland, all Eastern Europe except 
Albania, Caucasus, China, South Korea, 
Singapore, Taiw an/Thailand, Cuba, 
Trinidad/Tobago.
Notes: a. Here the boundary is a total fertility rate of less than 2.0. War times are excluded.
b. Australia in the late 70s, and Canada in the early 80s.
Sources: J. -C. Chesnais, 'l'he Demographic Transition, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992; The W orld Bank, 
World Tables 1992, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992, national tables; UN, The World's 
Women 2000, online edition. These global data series, are checked with regional ones, and wherever the 
former sources deviate from the latter, the latter is used: W. Brass et al., The Demography o f  Tropical Africa, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1968; J.M. Guzman et al. (eds.), The Fertility Transition in Latin 
America, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996; R. Leete and 1. Alam (eds.), The Revolution in Asian Fertility, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993; J. C'leland, 'A Regional Review of Fertility Trends in Developing Countries: 
1960 to 1990', in W. Lutz (ed.), The Future Population o f the World, London, Earthscan Publications, 1994, 
pp. 55-82; South Africa: S. Ziehl , Families and Households in South Africa, in ? , p. 10.
The inter-war plunge o f Western European fertility turned out to be conjunctural, undone by the 
post-war boom. The beginning o f a secular decline into below replacement fertility may be located 
in Japan, although the first Japanese dive, in the mid-fifties, did briefly recover. After 1975 a 
general “W estern” decline set in, but soon halted in the United States, reverting to replacement 
fertility in 1990, on which level the country has, by and large, maintained itself since then. This is 
due to the fertility o f Hispanic and Afro-American women in the US, while non-Hispanic W hite 
women have on the average 1.85 child, still higher than EU women ( Hacker 2000) The decline 
was successfully resisted by Eastern Europe till the end o f Communism, after which birth rates 
collapsed. The last quarter o f the previous century also saw the set-up o f forceful and radical birth
Beyond “Transition”: Ageing and Dying Out
B y 1965 C onjunctural and  F inished
By 1975 C onjunctural and  F in ished  
B y 1975 and  Trend into 2000s
By m id-1990s and  Trend into 2000s
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control policies in East Asia, from Thailand to Korea. In the Caucasus and in the West Indies, the 
birth records are probably telling more about uncertain family prospects than about family 
planning. Below replacement fertility also reached south India in the 1990s, with Kerala having a 
fertility rate o f  1.8 already in 1991, and Tamil Nadu not far off, with one o f 2.2. (Singh 1999) In 
other words, despite all the still important institutional differences, the fertility outcomes between 
China, South India, and North-western Europe have become very similar -  and so they may have 
been in eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries.
Should these below reproduction birth rates continue, we would be leaving the demographic 
transition (to a new population equilibrium) and heading instead for a new era o f  population 
decline. Eastern Europe is already declining in population, and in Germany, Italy, and Sweden only 
immigration is preventing the population from falling. The EU as a whole is very close to that 
point, and so is Japan. The younger population structure o f East Asia and o f North America means 
that it would still take some time for the current birth rate to translate into a natural decline o f the 
population.
The United Nations Population Division has tried to make a “realistic” forecast to 2050, 
assuming migration (except into Japan) and an upward bend o f fertility in the second fourth o f  the 
new century. The most noteworthy o f this prognostic is a major demographic shift in the world. 
Europe is the big loser. In 1900 Europe housed a fourth o f  the w orld’s population, in 2000 one 
eighth, an in 2050 Europe is predicted to harbour only one sixteenth o f the human beings o f  the 
earth. Africa which till the mid-1990s had a smaller population than Europe may have one fifth of 
the planetary population in 2050, not far from three times as many as the whole o f  Europe. Major 
shifts are also likely among the major powers o f the 20'1' century. While the US population is 
anticipated to grow by eighty million in 1995-2050, Japan may lose twenty million, and the 
European Union forty million in the same period (UN 2000c, table 2; 2000d, table IV. 11).
Africa and the Different Processes o f Fertility Decline
The African family system is so far well above reproductive level fertility, and therefore absent 
from table 1. The unique African desire for children was still standing out on the eve o f the last 
quarter o f the twentieth cenlury.
Table 2
Desired number o f Children in Family Regions of the World.
Mid to late 1970s Unweighted averages.
Mean Range Per Cent Giving No
Sub-Saharan Africa 7.3 8.3-6.0 19.1
Arab-Muslim World 5.1 8.7-4.1 14.7
South Asia 4.1 3.9-4.2 11.0
Andean America 4.3 5.1-3.8 0.6
Caribbean 4.2 4.7-3.8 0.2
Southeast Asia 4.1 4.4-3.7 1.7
East Asia (Korea) 3.2 1.0
Reg ions; Sub-Saharan Africa: Benin, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Senegal, Arab- 
Muslim world: Egypt, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen; Andean America: 
nubia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru; Caribbean: Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti, 
Jamaica, Panama, 1 rinidad and Tobago, Venezuela; South Asia: Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan; Southeast 
vmj. Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand
Re-calculations from UN, Fertility Behaviour in the Context o f  Development, New York 1987, table
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The special position o f children in the African value system ol the 1970s is undei lined by the 
fact that the only other country with women wanting more children than the least natalist Black 
African country was Mauritania, a predominantly Arab-Berber country in the border region of 
North and Sub-Saharan Africa. As Sudan is also a border country (with a mean desire tor 6.3 
children), on ly  one fu lly  A rab- M uslim  country had a desirable tertility o n  p a r  w ith the low est 
African countries (Ghana and Lesotho), Syria with a mean wish for 6.1 children. I he fatalist 
abdication from any numerical wish, which yields a statistical understatement ol the num ber of 
children desired, is also very much African and Yemenite. If we take away Yemen and the two 
Arab-African border countries, on the average only five per cent o f the women of the five other 
Arab-M uslim countries had no idea o f desired family. However, towards the very end of the past 
century, African fertility began to move downwards.
Table 3
African Fertility Developments 1970 -1995/ 2000
TFR1995-2000 Change TFR Change
Angola 6.8
since 1970 
+0.4 Lesotho 4.8 -1.0
Benin 5.8 -1.0 Liberia 6.3 -0.2
Botswana 4.4 -2.5 Malawi 6.8 -1.0
Burkina Faso 6.6 +0.2 Mali 6.6 +0.1
Burundi 6.3 -0.1 Mozamb. 6.3 -0.4
Cameroon 5.3 -0.5 Namibia 4.9 -1.1
Centr. Afr. R ep.4.9 0 Niger 6.8 -0.3
Chad 6.1 +.0.1 Nigeria 5.2 -1.7
Congo/Bra. 6.1 +0.2 Rwanda 6.2 -1.6
Congo/Kin. 6.4 +0.4 Senegal 5.6 -0.9
Cote d'Ivoire 5.1 -2.3 Sierra L. 6.1 -0.4
Equ. Guinea 5.6 +0.6 Somalia 7.3 +0.6
Erirtrea 5.7 - South Afr. 3.3 -2.4
Ethiopia 6.3 +0.5 Swaziland 4.7' -1.8
Gabon 5.4 + 1.1 Tanzania 5.5 -0.9
Gambia 5.2 -1.3 'logo 6.1 -0.5
Ghana 5.2 -1.5 Uganda 7.1 0
Guinea 5.5 -0.7 Zambia 5.6 -1.1
Guinea B. 5.8 -0.1 Zimbabwe 3.8 -4.1
Kenya 4.5 -3.5
Sources: 1995-2000: UN, The World's Women 2000: Trends and Statistics, internet ed., table 2B; Angola 
and Guinea:, World Bank, World Development Report 1979, lable 18, referring to “ 1977”, which should 
probably no be taken as one unique year, given the dependence on infrequent surveys and estimates; 1970 all 
others: World Bank, World Tables 1902, national tables.
Usually, these figures are survey estimates, in several cases o f shaky reliability. W hile 
individual d ecimals h ad better b e t aken w ith s ome caution, a nd c hanges o f  a few d ecimals h ad 
better be taken as probable measurement errors, there are certain patterns discernible. There are two 
distinctive national cases o f strong fertility restriction, Zimbabwe and Kenya. Further, two broader 
regions o f  b irth c ontrol. S outhern A frica a s a w hole l s o ne, b eginning i n the 1960s a mong t he 
Blacks o f South Africa, who by the late 1980s had the lowest fertility rate in Black Africa, 4.6 
(Caldwell and Caldwell 1993, 236), as against 5.1-5.2 in Zimbabwe and Gabon (W orld Bank 1992). 
The second region o f decreasing birth rates is the West Coast, from Nigeria to Senegal, with a 
couple ol exceptions, and of lacunae of recent knowledge, a process starting in Nigeria and Ghana 
in the second half o f the 1980s, reaching the Francophone states in the 1990s.
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The rise o f births in Gabon is no statistical artefact, but a modern recuperation in a 20lh century 
low fecundity/high sterility Equatorial area, running from Northern Cameroon into Angola, 
including the Congos and the Central African Republic (Brass et al. 1068, 67ff, 177-8, 346-7).
Three regions still maintain high fertility, the most agrarian, the least proletarianized, the Sahel, 
the Lacustrine region in the East, and the Horn.
To gel a hold on what has happened recently, we have to take notice o f the fact, that the African 
family has at last been drawn into a global political process, which started in the 1950s, trans­
national family planning, birth control, population policy. Let us first draw the general framework 
o f this global pursuit and its relationship to the historical decline o f fertility.
Birth Control: Against the Stale, and For the State
We might sum up the long, winding, and complex world history o f mass fertility decline by 
highlighting three sets o f  variables: time, family system, and state-society relations in the process.
Table 4 
World Routes of Fertility Decline
F irst Wave (by 1930)
Process: Socio-cultural against the State
Family systems: Western European, European settler variant, Eastern European
In term edia te  (1930-1950)
Process: First Socio-cultural against the state, then with the state 
Family system: Japanese variant o f the East Asian
E arly  Second  W ave (1960s)
Variant A. Process: State developmental ism with cultural support
Family systems: Economically relatively developed East Asian, economically developed 
Southeast Asian, North African Arab-M uslim, Turkish-M uslim Socio-cultural 
M ovement with State Support
Variant B. Process: Socio-cultural Movement with State Support
Family System: Afro-Creole and Euro-Creole variants o f the Creole family system
M edium  Second  Wave (1970s)
Variant A. Process :. Socio-cultural Movement with State Support 
Family system: Iranian M uslim, Southern African
Variant B. Process: State developmental ism with socio-cultural resistance:
Family System: South Asian Hindu
Variant C. Process: State developmental ism with socio-cultural support
Family System: Less economically developed East Asian and Southeast Asian, G ulf
states Arab-Muslim, developed Indo-Creole variant o f the Creole family
L ate Second  Wave (1980s-)
Variant A.Process: State developmental ism with cultural resistance 
Family System: M uslim South Asian, Kenyan African 
Variant B. Process: Weak State push and cultural resistance: 
fam ily  System: Poor Muslim, most African, poor Indo-Creole
I he role of the state and the character o f the family system constitute the m ajor divides 
between the two historical intercontinental waves o f birth control. The first wave was everywhere 
igainst state policy, and was carried only by European family systems, with their core in Western 
Europe, their off-shoots under different conditions in overseas settlements, and, conversely, a rather
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different Eastern variant, affected by assimilating conditions. T h e  second had alw ays either th e  
active promotion or at least the benevolent support o f  the state. It finally covered all the remaining 
world family systems, but at least the South Asian and the African proved themselves capable ot 
strong resistance. In view o f widespread stereotypes, the relatively receptive reactions o f  Arab 
M uslim  fam ilies a nd o f n on-Arab W est A sian M uslims, from  T urkey t o I ran i s w orth noticing. 
Also in the second wave, the impetus for change sometimes came from the society o f  individuals 
and couples, rather than from the state, but then, opposite to the first wave, with the more or less 
active support o f the state.
The family system has been a crucial variable in both waves, but always operating in specific 
historical socio-political settings. The “demographic transition” is not a linear process o f 
individuals and couples on a certain level o f  mortality and socio-economic development, but a 
complex, historically situated social process, inserted in family systems, class relations, socio­
cultural movements, and states.
The sense o f mastery, crucial to decision-making about birth control, drew upon two major 
historical sources. A collective, and individualized, modernism was one, bred from high class, from 
social revolution, from  mass modernist movements, or from mass media. A state-induced c ivic 
opportunity-cum-obligation was the other, deriving from new economic developmentalist doctrines 
and, in some cases, from preoccupations with very high density o f population. Either way, the 
families o f the world changed crucially.
Africa and Global Family Planning
Kenya is the India o f Black Africa in terms o f family planning, the governmental pioneer and 
for long cautious and frustrated. The idea was developed by an outgoing colonial civil servant and 
got adopted by one o f  the leading politicians o f independent Kenya, Tom Mboya, M inister of 
Planning and Development , and launched as a policy program in 1967, with considerable foreign 
assistance, from Rockefeller's Population Council above all. President Kenyatta refrained from 
committing himself, and the whole program had a rather low domestic profile till the mid-1980s, 
under the Moi Presidency. No visible effects were discovered till the census o f 1989.4 Husbands, 
and males generally were for long hostile to birth control. One district study in the early 1970s 
found that most o f the women who dropped out o f the family planning program did so because o f 
opposition from clan or lineage elders.5 The dramatic size o f the decline o f the fertility rate, from 
7.7 in 1984 to 6.7 in 1989, from survey data, has been criticized for sampling bias,0 but the trend, 
upward since Independence like in India, had definitely turned at last.
The first major drop in sub-Saharan fertility occurred in Southern Africa and owed much more 
to wider spread education and health services, further helped by the separation o f couples through 
extensive male labour migration, than to specific public programs o f family planning. Zimbabwe 
and th e  m ore special c ases o f  Botsw ana, diam ond-rich, s mall population, very  extensive 1 abour 
migration, and the Black population o f South Africa led the way in bringing about a very 
substantial fertility decline between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s.7
Anglo-Saxon birth control clinics had been introduced already during the colonial government 
o f Rhodesia, and a developed network of pharmacies and health clinics provided contracqitives.
4A. Ajayi and J. Kekovole, Kenya's Population Policy: From Apathy to Effectiveness, in A. Jain (ed.), Do 
Population Policies Matter?, New York, Population Council, 1998. 113-56.
1 O. Odhiambo 1992, PhD Thesis University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. UMI 1995: 187.
0 A.-M. Jensen, Fertility -  Between Passion and Utility, Oslo, Oslo University Dept of Sociology and Human 
Geography, unpublished Dr. polit. Thesis 1992, pp. lOOff.
7 Survey data from UN, Human Development. Report 1999 op. cit, table Demographic Trends.
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The White minority government provided “ field educators” . By the late 1080s, about twice as many 
women in Zimbabwe as in Kenya were using contraceptives.H The Shona, the majority people of 
Zimbabwe, are very p a tr ia rc h a lb u t a strong (mainly Protestant) Christian missionary tradition o f 
schooling turned out more important. By 1960 at least half o f all girls were enrolled in primary 
schooling, and after Independence in 1980 a major educational drive brought full enrolment in a 
few years. In the late 1980s some third o f girls were in secondary education. The ZANU 
government also came to support family planning, like Botswana (Lestaeghe 1989, 488; Scribner
1995).
Botswana had  a parallel educational expansion, w ithout parallel i n B lack A frica. Kenya, fo r 
instance, which had a lead in primary education in 1980, stagnated afterwards. In 1990 the crucial 
secondary school enrolment in Kenya was less than half that o f Zimbabwe and Botswana. In West 
Africa, the economic and political crises after 1980 led to a decline in school enrolm ent in the 
ensuing decade (Scribner 1995, table 111; 3).
M ost o f Africa is, of course, not at risk o f being over-populated with regard to availability o f 
land, and the Francophone and Francophile elites were for long deaf to all family planning, in 
concordance with the French natalist tradition, as well as with Catholic doctrine (Caldwell 1966, 
165ff; Kokole 1994, 82). A couple o f the more stable and modestly prosperous Francophone 
countries have also had special reasons for being uninterested. Cote d ’Ivoire and Gabon have 
actually faced a scarcity o f labour, and particularly the former is heavily dependent on foreign 
migrant labour.
At Arusha in Tanzania in 1984 African government representatives, preparing the world 
conference on population in Bucharest, adopted a resolution, that, “Governments should ensure 
the availability and accessibility o f family planning services to all couples or individuals seeking 
such services freely or at subsidized prices” .10 In 1989 Nigeria launched a rather vigorous policy o f 
birth control “Four is enough!”— , and in the first half o f  1990s long reluctant governments, like 
those o f Senegal and Cote d 'Ivoire, began to promote contraception.11
Neither politically nor economically have most Africans had much reason to feel a new sense o f 
mastery after Independence. Children and kin have remained the most reliable source o f security in 
a brutalized world, where the winning lots have been few. Slowly, however, toward the end o f the 
century, education was accumulating, media images o f life-style options began to appear, and 
donor-aided governments supported fertility control.
The economic significance o f family planning, i.e., the significance o f the latter for issues o f 
well-being or poverty, should not be underestimated. From 1991 to 1999 sub-Saharan African GDP 
per capita (measured by purchasing power) declined by six per cent. If the continent had had a 
South Asian trajectory, while keeping its own modest path of economic growth per capita income 
would instead have increased by two per cent. With a Chinese population policy -  hardly
1 hirty-six percent in Zimbabwe as against eighteen in Kenya according to fertility surveys, O. Kokole, ‘The 
Politics o f Fertilty in Africa,’ in Finkle and McIntosh op. cit., p. 83; Jensen op. cit. p. 102. Other surveys have 
yielded the figures of 27 and 15 respectively. S. Scribner, Policies Affecting and Contraceptive Use. A 
Assessment oj Twelve Sub-Saharan Countries, Washington D. C., World Bank Discussion Papers, 1995,
p.39.
On the Shona, see further, A. Jacobsson-Widding, Chapungu: The Bird That Never Drops A Feather. Mate 
and Female Identities in African Society, Uppsala Acta Universitatis Uppsaliensis, 2000; D. Meekers, T he  
Noble Custom of Roora: the Maariage Practices of the Shona of Zimbabwe’, Ethnology XXXII (1993).
J C liamie, ‘ 1 rends, Variations, and Contradictions in National Policies to Influence Fertilty’, in Finkle and
Mcintosh op. cit. p. 43.
International Planned Parenthood Federation, Country Profiles, internet edition, 1999.
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compatible with the African family system, true - ,  African per capita income would have grown by 
nine per cent (calculations from UN, The Sta le  o f  the W orld P opulation 200 0 , internet ed., table 
A l)
Globally, the presence o f children is a very variable feature o f the human landscape. Around the 
turn o f millennium, children up to the age o f fifteen make up almost half o f  the population o f  
African countries, and forty per cent o f Asian populations from Pakistan to Syria, a third of India, 
Mexico, and Brazil, a fourth o f China and Korea, a fifth o f  North-western Europe and USA, and a 
sixth o f Central and Southern Europe (UN Statistics D ivision, Socia l Indicators, 2001.) However, 
fertility change lias now got going everywhere in the world, affecting all family types.
The twentieth century o f  the Christian or Common lira saw the historical peak o f population 
growth, in its third quarter, and it also contained a unique historical turn to deliberate, peace-time, 
below-reproduction fertility among the w orld 's leading countries. By early 21Sl century the world 
as a whole is heading back to a pre-1750 slow growth pattern o f human population. The era o f the 
demographic transition is closing.
The Institutional Meltdow n of Patriarchy
The power and the authority o f fathers have melted down -  if  not disappeared - ,  because their 
three major props have been seriously weakened, their control o f property, o f space, and o f culture.
Massive proletarianization and salarization have made access to land and cattle irrelevant, or o f 
marginal interest only, to a huge part of the human population. The development o f new transport 
means and routes, with the opening up o f New Worlds, and the rise o f big cities all over the world, 
have provided escapes from paternal power. Thirdly, the tremendous and rapid growth of 
knowledge, with far-reaching practical technical applications, and o f global power relations have 
seriously challenged the wisdom o f fathers and ancestors. The acquisition o f education and of 
“information” has overtaken the experience o f age.
The same processes, which strengthened the status o f sons and, with lags and qualifications, 
daughters, have also furthered the position the position o f wives, again with lags and qualifications.
However, these transform ations o f property, space, and culture relations have n o t only been 
distributed unevenly, in extension, depth, and  velocity, across the world. T hey  have confronted 
different family systems, yielding different impacts.
How much they have affected sub-Saharan Africa is difficult to pin down with numerical 
precision. The non-agrarian labour force is distributed somewhere between the two poles provided 
by the UNDP (2001, table 24), Zimbabwe with three fourths o f males and two thirds o f  women in 
industry and services, and Ethiopia with one tenth. De-agrarianization is thereby more advanced in 
Zimbabwe than in, say, Indonesia or Turkey— not to speak o f Bangladesh and Pakistan -, whereas 
the Ethiopian figure is almost as low as you can get.
Wage and salary workers comprise three fourths o f the economically active population in South 
Africa, about two thirds in Botswana and Namibia, but are still a minority in sub-Saharan Africa 
north o f  its southern part, a third o f the male labour force in Kenya, a fifth in Uganda, and less than 
a tenth in Benin and Ethiopia. In terms o f proletarianization, Kenya is similar to Indonesia and 
Pakistan, while Uganda is well ahead o f Bangladesh, which in turn is well above Ethiopia or Benin. 
(UN, The W orld's Women 2000, table 5E.)
By the end o f the 20lh century urbanites comprised a third o f the African population, about as 
much as in East Asia, somewhat more than in South Asia, if  the World Bank (2001, table 2) is to be 
believed.
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Literacy in sub-Saharan Africa is more widespread than in South Asia, mainly thanks to ex- 
British Africa. Youth literacy is equal to that o f the Arab states, and somewhat less gender-divided. 
Bui poor Last Asia is far more literate. (UNDP 2001, table 23).
It is well known that Africa is poorer than the rest o f the Third World, GDP per capita at 
purchasing power parities being about seventy per cent o f that o f South Asia (UNDP 2001, table 1). 
But the former is hardly behind the latter in the structural winds o f change.
The African Family and Institutional Pressures
The traditional Africa family, in all its main variants, was strongly patriarchal, if  historically not 
at all uniquely so. The backbone o f African patriarchy was the power o f  elders in societies where 
age, as a basis o f authority and solidarity, was more important than in the bulk o f Eurasia and of 
conquered America. There were variants o f matrdincality -  in which power was often invested in 
the maternal uncle. The were also significant female economic outlets from male patriarchy. But 
the general tendency was one o f male sexual superordination.
The colonial powers, on the whole, left, the African family institution in legal peace. Without 
much success they did provide for Christian alternatives o f monogamous “Ordinance M arriages”, 
as they were known in the British em pire.12 The French authorities tried to raise the marriage age, 
require bride consent, making marriage independent o f bridewealth payment, and, like the 
Belgians, to ban polygyny; to little avail (Philips and Morris 1971). The main result o f these 
colonial efforts was a complex legal pluralism, o f colonial statutory law, a wide ethnic palette o f 
“customary law”, and Islamic arid, in East Africa for instance, Hindu law.
This complexity forms the background to attempts at national legal unification and reform after 
independence. As far as family law is concerned, this process seems to have had two major waves. 
One was soon after independence, geared to national unification and modernity, nationalistically 
inspired and imperially guided.
The other one surged in the course o f  the 1980s and 1990s, having a global source o f inspiration, 
the UN Convention against All Discrimination o f Women (launched in 1979), a global rights 
model, and often working through global entanglements with LIN conferences, on family, on 
population, on women.
O f the first wave, the Ivory Coast Civil Code o f 1964 is perhaps the best example (Levasseur 
1976), flanked b y  anglophone vanguard projects in Ghana an d  Kenya (Philips and  M orris 1971; 
Law Faculty o f Ife 1964; Kuper and Kuper 1965). The second, much more powerful wave had its 
centre in Southern Africa, and in democratic South Africa (Eekelaar and Nhlapo 1998). Although 
key countries in W est and East Africa ratified the Convention earlier, in the mid-1980s (Kenya, 
1 anzania, Uganda, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal).
The Ivorian abolition o f polygyny seems to have been written in water (Clignet 1970; Scribner 
1995,30), and its Napoleonic matrimonial property regime would, if effective, reduce Ivorian 
female autonomy (Levasseur 1976, 206-7). The Ghanaian and the  Kenyan government bills got 
stuck already in the political process. There is clearly more clout in the recent Southern African 
egalitarianism, but the constitutional and legal thrust into ancient crusted customs and into 
generations o f violent male despair (Mathabane 1995) is still too new to warrant a fair judgem ent.
in the 19 70s only a couple of per cent of Ghanaian marriages were o f Ordinance type, Bergmann/Ferid
( rhana 1992, 25; Oppong 1980, 204.
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“Patriarchy” in a broad sense, pushed to the forefront by contemporary Feminism, including 
male supremacy over women, as well as fatherly power over children, may be dissected into three 
aspects pertaining to the institution o f  the family; aspects o f relations between generations, within 
couples, and among the sexes. For each o f these, some crucial indicators can be singled out, but in 
a global analysis they have to catch their net much wider than is usual in Western Feminism.
In this vein we shall approach patriarchy analytically as a sum or configuration o f a set of 
relations and practices. The ones below are those I have, so far, found most pertinent. As part o f a 
first, rough continental profile sketch, let us try to relate today's Africa to eacli o f these variables, 
for the purpose o f comparing it with the other major family systems o f  the world. (The following is 
more a bait for collegial discussion, than a conclusive scholarly generalization.)
Parent-child relations.
At its core, patriarchy refers to the domination o f the paternal generation over the child 
generation, and the latter's obligation o f obedience and service to the former. In the wider meaning 
used here, patriarchy will include also other forms o f first generation power, including that of 
mothers, mothers-in-law, and o f maternal uncles in matrilineal families.
a. Obedience and dependence.
Is there an institutionalized norm, perhaps even legally sanctioned, o f obedience to parents? The 
Confucian Chinese concept o f hsiao , “filial piety”, as the supreme family norm and inscribed in 
the imperial Penal Code was the strongest expression o f this duty o f  child obedience and respect. In 
modern times it entered legislation through the Code Napoleon and its spread in Europe and the 
Americas.
If the African family has a single supreme value, it is probably fertility, rather than any 
equivalent o f filial piety. However, respect for seniority is central to social systems, in which 
lineages and age-groups are core features o f the social structure, and deference to elders is a 
pervasive norm. Strict paternal and teacher discipline is also a frequent theme o f the 
autobiographical literature (e.g. Ba 1992: 249; Kenyatta 1938/1961: 9; Laye 1953/1997: 71-2; 
Mandela 1994: 5, 21; Nkrumah 1957: 11, 16-17; Odinga 1967: 11). True, these eminent gentlemen 
were children quite some time ago.
How the widespread custom o f foster parentage ties in with child obedience seems unclear to 
me, but there are no indications o f it meaning child freedom.
The norm of deference to parents is included in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights, in which paragraph 29 stipulates that one is obliged, “to respect his parents at all times, and 
to maintain them in case o f need”, and should be taken as a valid social norm (Goolam 1998, 373 
ft). Under influence o f  the UN Conventions, and internal democratization, South Africa is in the 
second half o f  the 1990s engaged in a legislative effort at establishing children's rights, but this is 
clearly a novel departure in  A frican norm ativity ( Sloth-Nielsen and  van Heerden 1998; G oolam
1998)
b. C hildren's marriages.
To what extent does the parent generation govern the family formation o f the child generation? 
Do parents arrange marriages? Do they at least have some veto power, in a norm o f parental 
consent? Or is the coupling o f the child generation a choice o f its own? Traditionally, among most 
African peoples the parental generation concluded marriages without much involvement o f their 
children, particularly not o f their daughters. But there are also known customs o f direct consent,
e.g., among the Ashanti (Rattray 1927), the Gikuyu (Kenyatta 1938/1961, 165ff, and in the modern 
interpretation o f customary law in Nigeria (Nwogugu 1974, 43). National statutory law has often
Patriarchy as a Set o f Variables -- and African locations in it
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introduced an explicit requirement o f the consent o f the marriage parties themselves, for instance in 
the Cote d Ivoire Civil Code o f  1964 or the Tanzanian Law o f Marriage Act from 1971.
Parental arrangem ent h a s  by a ll signs declined strongly, although i t  h a s  not disappeared, fo r 
instance, among the Hausa o f northern Nigeria (W erthmann 1997, 133 ff), or among the M inyanka 
o f Mali (Rondeau 194, 193-4).
Parental consent, on the other hand, still seems crucial, although sometimes circumvented. 
Apparently, African parents, and kin, still play a considerable role in marriage arrangements, 
through the still widespread norm o f bridewealth, and through other means (Lestaeghe 1989, 241; 
Potash 1995, 82ff; Rwezaura 1998, 186-7; Rondeau 1994, 193ff). Parental consent is apparently still 
a widely spread norm, if  far from always and everywhere obeyed. The Legal Age o f M ajority Act 
in Zimbabwe o f 1982, which made marriage without parental consent legally permitted, created an 
uproar among the chiefs (Folbre 1988, 74-5).
c. The Household o f Adult Children.
Does a new couple enter into an extended family household, headed by the parental generation? 
Alternatively, is there a norm o f  putting up the new household close to that o f either parental set o f 
the newly-wed? Or is neolocality the expectation? And what about caring for old and needy 
parents?
The predom inant traditional pattern, w as to  m ove in to  th e  h usband 's  fa ther's  household, and  
European neolocality was clearly a marginal exception. In spite o f urbanization, the persistent 
economic crises seem to have reproduced extended households o f various sorts. For Black South 
Africa, for instance, with its high degrees o f proletarianization and urbanization, Ziehl (2001?, 
table 8 .2) r eports 4 5% o f  h ouseholds b eing e xtended. In t he v ast c ontinental c ountryside, t hese 
extended families are still the rule (cf. W eisner et al. 1997) The extended family is the major social 
safety net in Africa (Sokolovsky 2000; W eisner 1997), although loss o f  respect for and neglect o f 
elders are also found (Cattell 1997; Bradley 1997, both reporting from rural Kenya).
African households in the mid- to late 1980s reportedly most often comprised an average o f 2.7 
adults per household, lower in Uganda (2.4), higher in Burundi and Liberia (3.0), and, above all, 
Senegal (4.4). The African average was actually somewhat lower than those o f North Africa, 
Southeast Asia, and Andean Latin America. (Ayad et al. 1994, table 6.2) How comparable these 
fertility survey data and household definitions are across monogamous and polygynous family 
systems, is not yet clear to me, though.
A further aspect o f the householding o f grown-up children is the location o f youth . Do the 
youngsters leave their parental home only to get married -  apart from institutional leave o f absence 
at schools in loco parentis or in the army? Or is there a period o f independent young, single living? 
This is currently a major divide between Northern and Southern European families.
To my knowledge there are no systematic, general African data on this. From the general 
family set-up one may suspect, that single householding is quite limited. True, there are reports o f 
the emergence of single living in some cities o f the 1960s and 1970s, such as Abidjan (Levasseur 
1976: 330ff) and Accra (Oppong 1980: 205ff). The possible time-span o f independent youth is 
variable, as the age o f  marriage varies considerably across the African continent, though, 
something which we shall come back to below.
he patriarchality o f these extended households may vary, including some matriarchs, - urban 
ack South African households, for instance, have a matrifocal tendency (Caldwell and Caldwell 
993, 293 ), similar to that o f the US ghettos - but on the whole it seems to be fair bet, that power is 
vested in senior males. In matrilineal or bilateral societies, that role is then played by a maternal 
uncle or a brother (Potash 1995, 77 ff; Jacobson-W iddmg 1992).
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In summary, with regard to parent-child relations, Africa on the threshold o f  the 21s' century is 
still a continent o f  patriarchy, although there is more freedom of marriage than in South Asia.
Coupling
M ale-female coupling has two dimensions pertinent to patriarchy. One refers to the social- 
emotional importance o f  the conjugal bond, its extension o f activities, its intensity o f attachment. 
The other to the internal structure o f coupling. The two dimensions can vary, and have historically 
varied, independently o f each other, although in m odem  times there is a tendency towards 
clustering. The north-western European family is the one most focused on the male-female couple, 
and also the one most committed to egalitarianism. The African, and particularly the W est Coast 
African family is something o f a global diagonal to the north-western European, with a very 
blurred conjugal focus and with a clearly asymmetrical internal structure o f  power. The Arab- 
M uslim and the Asian family systems have considerably weaker conjugal ties than the European, 
but, on the whole, stronger than the African.
In part, the two dimensions compensate for each other, the most intensive and extensive bond 
having the stronger egalitarian tendencies, the more segregated and detached relations o f  coupling 
being more hierarchical.
W ith regard to the structure o f male-female coupling, there are three major aspects pertinent to 
analyses o f patriarchy.
a. Sexual asymmetry.
Polygny and concubinage, a man having two or more wives, alternatively a wife and one or 
more concubines or “minor w ives”, is the most explicit form o f sexual asymmetry in coupling.13 
Sexual double morality is another, slightly weaker version. It may be institutionalized and even 
legalized with regard to mistresses and “kept wom en” and their offspring, is another manifestation, 
or just expressed in different norms o f extra-marital or pre-marital sex.
In this respect, Africa is above all the w orld's centre o f  polygyny. It is not unique, as M uslim 
law allows polygyny, but the prevalence is incomparably high.
Table 5
Polygyny in Certain Arab, Asian and African Countries in the 1970s-late 1980s
Per 100 married men Per 100 married women
Algeria 2
Egypt 4
M orocco 6.6 5
Sudan 17
Syria 2
Tunisia 0.5
Yemen 7.0
Pakistan 5
Burkina Faso 38
Burundi 12
Cameroon 24 39
1 ’Polyandry, a woman with two or more husbands, is a rare family form, which may be found in Tibet and in 
the Himalaya region, for instance. It is not all to be considered the inverse of polygyny, or to be confounded 
with the constellation of an entertainment star and her circle of lovers. The husbands are not chosen by the 
wife, and the power in polyandry usually rests with the elder husband, and other(s) is/are normally his 
younger brother(s).
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Table 5 cont’d
Ghana 
Kenya 
Liberia 
Mali 
Namibia 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe
Sources: Arab nations: Ph. Fargues, The Decline of Arab Fertility, Population 44:1 (1989) table 4, corrected 
for the Sudanese figure according to Fargues' own source: International Statistical Institute, World Fertility 
Survey, The Hague 1981; women in polygnous unions in African nations, Morocco, and Pakistan, surveyed 
in 1986-92: Ch. W estoff e t al., Marriage and Entry into Parenthood, Calverton M d, M aero Intemational, 
1994, table 3.5; Zimbabwe: S. Scribner, Policies Affecting Fertility and Contraceptive Use, World Bank 
Discussion Papers no.259, Washington D.C. 1995: 31, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Senegalese men: I. Spezier, 
Men, Marriage, and Ideal Family Size in Francophone Africa, Journal o f Comparative Family Studies 1999; 
Men in Cameroon and in Senegal 1976: Lesstaeghe 1989: 215.
Even with a certain margin o f  error, surveying and cross-cultural, the stark difference between, 
say, Catholic African Burundi, or the Christian ha lf o f  Ghana, where a fourth o f Christian women 
were in polygamous unions (Klomegah 1997: 83), and M uslim Arab Yemen or Egypt, is clear. 
Today, polygyny i s, above a ll else, an A frican institution, recently  legitim ized b y  th e  advanced 
egalitarian South African legislation (Nhlapo 1998: 633), although a rare formal practice there.
Polygyny also goes together with a whole palette o f informal asymmetrical sexual relations, 
often with fancy designations, like the W est African “deuxieme bureau '’, literally second office, but 
a classical code word for the French secret service, “outside w ives”, or “second house”.
In regard to institutionalized sexual asymmetry, Africa is sui generis.
b. Gender hierarchy.
The classical patriarchal family had decisive power clearly vested in the husband -  and/or his 
father— , to whom the wife owed submission and obedience. Hierarchical coupling and family 
formation are expressed in the concept o f the “head o f the family”, who is normally male. 
Normative male superiority is often further buttressed by a considerable age difference between 
groom and  bride. The strongest form  o f  m ale dom ination o f  the couple relation is  arguably the  
Muslim rule o f talaq, o f  an unhindered, exclusively male right to unilateral divorce. A similar right 
to “oust wife” existed also in imperial China.
A male-female hierarchy is pervasive in the African tradition, like all major family traditions. It 
is generally buttressed by the important, widespun kinship networks -  but also mitigated and 
complicated by the latter -, and by local rule by elders and chiefs. However, this hierarchy is more 
complicated and more variable than Asian family systems. Among the very masculinist patrilineal 
East and Southern African populations, the bridewealth institution, which is still operating, means 
that daughters are assets to their fathers -  instead o f just more or less costly liabilities in classical 
East and South Asia -, and wives a considerable investment to husbands. As a prominent South 
African lawyer has put it: “the whole [ African] marriage drama is premised on the notion that the
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m an's fam ily are  th e  supplicants and  th e  w o m an ’s people the holders o f  pow er” (N hlapo 1998, 
623). That is almost symmetrically the opposite o f  the contemporary Indian dowry relationship.
The complex and conflictual male supremacy in Africa is illustrated by the remarkable Creation 
M yth o f the Gikuyus. Gikuyu, the First Man, had nine daughters and no sons, but the Divider o f  the 
Universe was moved to provide him with nine young men, who married his daughters. The women 
ruled a first society o f nine maternal clans, oppressing the men. The men then banded together, 
made a 11 the w omen p regnant at the s ame t ime, a nd w hen the latter w ere no 1 onger capable o f  
fighting due to their advanced pregnancy, the men made revolution. The men took power, 
established themselves as the heads o f families, and changed the name o f the nation to the paternal 
Children o f Gikuyu. However, the women made a last stand over the clan names, threatening to kill 
all male children, and to refuse to bear any more. In front o f  this threat, the males conceded on this 
single point, and the clans continued to bear the names o f the nine daughters o f Gikuyu (Kenyatta 
1938/1961, 3ff>.
M ost African customary family law places adult women firmly under male guardians, usually 
the husband, i.e., as legal minors. (Cf. Cotran 1968; Philips and Morris 1971; Stewart and 
Armstrong 1990) Post-colonial national law maintained a discriminatory stance against women. 
For instance, in the late 1980s, N igeria women had to secure the permission o f their father or their 
husband to get, a passport, a bank loan, a scholarship or custody rights over her children (Nwabara 
1989:9).
Only in recent years is statutory law trying to change this, with the Zimbabwean Legal Majority 
Act o f 1982 one o f the first o f social significance. In the mid-1990s, with the democratization o f 
South Africa, a vigorous movement towards legal gender equality asserted itself in Southern Africa 
(Eekelaar and Nhlapo 1998) In the Francophone states, however, Napoleonic stipulations o f the 
wifely duty o f  obedience have sometimes been put onto the statutes recently, as in §32 o f the Mali 
Personal Status Act o f 1987 (Bergmann and Fend 1998, Mali, p. 25).
In W est and Central Africa adult gender relations are much complicated by matrilineal descent, 
which in itself did not preclude male supremacy, but it weakened the power o f the husband and the 
father considerably, and maternal uncles could seldom compensate for that. Furthermore, even 
among patrilineal W est Coast peoples, such as the Yoruba and the Igbo, or even among the sterner 
patriarchs o f the Hausa and the Fulani, married women are not thrown out o f their fathers’ lineage, 
as in East Asia and northern India, but can count on the support o f their own kin (cf. Caldwell
1996).
Obliquely, the African marital hierarchy has been cut into by recent national legislation on 
w idow s' inheritance rights. Linder customary law, widows normally inherited nothing from their 
husbands. In patrilineal societies, his male descendants were the normal heirs, in matrilineal ones 
his brothers or, for lack o f them, his nephews (e.g., Obi 1966, 332 ff, on inheritance in Southern 
Nigeria). Ghana’s 1985 Intestate Succession Law, for example, made the surviving spouse the 
primary heir (Oheeba-Sakyi 1999: 166 ff). In 1996 a gathering o f Zimbabwe Chiefs came to a 
similar conclusion (Stewart 1998, 222).
M ass polygyny is made demographically possible by men marrying much later than women. In 
this age difference there is also a gender hierarchy, betv/een a more experienced male and a less 
experienced female, underlined in very age-grade conscious societies. Studies o f conjugal decision­
making have also found a significant impact o f the age relation o f the spouses (e.g., on Accra upper 
middle class couples, Oppong 1970, table 1). In the 1990s the age difference at first marriage o f 
men and women is highest in the world in the Sahel and in the W est Coast states, ranging from 
about nine years in Gambia and Burkina Faso to six years in Chad and Niger, in Nigeria on the 
average about seven years. In Hausaland and generally in the Sahel, girls still marry in their teens 
to men seven-to-nine years older (UN 2001; Heaton and Hirschl 1999). Compared to the mid-late 
1970s there has been a certain decrease o f the age gap in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as in Saharan
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and Northern Africa and Muslim South Asia, the regions with the largest gaps (cf. Casterline et al. 
1986, table 1).
c. Gender Autonomy.
African family systems have shown that hierarchy and autonomy may vary independently o f 
each other, because o f the flexibility o f the conjugal bond, or o f the porosity o f the couple 
relationship. In W est Africa, in particular, polygyny and male-female legal hierarchy are often 
combined with a great amount o f wifely economic autonomy and independence. The wives have 
each their own household and plot o f  land, and by tradition many W est African women are 
formidable traders, usually in full control o f their business and their earnings (Caldwell 1996).
The traditional wifely autonomy, working her (allotted) plot o f  land or plying her trade, has 
been transposed also to the urban salariat. About a sample o f Accra civil servants in the 1960s, it 
could be said: “ ...few couples were spending, saving, or owning property together” (Oppong 1971, 
184). No scholarly report on the European family could ever have said that.
However, along the Afro-European diagonal o f weak bonding/strong hierarchy-strong 
bonding/weak hierarchy there is a noteworthy rapprochement o f Scandinavian and West Coast 
African gender autonomy.
At the beginning o f the last third o f the 20th century, Scandinavian countries began a practice o f 
individual taxation, making for economic autonomy within marriage. At the other end o f a 
continuum, the wife is completely dependent on her husband,— or “m erged” as in the old Common 
Law tradition, — dependent on his income, and having to have his permission to do anything 
outside the home, as in the Napoleonic law tradition o f Latin Europe and Latin America.
West Coast African autonomy is primarily socio-economic, neither legal (see above) nor sexual 
or procreative. At least until very recently, decisions about family reproduction were firmly in male 
hands (Caldwell and Caldwell 1996, 343).
Gender Sacrifice
Male supremacy in sexual and family relations has also given rise to various forms o f female 
sacrifice, o f  which a comparative overview can only hope to touch physical-material aspects, not 
the frequent social and psychological ones.
There are two aspects here, one corporeal, the other material. The former cover a range over the 
life-course from female infanticide or fatal neglect o f female infants, via aesthetic cruelty, such as 
the classical Chinese custom o f foot-binding, and sexual mutilation, to daughter-in-law 
maltreatment, and widow immolation. The latter focuses on the rights o f  inheritance, or not, o f 
daughters.
In varying forms o f severity female circumcision is a widespread practice in Africa in a broad 
belt from Senegal (though not among its main ethnic the Wolof) via northern Nigeria, 
contemporary Central African Republic to the Horn, and with an eastern north-south extension 
from Tanzania to Egypt, including the Copts (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1997, 206-7). Infibulation, the 
worst form— involving excision o f the entire clitoris, the labia minora and maiora, and the sewing 
up o f the remnants o f the labia maiora— is concentrated to pastoralist or agro-pastoralist peoples in 
a narrower and shorter belt from Chad to Somalia and Eritrea (Hicks 1996) Only recently has sexual 
mutilation come under attack and into legislative initiative in Africa.
Sexual violence is difficult to document in a systematic fashion, but it is certainly an expression 
ot abuse o f women as sacrificial objects. The violent despair and uprootedness spawned by the 
apartheid regime seem to have made widespread sexual violence endemic in South Africa (Mama 
October 2001, oral communication; cf. the chilling three-generation story o f M athabane 1995).
19
Veiling and female seclusion have caught on in Muslim Africa south o f the Sahara only patchily 
and partly. It is important among the upper classes o f Northern Nigeria, above all, without making 
extra-domestic economic activities impossible (W erthmann 1997). African Muslims are, in this 
respect, more similar to their Southeast Asian co-religionists than to their pious Arab neighbours or 
to the north Indian practitioners o f purdah.
Female infanticide is an old North Indian and Chinese custom. Suspect gender ratios have for 
long been known in northern India, and have re-emerged with birth control in China and in South 
Korea. T h e  African bridewealth system makes such a practice meaningless, and it seems to be 
unknown. African widows, in contrast to traditional South and East Asian sisters, have always been 
eminently remarriable, often inherited by a brother o f the deceased. N or have African divorcees 
been pushed out o f the marriage market.
On the other hand, African customary law usually made daughters go without inheritance. In 
colonial times, Yoruba law in Nigeria was changed into giving daughters inheritance rights, 
including to land. But that was unique in Nigeria, where otherwise only sons inherited their fathers, 
and matrilineal fathers were inherited by their brothers or their nephews (Obi 1966, 332ff), and on 
the whole in Africa, daughters did n o t inherit their fathers, who usually held th e  wealth o f  the  
parental generation (Goody 1976, 5ff; Cotran 1968; Stewart and Armstrong 1990). To the extent 
that its believers followed Islamic law, the latter represented an advance o f daughters' rights in 
Africa, allowing them at least half o f  the share o f sons. Only with the recent wave o f anti- 
discriminatory legislation is a gendered equalization o f inheritance coming into sight.
The daughters o f  Africa have had to make painful sacrifices to male power, but, at least outside 
the infibulating Horn, less so than many Asian women.
Patriarchy in 2000 C.E.
By 2000, familial patriarchy has, by and large, been successfully tom  down in Europe and in the 
European overseas settlements o f  the New Worlds, much less so in Japan. The very different 
timing indicates that successful industrialization and economic growth are not adequate causes o f 
explanation. Legal equality o f spouses was established after W orld W ar I in the Soviet Union and 
in the Nordic countries. Substantive progxess, but short o f  complete equality, was also made in the 
1920s in the UK, the US, and in the British Dominions.
After W orld W ar II, the Communists established legal equality in Eastern Europe and in China, 
and the American occupation in Japan. But free choice marriages gained the upper hand in Japan 
only gradually, among men and women bom  after the war (Natsukari 1994, 143). In West 
Germany— despite the stipulation o f the 1949 Constitution and a first marital equality law o f  1957—  
and in the Napoleonic law countries o f  Western and Southern Europe, legal gender equality was 
not established till 1976.14 In the US the last remnants o f  state law male supremacy were ruled 
unconstitutional only in the 1970s, and by then British common law opinion had also finally come 
round to equality (Therbom  1995 ch. 6; 1999 ch.6). In Latin America, in spite o f recent revisions 
there are still explicit legal manifestations o f patriarchy, for example in Argentina and Colombia 
with admonitions o f child obedience, in Brazil with a clause emphasizing that the husband is the 
head o f the family, in Uruguay (and till 1994, Chile) with wives told to obey their husbands. Federal
l4Upon prodding the Constitutional Court, the West German parliament in 1957, eights year after the 
Constitution, passed a gender law on equal rights into its family law, which included the clause (§1356): 
“The w ife... has the right to work outside the household (erwebstatig) to the extent that this is compatible 
with her duties in marriage and family.” Only in 1976 a reformed law stated: “The spouses have the right to 
work outside the household.” (Helwig 1982: 121-2).
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Mexican, and Peruvian family legislation, on the other hand, are now egalitarian (Ferid and 
Bergmann 1989-92; Fries and M atus 1999: 110).
East Asia generally, China in particular, and Eastern Europe are the areas o f most radical 
change in the 20th century. Political action was crucial here, Communism in China and in Eastern 
Europe, the American postwar reconstruction o f Japan, also affecting South Korea and Taiwan. 
Post-colonial independence, while usually putting equality on statute books, has clearly been less 
effective. Most change took place in the second half o f the century only, and in the Code Napoleon 
countries o f Europe and America mainly in the last third.
North-western Europe and its overseas off-shoots were the least patriarchal part o f  the world in 
1900, and they are so in 2000. The remaining patriarchal blot in 2000 refers to w om en's remaining 
dependence on husband's income, as expressed in still strongly gendered employment rates 
outside Scandinavia. Recent egalitarian legislation and socio-cultural change in Latin Europe and 
America notwithstanding, there is more extended family living and there appear to be more marital 
hierarchy and sexual asymmetry than in the North.
After the transformation o f  Confucian China, the three most patriarchal cultures o f the world 
are, South Asian Hinduism (and Islam) -  in spite o f formal equality legislation in India-W est 
Asian/North African Islam, and Sub-Saharan Africa, especially outside or only on the margin o f the 
influence o f the two m id-Eastem  world religions. At this point at least, the comparative measure is 
too crude to allow any strong argument about an internal ranking o f these three. But their distance 
to the North Atlantic area is clearly substantial. M ost peoples o f the African West Coast have since 
ancient times a remarkable combination o f strong male superiority and wifely autonomy, 
manifested in a vibrant female trading tradition, and in the wife, or wives, having a household and a 
budget o f her own.
Cultural globalization is likely to continue containing and producing tensions and conflicts about 
gender and generation relations in the world.
On the other hand, there is also, at the end o f the 20th century, a remarkable global politics o f 
gender, intertwining global egalitarian efforts, through the UN machinery, national symbolic 
politics, local action, and national-local clientelism. On paper, the UN C onvention  on the 
Elimination o f All Forms o f Discrimination Against W omen was a great success. By March 2000 it 
had been ratified by all countries o f the world, except Afghanistan, Sao Tome and Principe, and the 
United States (UN 2000b, table 6B). In the 1990s gender politics became a high-profile symbolic 
politics in many Third World countries, including military regimes. Pace-setters in Africa were the 
“First Ladies” o f N igerian miltary dictators Babangida, Abacha, and (with more restraint and more 
seriousness) Abubakar. M rs Rawlings o f  Ghana, among others, followed the example (Mama
1999).
The erosion o f patriarchy and the de-institutionalizing o f sexuality are what a conservative 
social writer like Francis Fukuyama (1999) has called "The Great Disruption”. Like many o f his 
mind Fukuyama wants to see a patriarchal marriage as inscribed in a biological order, now 
perversely disrupted by female autonomy, through the pill and through access to the labour market. 
Putting “kinship and family in a biological context” then means an interpretation o f the family in 
terms strikingly similar to the feudal conception o f the lord-peasant- relationship, o f the lord 
protecting his nurturing peasants: “The family bond .. is based on an exchange o f the w om an's 
fertility for the m an 's resources. ... historically, the institution o f marriage existed to give legal 
protection to the mother-child unit . . . ” (Fukuyama 1999: 101). For the proper feudal image o f 
landlord-peasant protection and exchange see the great conservative German medievalist Otto 
Brunner (1943).
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The Secularization and the Spatial Divergence of Sex and M arriage
Marriage is the key institution regulating human sexuality. It should therefore be analyzed 
sociologically as a “sex-marriage com plex” o f behaviour and o f norms. In view o f a great deal of 
recent writing on the topic, a proper understanding o f  what is happening to sex and marriage had 
better start by underlining the enduring centrality o f marriage, and more generally o f  long term 
heterosexual coupling, in human societies.
The Historical Importance of M arriage
Marriage is still an almost universal aspiration and achievement. For people born around 1950 
we have global data for people ever married by the age o f 45-49, i.e., by the end o f female fertility. 
Among the 199 politically delimited territories, the only ones in which less than two thirds o f 
women had been married by the end o f their fertility were Caribbean countries and dependent 
territories, products o f plantation o f slavery and indentured labour, giving rise to what I have called 
the Affo-Creole family. In Jamaica, for instance, only 54 per cent had ever married, in Barbados 
60, in Guyana 62 per cent.15
Outside the Caribbean and Southern Africa, some small other (mainly Pacific) islands apart, the 
only countries with less than ninety per cent o f their women ever married were, on one hand some 
South American ones harbouring “Indo-Creole” families, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, and 
on the other two Nordic ones Finland and Sweden. All these had a marriage rate around 85 per 
cent. For the rest o f  the world, the proportions married resemble electoral results in dictatorships, 
US 93.9, UK 95.1, Japan 95,4, Spain 91.9, Russia 96.5, Egypt 98.6 , Brazil 92.0, China 99.8, India 
99.3, Indonesia 98.5. Representative African examples include: Cote d 'Ivoire 99.3, Ethiopia 99.1, 
Nigeria 97.8, Tanzania 99.3, Zimbabwe 99.4. (UN Population Division 2000: United Nations at 
www .un.org./news/A.V
On th e  w hole, A frica h as  belonged to the v ast w orld  regions o f  virtually universal m arriage 
(Brass et al 1968, 201-2). However, in recent times Africa also includes some deviants, above all in 
Southern Africa, although the Gabon figure o f  90.6 also indicates a marriage rate below the 
universal. Botswana in 1991 had a marriage rate o f women at 45-49 in between the Caribbean and 
the Scandinavian, at 77.6. The Botswana rate o f non-marriage o f the 1990s is similar to the 
Scandinavian one o f  the 1930s. Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland had about a tenth o f their 
women unmarried at the end o f their fertile period, resem bling Europe west o f the Trieste-Saint 
Petersburg line in 1900 (cf. Hajnal 1953). The reason for the limits to marriage in Southern Africa 
most likely derives from the disruptions caused by long-distance male labour migration.
W estern Europe in the 1990s was still in a period o f rapprochement to the pattern o f  almost 
universal marriage characterizing the rest o f the world, except the Creole Americas, and most 
closely to the partem prevailing in Greece and Hungary around 1900, where four per cent o f women 
were unmarried by the age o f 45-49 (Hajnal 1963). Lain American nuptiality is also at a historically 
high level, from a hemispheric median o f 19 per cent o f women never m arried going to down to 9 
in 1980 (Zavala de Cosio 1996, 104), where it has remained.
At the other end o f the spectrum, Asian marriages have come down somewhat, in (South) 
Korea from 100% in 1930 to 99 in 1990, in Japan from 98 in 1920 to 95 seventy years later, while 
the Egyptian stayed around 99 since 1947 (Hajnal 1963, 104; UN 2001a) In Bangkok in 1990 sixteen 
per cent o f  women aged 40 to 44 were unmarried (Jones 1997, 57)
15For many similar Caribbean islands and countries, the figures available are a bit o f target, as they include 
non-married cohabitation. Then 91 per cent of Dominican women and 99 of their Haitian neighbours have 
“married”.
22
Research Review  Supplement 15 (2004) 1-32
The Contraction and the Secularization o f Marriage: Age, Cohabitation, and Divorce
The space o f marriage is contracting through the rise o f  the marriage age. The age o f first 
marriage is going up virtually everywhere in the world, although in Ireland the female age o f 
marriage had only reached back to its 1941 high level, 28.7 years, in 1996 (Hajnal 1953, 120; UN 
2001). Indeed in countries characterized or strongly influenced by the classical m odem  north­
western European family system, the marriage age is now returning to previous peaks, after 
declining for most o f  the 20th century. In England and V/ales the average age o f marriage for 
women in 1930 was 25 years, an old historical level there, declining to 22.6 in 1971, then moving 
upwards, to .26.9 in 1995 (Halsey 2000, 58). The American median age o f first m am age, for 
instance, went down from 22 (for women) to 20 between 1950 and 1960, standing at 25 in 2000 (US 
Census Bureau 2001).
The mean female age at first marriage (SMAM) has risen in Japan from 21 in 1920 to 25 in 1960, 
and to 27 in 1990; in China from 19 in 1955 to 22 in 1990, in India from 14 in 1901 to 16 in 1961, and 
to 19 in 1991 (then one o f the rather few countries o f the world still marrying women in their teens) 
in Egypt from 20 in 1960 to 22 in 1995; in Morocco from 17.5 to 26 between 1960 and 1995; in 
Mexico from 20 to 22 between 1960 and 1990. In Brazil the average age was then almost 23.
Africa seems to follow this pattern, although exact, and longer, time series are often lacking. 
Since the 1950s the female age at first marriage in Guinea has risen from 16 to 19 in 1990, in Niger 
from 15 to 18. In Burundi it has stayed at 22. In Congo/Kinshasa and in M ozambique it may have 
declined though. From around 1980 to the early 1990s the marriage age rose in Nigeria from 19 to 
20, in Cote d 'Ivoire from 19 to 21, in Zimbabwe from 20 to 21, and in Botswana from 26 to 27, the 
same age as in South Africa then. (Xenos and Gultiano 1992, appendix table 1; Rashad and Khadr 
1999; Zavala Cosio 1996: 104; UN 2001; UN, Statistics and Indicators on Women in Africa 1989; 
Lestaeghe 1989 table 6.16)
There appears to  be a certain  convergence among the African countries. T h e  later marrying 
peoples o f Southern Africa and Burundi-Rwanda now diverge less from the rest. The Sahel and 
Uganda still marry their daughters in their teens, leaving them little youth before their wifely roles.
Secularization o f m am age manifests itself m ost clearly in informal cohabitation. Such 
‘consensual unions’ were historically an old, widespread phenomenon among blacks, 
mulattoes/mestizos, and uprooted Indians in the Americas, and was quite frequent among the 
European working-classes o f  nineteenth century big cities. Such unions were generally those o f the 
poor and the peripheral, and in Europe they had declined strongly in the course o f he 20th century.
The new, ‘respectable’, socially central cohabitation, still largely a European/North 
American/Oceanic phenomenon started in the 1970s. In the form o f a b rief trial marriage it had 
even reached a European royal dynasty and its succession to the throne in 2000, when the 
Norwegian Crown Prince announced that he was moving in with his beloved whom he duly 
married a year later). In North-western Europe informal cohabitation made up between a fifth 
(Britain) and a fourth (Sweden and. Denmark) o f all couples in 1995 (Eurostat 2000: 48; Halsey 
2000: 60; SCB 1993). In this, religiously the most secularized part o f  the world, informal 
cohabitation has become the predominant form o f first coupling.
Elsewhere among European settlements, the secularization o f marriage is much more limited, hi 
%  ten per cent ot Australian couples were informal (Australian Bureau o f Statistics 2000), in 
100 about six per cent o f  US couples were reported cohabiting (which may be a certain 
estimation, US Census Bureau 2000, online report P20-537), in Spain in 1995 only two per
cent (Perez-Diaz et al. 2000: 14).
Africa, the line between marriage and non-marriage unions has often been more blurred than 
core areas ot the world religions, largely because o f the often long drawn-out and
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complicated bridewealth negotiation and payment process. Colonial authorities also tended to treat 
unions according to customary law as something less than a m arriage.16 However, there is a 
uniquely careful Belgian colonial census o f  the Congo in 1956-57, which distinguished “de facto 
unions” from all others, by having no bridewealth paid and no ceremony held. Such unions then 
constituted eight per cent o f all Congolese unions. They were apparently prim arily trial marriages, 
o f  a kind which thirty-forty years later has become similarly frequent in France ad other countries 
o f  W estern-Central Europe. A th ird  o f  teen-age w om en in  unions in  Leopoldville lived in such  
informal cohabitation, and a fifth o f women at the age o f 20-24, falling down to ten per cent in the 
next age category, but then never going below six per cent (Brass et al. 1968: 213).
In Congo, cohabitation was clearly established on a significant scale at least ten-fifteen years 
earlier than in Scandinavia (cf. Trost 1981). Here is a significant rift in African patriarchy, as well 
as an informalization o f marriage, which at least in large part probably derives from the 
m atrilineality o f  m any Congolese peoples.
In the mid-1970s, M eyer Fortes (1978: 29) reported from W est Africa: “Consensual, free and 
casual unions from which children result are o f wide occurrence”, which by then m ight be said 
about Denmark and Sweden, but hardly about the rest o f Europe. In East Africa, a Tanzanian White 
Paper o f 1969 took account o f  a significant rise o f  informal cohabitation, suggesting that family law 
should recognize such unions (Rwezaura 1998: 78). This was about the same time that the Swedish 
legal apparatus began to pay attention to the issue.
The 1980/81 Fertility Survey o f Cote d 'Ivoire found a very high proportion o f coupling starting 
as informal cohabitation, but also a great ethnic variation. Among the matrilineal Akan and Kru 
sixty and forty per cent, respectively, began their first union as informal cohabitation whereas about 
twenty per cent o f the patrilineal M ande did (Gage-Brandon 1993: 223).
South African knowledge about family relationships was until recently ham pered both by the 
legal non-recognition o f  customary African marriage and by the secretiveness o f  the apartheid 
regim e (Caldwell and Caldwell 1993). Flowever, data from the 1991 census, showing an eighth o f 
people in unions cohabiting (Ziehl 2001), indicates a pattern similar to W estern or North-western 
Europe.
M arriage has been extended by the strong decline o f adult mortality and by the increased 
longevity o f  older people. But tn the most recent years that tendency is being overtaken by a rise o f 
divorce. Only among Swedish children bom  in the forties and later was divorce a more frequent 
reason fo r fam ily  d isruption th an  death, and a som ew hat 1 arger proportion o f  those b o m  in th e  
1960s lived for at least 16 years with both their parents than did the birth cohort o f the 1900s (SCB 
1992). In the U nited States there were more widowers than male divorcees until the 1970s, and 
more widows than female divorcees till 1997 (U S ’Bureau o f Census 2001, table HH-1.). Now  more 
than a fourth o f  all marriages made in the EU in the early 1980s had been dissolved by the late 
nineties, in Britain and Scandinavia 40-46 per cent, in France and Germany a third.
In the Christian and Hindu worlds, but not in the Muslim or the Buddhist, the possibility o f  no­
fault, non-refuseable divorce constitutes a further indicator o f the secularization o f marriage. The 
first m assive rise o f  Christian divorce occurred after World W ar I in the former belligerent 
countries (Philips 1991: 186).
The 1920s was also the period in which the Lutheran Scandinavian countries legislated no-fault 
divorce. For the rest o f the Christian world liberal divorce legislation started in the English­
16The lack o f fit between African and colonial norms made even ambitious census undertakings by colonial 
powers incapable of getting a good picture of the family structure. For instance, a census in 1956-7 o f four 
cities in Cote d’Ivoire o f similar size and ethnic make-up undertaken by four different census teams reported 
percentages in “free unions” ranging form 1 to 66 per cent i ! ’rass et al. 1968, 188).
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speaking countries in the late 1960s, spreading to most oi it in the ensuing decades (C astles and 
Flood 1993), mainly leaving only Ireland and Chile out.
The current rates as well as the historical tendency o f  divorce vary greatly across the world, rhe 
divorce rate, intercontinentally most often measured by the crude rate per thousand population (or 
over 15 years), is currently highest in USA, in post-Communist Europe, and in Cuba. Japan has a 
relatively low rate o f divorce, China even more so, and divorce is still rather rare in India.
Historically, divorce was practised on a uniquely massive scale by the M uslim  M alays o f 
Southeast Asia, in today 's Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore (Jones 1994). Next, but lar behind 
was Egypt, and then came the United States. The trajectories crossed each other in the second half 
o f the twentieth century.
M arriages in some parts o f  Africa have for long had a considerable instability, while in others 
divorce was difficult and rare (e.g., Burnham 1987: 4 Iff). The thinness o f the marital bond coupled 
with the thickness o f kinship, and, particularly in Southern Africa, male long-distance labour 
migration, make for lengthy separations o f  spouses among many populations. A remarkable 
ethnographic example is provided by Fulani pastoralists o f  the W est African savannah. When the 
children are grown up, the father has transmitted his property to them, and the parental couple then 
often split up, settling with one or the other o f their o ffsp rin g  or among their own native km 
(Burnham 1987: 48).
Around 1970, divorce w as p retty w idespread in A frica. I f  w e t ake S weden a s a y ardstick -  
which then had the second highest divorce rate in W estern Europe but was clearly behind USA -  
for the infrequent UN measure o f the percentage o f women above the age o f 15 who are divorced 
and separated, we get the following picture. 4.2% o f Swedish women were then divorced 
(calculated from SCB 1999. 34). Higher rates were recorded for many African countries, Botswana
6.7, Ethiopia 8.4, Uganda 7.2, Tanzania 5.5, and Zambia 9.1 (UN 1989, table 4). Kenya had 3.3, 
Liberia 3.9 % divorced. Not all African countries were included in this database, Ghana, Nigeria, 
and Zimbabwe being among those missing.
The world-wide Demographic and Health Surveys o f 1986-92 make a wider comparison 
possible. By four years after their first union, twenty per cent o f  Ghanaian, Liberian, Namibian, and 
Ugandan women had experienced its dissolution, whether by divorce or by death. In Botswana, 
Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe 15-18 per cent, but in Nigeria only 7.5. Corresponding 
figures range from 10 (M orocco) to 2 (Jordan) per cent in the Arab world, and stand at 4 % in 
Pakistan and 6-7% in the classical high-divorce country Indonesia. Latin America is more similar 
to Africa, 11% o f Brazilian women having their first un ion dissolved after four years, eight per cent 
o f Mexican. Only the Caribbean, Afro-Creole family is more unstable than the African. Thirty per 
cent o f Dominican women were out o f  their first union after four years (W estoff et al 1994 table 
4.1.).
This African marital disruption is high also by European standards. In Britain, which with 
Denmark and Sweden now has the highest divorce rate in Western Europe, one would have to go to 
marriages contracted in 1993/94 (Halsey 2000, 63) to find a rate of dissolution within four years 
about the same as all Ghanaian unions together exhibited in 1988.
The New Space o f Sexuality
The sex-marriage complex has been, and is being, subjected to conflicting spatio-cultural 
processes o f change. Sexuality has been increasingly secularized and its  a rea  o f operation has 
expanded. By sexual secularization I mean sexuality being stripped o f religious or other aprioristic, 
non-consequentialist normative rulings, as “sinful ' or otherwise condemnable outside marriage, 
even if  consensual and even if  not betraying any promise or trust . This secularization has gone 
furthest in the Christian regions o f  the world -  fundamentalist revivalism  in the parts o f  the US
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notwithstanding but is also becoming very significant in the ex-Contucian area, in Buddhist 
countries, and among the African peoples, a minority it seems, who had strong norms against extra­
marital sexuality. In M uslim  and Hindu cultures changes are more limited.
Sexuality is also expanding, biologically in the lowering o f the age o f menarche (Bongaarts and 
Cohen 1998), in time, with earlier sex debuts for whatever reason, and culturally, as the front stage 
o f  the entertainment industry. In Britain, for instance, the median age o f  the first sexual intercourse 
decreased from 21 for women born in the 1930s and 1940s to 17 for women born between 1966 and 
1975, with a sizeable minority sexually active before the (legal) age o f sixteen (W ylie et al. 1997, 
1314) Among metropolitan area, American young women, aged 15-19, 30 per cent had had sex in 
1971, and ha lf o f them in 1979 (W eiss et al. 1997, 1482). The Australian sexual debut in the 1990s 
took place at about the age sixteen on the average (Carter 1997, 93). In Finland, 6-9 per cent of 
women bom  between 1933 and 1942 had sex before the age o f 18, among those bom  after 1972 the 
corresponding figure was 55-60. Between a fourth and fifth had it before 16 (Kontula and Haavio- 
M annila 1995, 53, 54).
Changes in Japan came somewhat later, mainly in the 1980s-early 1990s. In 1974 11% o f female 
Japanese university students had had sexual intercourse, in 1986 26%, and in 1995 43 % (Hatano 
1997, 805). By contrast, in China in 1989/90 only six per cent o f  female university students had 
sexual experience (Ruan 1997, 384), and in four universities o f  Egypt in 1996 only 3 per cent (el- 
Tawila 1998).
A freer and more open sexuality has also enriched marriage, The very good and fully 
representative Finnish study shows a significant increase in sexual satisfaction and in marital 
happiness between 1971 and 1992, and a disappearance o f difference in male-female appreciation 
o f  sex (Kontula and Haavio- M annila 1995, 101ft).
African religion and ethics have not included the sexual asceticism o f  Christianity, Hinduism, 
and Buddhism. N or have they very often made the strict demarcation o f legitimate and illicit sex 
drawn by orthodox Islam. But within Africa, there have been considerable differences o f  sexual 
permissiveness. West Coast and Middle Africa have been more permissive, the patrilineal societies 
o f  East and Southern Africa much less so (Caldwell et al. 1992).
From  the 1986-92 above-mentioned surveys there are some data on the sexuality o f  teen-age 
women. The sexual revolution had clearly reached some African countries by the 1980s, if  not 
earlier, while other countries stood outside. Sixty per cent o f Botswana adolescent women had had 
sex, w ithout ever being married. Corresponding figures were in Liberia 46, in Togo 37, in Ghana 
and Kenya 26 per cent. No sexual experience was reported for 91 % o f Burundian women (who 
m arry late), 68% o f  Zimbabwe women, 60% from Ghana, 54% from Kenya, and 38 from Uganda 
(M acro International 1992, chart 7). There is no "abundance o f systematic data on African sexual 
behaviour, but there are indicators o f a lowering age o f sexual initiation. Surveys o f  Ghana have 
later recorded a m edian age o f  female sexual experience o f 17 and 15 (Ankomah 1997, 528-9).
The difficult and controversial issue o f the relations between patterns o f  sexual relations and the 
ADDS epidemic in Africa cannot be treated here.
Intim acy and Its Alternatives
Secularization o f sexuality and marriage does not necessarily mean a turn to what Anthony 
G iddens (1992, 58) has called “pure relationships”, i.e. a “social relation entered into for its own 
sake”. It may instead mean ‘com m odification’. In parts o f  Asia, mainly in the Southeast such as 
Thailand and Indonesia, in large parts o f  Africa outside the Muslim savannah belt -  and in post- 
Com munist Eastern Europe, recent decades have seen a spectacular growth a commercial sex 
industry. It has been spurred by combinaiions o f  normative dissolution, poverty, and opportunity 
w ith openings o f demand, from US soldiers in the Vietnam war to West German tourists, and
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excessively male urban migration in Africa. Often, the new industry builds upon old regional 
traditions o f trafficking in women, as from northern Thailand and certain areas of Java, or certain 
tribes in Kenya. Commodification has also increased in several patriarchal marriage systems, 
leading to rising dowry demands in India and to higher bride-prices in Africa.
De-institutionalization may also mean a substitution ol ‘stage performance for normative 
regulation. That is, a sexualization o f one 's body and sexual practice as a performative art, not for 
directly commercial purposes but more as a way o f  putting oneself on a social stage and in a social 
limelight. Marriage too may become a show-off, not only in the form o f an expensive wedding but 
also as a visible social performance.
How much these processes o f  commodification and staging have grown is impossible to say at 
this point, and it clearly varies a lot across the world. No doubt, there is less prostitution in Sweden 
today than hundred years ago, while there is much more in Africa and Southeast Asia. But their 
existence is analytically important to stress, given the tendency, inspired by Giddens, to deal with 
the secularization and the de-institutionalization o f marriage and sexuality m ainly in terms o f 
“intimacy”. Commodification and staging point to an opposite process, w ithout necessarily denying 
the former, to a breaking-up o f intimacy, through transactions, voyeurist windows, and cameras, to 
invitations to “Big Brother” viewing.
The Past Into the Future
The African family has been subjected to, and has participated in, the great global changes o f 
family relations, which have taken place in the twentieth century, in particular in its second half. In 
the very last decades o f the century, fertility reduction finally reached parts o f  Africa, but, as was to 
be expected, the African family system still maintains high fertility rates in a contemporary global 
perspective. African patriarchy has been partly eroded, particularly with respect to paternal control 
o f marriage. The relatively weak marital bond has opened up a wider range o f  options. Very recent 
egalitarian drives, above all in Southern Africa, notwithstanding, male supremacy and parental 
generation claims on children are being reproduced. Polygny has also proved very resilient. For all 
its complexity and contradictions, with very considerable female economic autonomy, 
contemporary sub-Saharan Africa stands out as one o f the most patriarchal regions o f  the world, 
together with the Arab-M uslim area and South Asia.
At least parts o f Africa are participating in the sexual revolution, in contrast, so far, to the other 
most patriarchal regions and to Mainland China. But the HIV/AIDS epidemic, with its disastrous 
mortality in Southern Africa, sets it under a dark cloud. The continental impoverishm ent over the 
last decades is likely to reinforce a commercialization o f sex.
Finally, what might be expected o f the future o f the family in the world? In the still high fertility 
countries, where the decline started more or less recently, it is likely to continue, probably picking 
up momentum in northern India and in Africa. For the foreseeable future, though, the fertility o f  
African families is most likely to remain well above European levels. Among the below 
replacement countries o f  th e  W est an d  th e  East, there m ay  o ccur s ome m oves upw ards, w hich, 
however, are unlikely to go beyond about two children per woman. The epochal erosion o f 
patriarchy is likely to be irreversible as a trend.
But since it is still in many parts o f  the world an intensely controversial subject, powerful 
backlashes here and there are not to be excluded. Some have already taken place, particularly in 
areas o f the M uslim world from Algeria to Malaysia. But on the whole, in the medium to long­
term, patriarchy will most probably erode further, the power o f  fathers in particular. On the other 
hand, even though there is likely to be less divergence on the scale o f  patriarchy, the power 
configurations o f family systems are likely to go on differing. W hile conventional labels o f  
traditional, global, local, authentic, mimetic etc. will probably lose their bearings, world customs,
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of which family customs are the most intimate and the most important to most people, will not 
converge around any one model.
from  recent revivals of all the w orld 's major religions we have learnt that secularization is 
neither an unstoppable train nor a common destiny. The trajectories o f  the secularization o f 
sexuality and marriage are likely show even m ore o f the same pattern. However, over the long 
haul, processes of religious secularization have hardly anywhere been fully reversed. In most 
countries it has been attacked without suffering significant losses. The marriage rate may go up or 
down, but in any case it is most likely to remain a central human aspiration and actual relationship 
for the foreseeable future. Informal cohabitation will probably increase in southern Europe, Latin 
America, East Asia, and Africa, though. The age o f sex debut is unlikely to rise. Sooner or later a 
sexual revolution will probably take place in Asia, within as well as before marriage.
The extent — if  not the existence -  o f the commercial sex industry will depend on the economic 
inequality in the world. It the latter should go down significantly, currently not a likely prospect at 
all, prostitution is likely go down with it (without disappearing). The relative futures o f  “pure 
relationships” versus relationships as “stage performances” are written in the stars.
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T H E  IM P A C T  O F  T H E  A ID S E P ID E M IC  O N  F A M IL IE S  A N D  F A M IL Y  C O P IN G  
S T R A T E G IE S  IN U G A N D A  
P eter  R. A tekyereza  a n d  E d w a rd  A. h iru tn ira
Introduction
Twenty years ago, the first clinical case o f HIV/AIDS was identified in Uganda. In 1992, the 
peak o f infections raised the prevalence rate from 9% in 1988 to over 30% (UAC 2001). 1 he 
disease has greatly affected the productive and reproductive age group especially between 15 to 45 
years. T he impact o f the epidemic in the country has been telt bolh from the inlected and alfected 
people's perspective. Although the initial interventions in the country emphasised the IIIV+ people, 
they have progressively broadened beyond the infected to  include th e  a lfected/inflicted a s  w ell. 
Furthermore, there has been a shift from prevention and control focus to care and support in the 
fight against the epidemic. The latter shift has brought to the fore the crucial role o f institutional 
and social safety nets in the fight against HIV/AIDS. The family, as the major social institution in 
the country (as it is in most sub-Saharan Africa), is by implication both the immediate victim and 
safety net. Studies show that the family in Uganda remains the fundamental institution for welfare 
and support (Atekyereza 2001b; Bohmer & Kirumira 2000). This paper, therefore, highlights major 
impacts o f AIDS crisis on the family and how different families are coping with the socio-cultural, 
economic, political, spiritual and/or ideological challenges.
Trends o f HIV/AIDS Prevalence in Uganda
Since the first case o f HIV/AIDS was diagnosed in Uganda. The national trends in the 
HIV/AIDS prevalence have been dropping, apart from the 1992 peak o f infections which raised the 
prevalence rate from 9% in 1988 to over 30% (UAC 2001). The effect o f  HIV/AIDS has been more 
profound on women than men and among the age groups between 15 and 45 years. The intensity o f  
the effects is mainly devastating on the actively productive age groilp. With both internal and 
external support, the government o f Uganda and other partners, several 1IIV/AIDS control 
programmes and activities were implemented. By end o f 1999, the rate o f prevalence had dropped 
to 8.3% (UAC 2001: 2). Though the first HIV case was identified in 1982 and anecdotal and 
observational evidence indicate that the disease was in the country by early 1981, the initial 
responses o f society and government was negligible. This was mainly due to general lack o f 
knowledge v/orld wide about the new disease, individual and collective denial by societal members 
and the existing socio-economic and political upheavals in the country at that time (UAC 1993a). 
Official government intervention started from 1986. Table 1 shows the HIV prevalence trends since 
1987.
Table 1: Trends of HIV prevalence in Uganda since 1987
Period Significant Event Description Average Prevalence 
Rate
1982 First AIDS Cases identified in Uganda _
1987-8 National Sero -survey 9.0% ’
1992 Peak o f Infections: Some urban sites with over 50% and others 
with 6%
30.0%
1995 Official announcement o f  decline in HIV prevalence 18.5%
1997 - 14.7%
1998 9.5%
1999
1 w u u , - — ___________________ ___  _ _____________ _________ 8.3%1 It should be noted that some sources quote 10
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According to the UAC (2001), it is estimated that 2.2 million people have been infected with 
HIV; about 800,000 people have died o f AIDS; 1.4 million people are estimated to be living with 
HIV/AIDS and 1.7 million children have lost a m other or both parents to AIDS (see also UNAIDS 
1998). The prevalence trends indicate that there are gender and age group differences as Figures 1 
and 2 indicate.
Figure 1: Trends in HIV Sero Positivity By Sex 1990- 2002
Source: Adapted from  A 1C, September 2002. Data Feedback Workshop Presentations
Figure 1 indicates that there are more women infected with HIV compared to men. Since 1990, the 
HIV prevalence trends have generally been falling. Though the situation appears to have been 
relatively stable from 1997, the percentage o f people getting infected started picking up again from 
the year 2000.
Figure 2: Age Group Differences in HIV prevalence since 1997
Source: Adapted from  A IC , S e p te m b e r  2 0 0  Data Feedback Workshop Presentations
Figure 2 indicates that there are higher 11IV prevalence rates among people aged 30 years and 
above. Lowest prevalence is among those aged 15 to 19 years. Statistics indicate that HIV
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prevalence rates among the under 15 years rose sharply between 1999 and 2001 but with a drastic 
fall in 2002. The irregular rates could be related to legal issues related to the age at which children 
can access 1I1V testing without parental consent (Kakande 2002). Characteristic ol the prevalence 
trends is also the fact that there is a relationship between marital status and I(IV infection, lhcre is 
higher HIV prevalence among the widows than other marital categories an indication o! mortality 
due to HIV/AIDS. However, from 2000 a rise in HIV prevalence among the married and 
cohabiting and the separated or divorced is noted (see Figuic 3).
Figure 3: Seiro Positivity by Marital Status
■  Single/never
□  Married/cohabiting
■  Separated/Di vorced
□  Widowed
Source: Adapted from AIC, September 2002 Data Feedback Workshop Presentations
In terms o f  individuals and couples, there is higher HI V prevalence among the individuals than 
couples, while in terms of education, there is comparatively lower HIV prevalence among persons 
educated up to the tertiary institutions, than those with prim ary or without any formal education. 
This implies that higher education has a lot to contribute to the control o f HIV infection. The 
statistics also show that the prevalence rates among repeat testers is lower than first testers and 
whereas all the first testers at both the main and other sites are relatively stable or without sharp 
rise, the repeat testers at the main and other sites have their prevalence rates rising sharply. In terms 
o f the rising levels o f sero positivity since 2000, the rise among women at both the main and other 
sites is far higher than that o f men. It should be noted though that rates are much higher at the 
indirect sites than at the main site. This may imply that further spread o f HIV testing centres could 
unearth higher levels o f sero positivity.
However, there is a need to be careful with the statistical data in explaining the real dimensions 
and infection rates. The issue revolves on the validity and reliability o f  the m ethodology used to 
collect the data from which these percentages are derived. For instance, new data collected by the 
AIDS Information Centre (AIC September 2002), indicates that the prevalence rates appear to be 
on the rise again (see Figures 2 and 3). In addition, the figure o f 1.7 million orphans that UAC 
quotes in 2001 was the same figure quoted by UNAIDS in 1998. There are no national official 
pievalence rates that have been indicated for the years 2000 and 2001. Hence, the figures being 
used for indicating the prevalence rates appear to be conservative. As Kirumira (2001) notes on the 
sources ot HIV/AIDS information sources, there is a problem o f selection biases, which arise from 
the peculiar characteristics ol sampled population categories. The women attending public hospital- 
based antenatal clinics, tor example, do not necessarily represent the adult female population. It is 
also documented that quite a number ol rural women do not attend antenatal clinics. Secondly, the 
methods and sources ol data vary over time and space which questions the reliability o f the 
information collected and presented. I he Uganda AIDS C ommission, which is charged with
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HIV/AIDS co-ordination efforts, has not developed a central data base that can collate information 
from different research efforts funded by different donors. Thirdly, it is important to note that in a 
m ature epidemic, prevalence may stabilise but this stability simply means that the number o f new 
annual infections equals the num ber o f  people dying from AIDS every year (Futures Group 1999: 
67 cited in K irumira 2001). Hence, the collation o f figures o f the HIV/AIDS status point to the 
importance of constantly reviewing and critiquing the methods o f periodic and routine sero 
surveillance.
The Interventions Against HIV/AIDS since its Identification
Since the identification of II1V/AIDS in Uganda, the national government has adopted a number 
o f  interventions particularly since 1986. The interventions started firstly with an open policy 
towards the AIDS pandemic, supported by the international and bilateral donor resources in order 
to enable people to come out boldly and face it as a strong health threat. This resulted in the 
formation o f the AIDS Control Programme (AGP) under the M inistry o f Health. A lot o f activities 
were carried out under this program me and substantial progress made in the areas o f  epidemiology, 
surveillance, health education and blood transfusion services. These achievements were made 
possible by international and  national non-governm ental organisations th a t responded with both 
financial resources and actual activities. T he  levels o f  AIDS interventions were at the  national, 
district, institutional and community levels. Al the national level, the first efforts were through the 
AGP in the M inistry o f Health and later other AIDS control programmes in sectoral ministries co­
ordinated by the Ugandan AIDS Commission Secretariat. Funding was provided to support AIDS 
control activities implemented at the district levels. Institutions such as the AIDS Information 
Centre (AIC), the AIDS Support Organisation (TASO), Joint Clinical Research Centre (JCRC), etc 
were very instrumental. At the community level, AIDS control activities were implemented 
through various groups and institutions like the post-test clubs; religion-based groups such as 
Church o f Uganda Human Development Services (CHUSA), Islamic Medical Association o f 
Uganda (1MAU), etc. Finally, at the individual level, the open declaration o f HIV sero status as 
through the Philly Lutaaya Initiative (PIT) and the others that followed, was a major breakthrough 
especially in the fight against stigmatisation o f people living with HIV/AIDS.
In addition to the multilevel focus, interventions also took a multi-sectoral approach. The m ulti­
sectoral approach was borne out o f  the realisation that the impact o f the epidemic went beyond the 
domain o f health and cut across all aspects o f individual, family, community and national life. In 
particular, PIIV/AIDS is now estimated to annually reduce the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 
up to 2% in countries such as Uganda, where agricultural production has registered a 37-61% 
reduction (UAC 2001). Hence, various sectoral m inistries needed to initiate AIDS control 
programmes addressing specific sectoral needs. Interventions under the multi-sectoral approach 
started with the ministries o f  Health, Education, Defence, Information, Gender, Labour and Social 
Development but later .spread to other ministries (UAC 1993a). These different program mes were 
aimed at, first, stopping the spread o f HIV infection through preventing sexual transmission o f 
HIV; preventing HIV transmission through blood and blood products and the vertical transmission 
o f HIV (from m other to child). Second, programmes were aimed at m itigating the adverse health 
and socio-economic impact o f  HIV/AIDS by coping with national HIV/AIDS related impacts; 
prom oting action at the community level to reduce AIDS related consequences; and providing care 
for the people with HIV and AIDS. Third, they aimed at strengthening the capacity to respond to 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic, by strengthening national and sectoral capacity for planning and policy 
development in relation to AIDS. The aim was also to strengthen im plem entation capacities o f 
district and local sectors; enhancing community coping capacity; and identifying and mobilising 
resources, both national and international including human, material and financial. Fourth, the 
approach aimed at creating a national information base on HIV/AIDS by meeting information 
needs through promotion o f appropriate information gathering and information access. Lastly, it 
aimed at strengthening national capacity to undertake research relevant to HIV/AIDS in terms o f 
short and long term needs; building framework for monitoring and evaluation o f  HIV/AIDS related
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research and ultimately contributing to the international efforts in the development of a cure for or 
a vaccine against HIV/AIDS (UAC 1093a).
The main targets o f the interventions were children, the youth and women (by, for example, 
PLAN International, World Vision, Actionaid, Uganda Women Efforts to Save Orphans (IJW ESO) 
etc.); Straight Talk News Letter, Naguru Teenage Information and Health Centre, Save the Youth 
from AIDS (SYFA), Programme for Enhancing Adolescent Reproductive Living (PEARL). It was 
realised that the young people (15-19 years) make up the most vulnerable catergory to HIV 
infection. 1 n particular g iris i n th is age g roups a re 4 t o 6 t imes m ore i nfected than b o y s ( UAC 
2001). The focus on women was borne out ol the realisation that the AIDS epidemic alfected 
women in a special way. In the national survey ol 1987, more women were (and continue to be) 
found to be infected with the 11IV than men (1993a: 5). In addition, women are the comei stone of 
Uganda’s social and economic sectors and bear the burden ol AIDS in many different ways. In 
addition to being at greater risk for HIV sexual transmission, they also have the special 
responsibility o f child bearing with its attendant dangers. It is also estimated that HIV positive 
pregnant women have a 40% chance of transmitting the virus to the child (vertical transmission). 
Furthermore, the women have the traditional responsibility ol looking after the sick (including 
those with HIV/AIDS) and they are also exposed to higher risks, which are largely bound with 
culturally expressed gender roles. There are women who are occupationally predisposed and 
exposed to HIV infection, such as bar maids and prostitutes on one hand and housegirls, clerical 
workers, on the other (UAC 1993b: 38& 40). The weaker economic and educational social position 
o f women in society further aggravates their vulnerability.
These interventions have yielded commendable achievements. In addition to reduction of 
annual rates o f HIV/AIDS infection, the HIV/AIDS intervention programmes have led to 
development o f a National Operation Plan for (1994-98), preparation o f National Guidelines for the 
Clinical Management o f HIV Infection and for IIIV/AIDS Research, establishment o f  a National 
AIDS Documentation and Information Centre (NADIC). In addition, Uganda has managed to 
implement an all-inclusive and participatory policy, resulting in over 600 organisations getting 
involved in HIV/AIDS activities countrywide. Another success lies in the goodwill created by 
Uganda's attitude o f openness about HIV/AIDS and strong commitment by the political leadership 
to fight the epidemic. Uganda has shown that the epidemic can be reversed or at least contained. 
The open campaign to raise awareness and inform Ugandans with unusual frankness about how the 
disease is spread is exceptional. Spread o f billboard warnings like "Just assume that everyone is 
in fected”, and constant radio messages made a difference. An additional achievement is the 
reduction o f stigmatisation levels by individuals openly coming out to publicly declare their sero 
positivity. The pioneer Philly Bongoley Lutaaya made a difference in the history o f U ganda’s 
efforts against IIIV/AIDS.
However, in spite o f these achievements, there are still challenges. The problem  o f  
stigmatisation still exists and positive living at the individual level can only succeed if  there is no 
stigma from society toward people infected or affected by the disease. Positive living is an 
encouragement to people living with HIV/AIDS that they can live a meaningful life, enjoying their 
full rights in spite of their sero-positive status. Eliminating stigma is central to controlling the 
spread o f HIV infection. It breaks the silence, and breaking silence means breaking secrecy, not 
confidentiality, about AIDS. However, the 2000-2001 Uganda Demographic and Health survey, for 
example, established that, on average, only 49.6% o f the people accept that if a female teacher tests 
HIV positive, she should keep the job (UBOS and ORC M acro 2001: 175). This implies that over 
50% of the people would like such IIIV+ female teachers to lose their jobs. Another dilemma is 
that the young growing generation is not willing to care for an IIIV+ relative at home in contrast to 
the older age groups. The willing ones are not well disposed in terms o f resources, while those in 
the productive group are shunning the care obligation. It is also important to note that, even amidst 
Uganda’s long experience with HIV /A IDS, more men than  w om en especially  from  th e  w estern
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region o t the country, feel that an HIV+ person should keep this information confidential (IJDIIS 
2001). T his ultimately may undermine the mutual social responsibility in the fight against AIDS.
Intervention Shift in the Fight against HIV/AIDS
Since the late 1990s, there has been a growing shift o f intervention focus from the infected to 
the affected and from establishing the magnitude o f  the problem o f  care and support o f  the people 
infected and affected by HIV/AIDS. The aim was to move from looking at AIDS as the disease of 
the ‘sick’ to an understanding that AIDS affects each and every member o f  the entire society. The 
intervention shifted the focus from blaming and stigmatising victims to collectively rising up to the 
challenge, because those who are not infected are affected by the disease. The programme 
measures increased people’s HIV/AIDS awareness and created societal responsibility to tight the 
disease. The overriding importance o f this shift was to give people a fallback position and 
encourage more people to go for IIIV testing. It is on this point that the role o f the family is very 
important as immediate victim o f the effects o f  HIV/AIDS, as well as the immediate safety net for 
the victims and o f  the effects o f HIV/AIDS.
The Fam ily as a Victim o f HIV/AIDS
As an immediate victim o f IHV/AIDS, the family has been affected in various ways by direct 
and indirect consequences o f  HIV/AIDS. The direct effects are related to the long span o f sickness 
and ultimate death. The indirect effects are related to the processes o f  sickness and death 
(particularly looking after the loved ones when they are sick and seeing them die); social, 
emotional and psychological stress plus stigma. The resultant impact has mainly been in the area of 
parenthood, marriage and/or re-marriage, family location and family size, inheritance and property 
rights, value o f children and intra-marital relationships. In bearing the social, emotional and 
economic stress, the people affected by AIDS bear astronom ically increasing medical and 
nutritional costs. Most o f the affected families are already in the poor groups. This ultimately 
alfects their food and other forms o f  security. Long nursing o f AIDS patients implies reduced 
labour input on the family farm. Children (especially girls) are withdrawn from school either due to 
financial stress or in order to take care o f the sick. This further aggravates vulnerability o f girls and 
women in society (Atekyereza 2001a; UNICEF 1996).
New diseases such as AIDS have had a significant impact on existing family forms (Adepoju & 
Mbugua 1997). Single person ‘ fam ilies’ a re  emerging as well as increasing numbers o f  single 
parent and child-headed families. The so-called single person families are related to the issue of 
marriage and re-marriage in the context o f  II1V/AIDS. There are many young people who have 
reached the age o f marriage but fear the possibility o f contraction o f  HIV/AIDS in a marital 
relationship. This fear emanates from the high level o f  marital unfaithfulness. Atekyereza (2001b) 
found that from all the Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) conducted in his study, 36 percent ranked 
adultery or extra-marital sexual relations as the number one problem to family stability while 57 
percent and 7 percent ranked it second and third, respectively. This fear is confirmed by the AIC 
(2002) data (see Figure 3). This greatly affects the level o f  partner intimacy, affection and trust - 
im portant cornerstones for marital and family stability.
The impact on family forms is further compounded by the re-marriage dilemma, especially for 
women. In Uganda, most traditional family systems cushioned both widows and widowers but did 
not allow for permissive sex. W hereas men find it easy to re-marry even after losing their spouses 
to AIDS, women find it hard to do so and this creates a dilemma for them, since they have 
traditionally accessed societal economic resources through their fathers as daughters or their 
husbands as wives (Atekyereza 2001a). There were for instance, institutionalised systems o f  re­
marriage such as widow inheritance. When a woman lost her husband, her elder or any existing 
brother-in-law was obliged to take her over in order to fulfil her sexual and material needs 
(Atekyereza 2001b). However, with the advent olTIIV /AIDS, inheritance o f widows is slowly but 
strongly dying out, while re-marriages are not as auom atic as before. This is increasing the number
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o f single parent (especially female-headed) families. Due to this kind oi dilemma, sometimes, the 
families left behind, especially headed by women and children, have tended to telocate to avoid 
stigmatisation and also for women to increase their chances for re-marriage in the new places 
where they are not known. This further complicates the AIDS control efforts.
In relation to the ahove is the aspect of inheritance and property rights. I he traditional norm in 
most patriarchal societies is that property belongs to the man and/or his kin. On death of the head 
o f the family, the property should naturally go to the heir, who is normally socio-culturally selected 
in view o f taking care o f  the family members leit behind (the wife and children). 1 he members left 
behind are usually defined as wives and children, because when the man loses a wife, he is 
culturally expected to remarry unlike in the case of a woman. As a result ol higher mortality rates 
resulting from the maturation o f the AIDS epidemic, most widows and orphans tend to find 
themselves in grave danger as far as family property is concerned. It is very common for a dead 
man's natal family to deny the existence o f not only unregistered but also registered but 
disapproved marriages, in order to take the property (Atekyereza 2001b). Young m others with very 
young children are the prime v ictims, while older widows with older children (especially boys) 
tend to either be respected or feared. In effect., this creates a dilemma between childbearing, 
property rights and AIDS. Whereas childbearing increases th e  w om an’s risk o f contracting and 
being weakened by IIIV/AIDS. it is through children that she derives her family and property 
security.
HIV/AIDS has affected the value o f children in families. I ike elsewhere in Africa, the value o f 
children (as a personal and family goal) is still very strong. Some people (including those living 
with AIDS) still prefer to produce children for their future immortality. The value has changed in 
terms o f the number o f children that one should produce. Some Ugandans today are beginning to 
prefer to produce fewer children to avoid leaving many orphans without anybody responsible to 
look after them. AIDS and other problems have increased general mortality rates and the number o f 
orphans. U ganda’s average life expectancy is now 43 years in 2002 (PRB 2002). In 1997 it was 
only 38 years (UAC 2001) while it was 40.5 years in 2000 (PRB 2000). As a result, the nature and 
process o f parenthood has changed. There are many children now' growing up under the care o f 
their grand parents or elder siblings because their parents have died. Ultimately, this has a strong 
impact on how children are socialised or prepared to face their future life as responsible adults. In a 
way, the combination o f these effects has had implications on family size in both rural and urban 
areas. Whereas in rural areas family size have tended to enlarge, the opposite has usually been the 
case in urban areas.
The Family as a Safety Net against HIV/AIDS
As a safety net, the family has helped members to cope with HIV/AIDS in various ways from 
the pressures arising from the direct and indirect effects. Some families in Uganda have been able 
to cope with the challenges single handedly, while others have received external assistance from 
government and non-governmental organisations as well as religious institutions. The coping 
mechanisms vary between rural and urban contexts and are mainly influenced by the socio­
economic status of families or individual members. The effects o f HIV/AIDS on the family and 
how families a re coping n eed t o b e s een in a b reader c ontext o f  t he e nvironment i n w hich t he 
family lives and as ultimately influenced by its economic status. In families less affected by 
poverty, the consequences o f HIV/AIDS have not been as disastrous as in those where family 
members are living in absolute poverty. The rich, for example, are in better position to afford the 
expensive antiretroviral drugs and better nutrition than the poor. This implies that rich sero 
positives have the possibility o f living longer than their poor counterparts. However, in all these, 
the familial and social networks have been central to family coping m echanisms against HIV/AIDS 
for both material and emotional support.
Strongly related to family coping mechanisms are the issues o f  social security, welfare 
inheritance and property rights. These are strongly and mutually interactive making it difficult to
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see coping mechanisms against AIDS in terms o f one and not the others. As already noted, the 
family provides the most im mediate source o f material, social, psychological and emotional 
support. In spite ol the noted inheritance and property ownership dilemmas facing families 
especially those in 1 illegal' statuses, there are organisations and groups that have helped some 
families to cope. Some interventions have been extended family based and others from government 
offices (e.g. District Probation and Community Development offices) and non-governmental 
structures such as the Federation o f Ugandan Women l awyers (I* IDA). These organisations have 
assisted in restoration or retention o f property rights for widows and/or orphans. In co-operation 
with PLAN International, the Department o f Sociology, M akerere University has completed an 
outreach project on succession planning among families with sero positive parents. 1'he objective 
of the project is to introduce children and potential guardians to each other before the death o f 
parents (Horizons 2001a). This enables parents to plan together wdth the future guardians the 
upbringing o f  the children.
In addition to assisting the I1IV+- family members, the family has also provided strong social 
and material support to keep orphans in school, feeding them, providing for their medical care and 
other needs. It is particularly these familial social networks for support that are important for the 
fall back position. People who need to go for IIIV testing need support and courage to take the test, 
share the results an d  plan  for th e  post-H IV -test living. T h is  is w hen a strong  supportive family 
becomes very important.
It is therefore important that when looking at this intervention shift in view o f altering roles o f  
the family, we take cognisance o f the realities surrounding the family today. There is need to ask 
ourselves what kind o f  family is taking on the role o f the fallback position. It is important to 
understand how the family or families in question have been affected not only by IIIV/AIDS but 
the entire conglomeration o f factors operating in the environment (Atekyereza 2001b).
Conclusion
The intervention shift in HIV/AIDS control and prevention is very opportune and its 
justification very commendable. However, the most important issue that remains is how to create 
formidable and convenient institutions for the fall back position, in light o f  the contextual 
challenges. It is therefore im portant to develop a research programme that will provide planning 
data for strengthening the family to take on the new functions. It is particularly important to look at 
how family dynamics, especially in relation to sexuality, power relations and decision making 
within the family, affect attitudinal tendencies, accessibility, timeliness and affordability o f  health 
care or disease prevention (especially in terms o f AIDS). And in order to understand these 
dynamics, the Family Systems Analysis Model (FSAM) helps us to  understand the hexagon o f 
intervening factors on the familial context. Individual background characteristics define the type o f 
people, their life chances within society and ultimately influence their perceptions not only on 
family values but also health behavioural patterns. New family values represent a compromise 
between personal interests and contextual and/or structural acceptability.
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Figure 4: The Family Systems Analysis Model
The context is an arena o f interrelations o f political, economic, societal, security, cultural and 
environmental factors. In terms o f security, for example, persistent armed conflict in some parts of 
the country have exacerbated the spread of HIV/AIDS. The very context, in which the individual 
family members live and family values thrive, is mediated by both indigenous internal and foreign 
external influences. Family members interact with and within the context under the internal and 
external influences and the interaction product is the structure of new family values and responses 
to life challenges like HIV/AIDS. Such values manifest themselves in the form o f unchanged, 
adjusted and changed or new values. Such a structure represents people's life aspirations and what 
the context can allow them. However though all contextual factors are significantly important in 
understanding family values and dynamics, the economic factor, in the last instance, asserts itself 
as necessary in socio-economic and political' dynamics o f society that create and recreate the 
environment in which family systems thrive or die.
The understanding o f the process o f HIV/AIDS infections, consequences and impact o f the 
family as well as the emerging coping mechanisms cannot be fully com prehended outside the 
holistic environment in which it is operating. It is after this understanding that we can assess 
whether the family has been facilitated to take on the new functions and stand up to the challenges. 
In any serious consideration o f  HIV/AIDS and the family, we must clearly explain what kind o f 
family we are talking about and in what context.
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Appendix
Table 2; Family Values: Faclor-Constituenls
Factor Constituent Elements
Background
Structural
characteristics
• Age
• Sex
• Marital Status
• Religion
• Education
• Residence
• Ethnic Cultural Group (Tribe)
• Occupation, Income Level, etc
Economic Factors • Means o f economic production (Land, Labour, capital (both cash and 
fixed)
• Economic history
• Employment
•  Infrastructure (hard and soft, communication networks
• Markets
• The media
• Technology
• Basic Economic Activities (Agriculture, Industries, Service sector, etc)
• Macro arid M icro-economic policies
• Economic and Business Institutions e.g. Banks
• Donors and International Monetary Institutions
• Wealth accumulation or Poverty
Political Factors • Political history
• Political system(s) and nature o f  politics
• Government priority and policies
• Juslice and Rule o f Law
• Democracy and Participation
• Ideological pluralism, Legislation, etc.
Society (Societal or 
Community Values 
and concerns)
• Social history
• Social services
• H ealth  values and  prob lem s e.g. E pidem ics - AID S, Ebola etc
•  Education
•  Sa fe  Water, etc
• Religious freedoms
• Social Equity and Fairness in provision o f Basic human needs
• Societal problems - prostitution, corruption, w itchcraft, alcoholism, etc
Environmental
Factors
The Natural Environment
• Forests
• W ater bodies
• L andscapes
• A nim al, P lant a n d  aquatic species
• W etlands
The Built Environment
• U rbanisation
• Settlem ent pa tterns
• In frastructure developm ent
• W ater-based developm ent pro jects  
Policy M atters
• M anagem ent o f  w aste and  hazardous chem icals
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• Exploitation o f  b io logical and/or natural resources
•  Tourist projects e.g. N ational and  G am e Paths
• D isaster preparedness
• P olitical and  legal w illingness and  com m itm ent
• Etc. . ----------- -----------
Security or 
Insecurity
• Peace
• Wars (civil and inter-territorial)
• Insurgence or Rebel Activities
• States o f Emergency and/or Concentration camps
• Cattle rustling;
• Robberies and Hard Criminal activities 
® Murders
• Sex crimes
• Etc
Culture • Material Culture (Objects and emblems, Subsistence economic activities, 
etc.)
• Non-Material culture (Nonns, Values, M ores, Beliefs, oral literature, 
theatre, etc.)
• Family Values, Role models
Family Values Family Patterns
• Family Meaning and forms
• Family definition criteria 
«• M arriage fo rm s
* Residence and  Fam ily Econom ic collaboration
* Form s o f  P arenthood  
«■ F am ily  Size
Family Functions:
• B iological reproduction (C hild bearing)
• Socia l reproduction (Socialisation)
•  A ffection and  com panionship between spouses
• Sexual regulation
• Status D efinition
•  Social welfare and  security  and  new ly em erging  roles
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T H E  H O U S E W IF E ’S D IL E M M A :
N O R M A T IV E  SE X U A L  C O E R C IO N  A N D  P R O T E C T E D  S E X U A L  
B E H A V IO R  A M O N G  M A R R IE D  G O V E R N M E N T  E M P L O Y E E S : 
T H E  R E S U L T S  O F  A Q U A L IT A T IV E  ST U D Y  IN N A S A R A W A  S I A I E,
N IG E R IA 1
David Wodi Tukura
The “ Housewife’s Dilemma” is probably best depicted in this near dramatic scene al a 
Focus Group Discussion.
Question '. “What will you do if  your husband insists on having sex though you suspect he 
is sleeping with other women?”
Wife: “1 cannot tell my husband that he should not have sex with me. Because sometimes 
if you tell him “No”, he will tell you he has 10 more like you outside. He will tell you, ‘II 
you are not ready, pack and leave my house’. You just have to manage it and pray to God 
to protect you”.
7'h F em ale Discussant: “Most o f  the men 1 know, our men, they are stubborn. No matter 
what you say, he will insist.”
Q uestion : “Condoms have been described as effective in providing protection trom  111V.
Do you agree?”
4th M ale D iscussant: “This condom thing I have never mentioned in my house”,
6,h M ale D iscussant: “1 am a harsh man and don’t take rubbish ... In our culture it’s a man 
who brings up such issues...”,
3“ Discussant: “1 condemn the notion o f condom s...Even before the World Health 
Organization, I tell will them this!”
The “Housewife’s Dilemma” was highlighted when 1,026 married government employees were 
interviewed under the Nasarawa Stale AIDS and Culture Study (NASACS) in North-Central 
Nigeria. It w as observed that gender roles and structural dis-em pow erm ent m ake i t  d ifficult for 
women to take decisions concerning their reproductive health. The findings revealed a deep- seated 
distrust o f  condoms by married men. The study observed that reproductive health attitudes are 
rooted deep in culture, economy and society. Unless women are empowered at the level o f  property 
relations and coded normative laws, alongside strategies that would transfer tangible assets to 
women, the vulnerability oi married African women to HIV/AIDS would continue to  rem ain a 
challenge in the 21s1 century.
The Housewife’s Dilemma: W hat Is It?
The housewile s dilemma reters to the sexual and reproductive health choices African women 
have to make oi cannot make due to pressures originating in their status as “married w om en” or 
“housewives” . The dilemma originates in the social and economic meaning o f being a “w om an” . It 
has its loots in the social and economic construction of the concept ot “ lem alencss” and 
“womanhood”. The dilemma is a spectrum spanning the mental, spiritual, social, and sometimes
Ihis research on which this paper is based was supported by a Grant from the JohnD. & Catherine T 
MacArthur Foundation.
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agonizing moral conflicts married women face when they find them selves at the following 
crossroads:
1. W hen the requirem ent that women bear children to fulfill the ideals o f motherhood 
conflicts with the w om an’s need to protect herself from the human immunodeficiency virus 
(HIV).
2. When the w om an’s need to remain in the economic security provided by marriage 
conflicts with the risky sexual behavior o f  a spouse involved in a sexual network.
3. W hen the need for protection from IIIV/AIDS conflicts with a socio-cultural order where 
norm ative and overt violence limit a w om an’s ability to take decisions on when she can 
have sex irrespective o f her husband’s sexual behavior.
These dilemmas place African women in life or death situations. In the following pages, we shall 
briefly explore the social and economic contexts of the “housew ife’s dilem ma”, in a world where 
poverty is associated with gender and where for married women, motherhood is a duty.
Poverty and Erotica
For reasons o f physiology and body chemistry, women are o f intense sexual interest to men. 
The Hebrew King Solomon was so fastidious in his love o f the female sex that he had seven 
hundred wives and three hundred concubines. Overwhelmed at the sight o f one o f his women the 
Jewish king rapturously declared:
You a re b eautiful, m y d arling, a s Tirzah, lovely a s Jerusalem, m ajestic a s t roops w ith 
banners. Turn your eyes from me, they overwhelm m e...S ix ty  queens there may be, and 
eighty concubines, and virgins beyond number; but my dove, my perfect one, is 
un iq u e ....” (Song o f Solomon Chapter 6: 4-5, 8-9)
Behind these profuse expressions o f adoration however lie hard economic facts. This m em ber of 
the human family, who provokes both pleasure and poetry is also the poorest and most dis- 
empowered branch o f humanity. Beneria and Bisnath (1996: 1, 3) w rite:
Poverty, then, is not m erely a function o f material conditions but also reflects the role o f 
institutions and ideologies in positioning women and men and ascribing different 
meaning to their lives...A s women are generally the poorest o f  the poor, elim inating 
social, cultural, political and economic discrimination against women is a prerequisite o f 
eradicating poverty (2).
Cheikh Ibrahima Niang (1996: 212) notes how in Senegal, the poverty o f women leads to a culture 
o f  “erotization”. He notes that the Laobe and adjoining communities promote erotic arts and 
practices as a means for acquiring economic assets that could lead to economic empowerment (3). 
For many women, getting married and remaining married is a defense mechanism against the 
pervasive poverty o f womankind. A way o f staying married is ensuring the male is sexually 
pleased. This “duty to please” has been confirmed by research. May I borrow an example from the 
findings o f  a study in another part o f  the world, Thailand, where Knodel et al. (1996) report that:
In virtually all the women focus groups and in many o f the in-depth interviews, women 
expressed the view that it was important for wives to please their husbands sexually. This 
was seen as important for discouraging husbands from seeking sex elsewhere. Indeed, 
given the perception o f an innate male need for sex, not providing sexual satisfaction for 
the husband is seen by m any women as risk ing his infidelity.
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Closely following the duty to sexually pleasing men, women also are assigned both by biology and 
society the task o f bearing children.
Women: Fruitful Vines of the Ancestors
In Africa, the ancestors are pleased with a woman who bears children, especially sons. 
Caldwell and Caldwell (1987: 409-10) argue that sub-Saharan Africa may offer greater resistance 
to fertility decline than any other region o f the world because:
high fertility (and a considerable number oi surviving children) is associated with joy, the 
right to life, divine approval and the approbation by both living and dead ancestors. 
Conversely, low fertility is only too easily interpreted as evidence o f sin and disapproval.
Bawah et al. (1999) in their study o f Northern Ghana observe the pressures and strains women tace, 
including physical violence, when they interfere with their duty to bear children through the use ol 
contraceptive methods.
Sowing Wild Oats: Husbands and Sexual Networking
Both married men and married women are involved in sexual networks. Men are however tar more 
prodigious sexual net-workers than women. In a study based in Kinshasa in what was Zaire, 
Bertrand et a l.(1991) report that twenty-three percent (23%) o f their married sample had engaged in 
extra-marital relations. Only one percent (1%) o f married women reported having had extra-marital 
relations (7). In their study of Ekiti in the Nigerian South-West, Orubuloye, Caldwell and Caldwell 
(1991) note that:
Even in rural areas, 56 percent o f the most recent sexual relations by monogamous males 
was outside their marriages, while in the urban area the proportion rose to 67 percent. In 
rural areas, three-fourths o f this need was met by single women, not necessarily all living 
there, while most o f the balance were married women. In the urban area, almost four- 
fifths was met by single women, with most o f  the balance coming from separated or 
divorced women, who were more numerous in the towns.
The extent of sexual networks was further studied by Orubuloye, Caldwell and Caldwell (1992) in 
their study ot “partner’s partners’’ in the Ondo Town Project. Sexual networks are accentuated by 
migration. In his study of sexual networking within the context o f migration in Ghana, Anarfi notes 
that, “more sexual activities go on outside marriage than within. More females than males are 
likely to have sex within marriage.’’ Migrants tend to establish sexual network where they migrate. 
Hope (2001) reports that:
Migrant or mobile workers tend to live as single men in the area o f their place o f work 
and often have sexual relations with both the local women and others (including 
prostitutes) from outside the area who travel to these work sites and provide sexual 
services to them. In some instances, some men have set up ‘parallel fam ilies’ in the area 
they work, living with women they regard as their wives and may even have children 
with them.
In South Africa for example, migrants return to their wives after some period o f separation 
and establish relations o f unprotected sex.
Danger in the Bedroom: The Hidden Epidem ic of H usband to W ife Transmission of 
HIV.
Husbands involved in sexual networks either locally or in liaisons contracted during a migration 
hip s tand a c hance o f  r eturning t o t heir w ives w ith a “ m icrobial” o r “ viral 1 oad” , o f  i nfections
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ranging from syphilis, gonorrhea to HIV. Thus Almedal, a senior officer with UNAIDS declared 
HIV a male driven epidemic (Foreman 1999). The time has come to recognize marriage and stable 
heterosexual relations in Africa as high- risk territory, deserving as much attention as we have 
given the risks faced by unmarried youth and commercial sex workers. Balmer et al. (1995) note: 
non-comm ercial sex is becoming increasingly important as a transmission route, 
particularly between marital partners.
M orrison et al. (1997) however also argue that:
Heterosexual transm ission accounts for the majority o f  HIV infections in 
A frica .. .W hile num erous studies have considered risk factors for STD among sex 
workers, few have examined STD risk factors among married African w om en...B ased 
on the low prevalence o f  risky sexual behavior among m arried African women, 
researchers have suggested that their STD risk is associated with their husband’s 
behavior.
Research based evidence is emerging on the subject o f husband to wife transmissions o f 
inlections. Straten et al. (1995) reporting a study based in Kigali, Rwanda, note that the population 
accounting lor most ol the prevalence and incidence o f 111V infection in Kigali are monogamous 
women who are at high risk because o f the current or previous behavior o f their steady sexual 
partners. Ndm ya-Achola el al. (1997) in a Nairobi study report that differing profiles o f male and 
female sexual behavior indicate, “m en’s extramarital sexual behavior puts them and their wives at 
risk for STD/HIV infection.” The researchers also note an increase in the num ber o f  pregnant 
women in Nairobi being diagnosed HIV/STD positive.
Can Madam Say “No?” The Normative Base o f Sexual Coercion
The issue o f sexual power relations within marriage, mainly the question o f the choices women 
can make or cannot make become salient when we realize marriage is no longer a safety net from 
HIV infection. In this situation., the risk to women emerges from the reality o f  sexual coercion, a 
situation where a virally loaded husband can demand sex from his monogam ous wife and where 
she cannot say “N o” even when she knows saying “Yes” could be her death sentence. Sexual 
coercion is a multidimensional phenomenon. It consists o f a norm ative social and economic order, 
where poverty is the differentia specified o f the female gender. This “norm ative order” is a kind o f 
Durkheimian “Social Fact” constraining, regulating and directing the behavior and conduct o f 
women. The quantum effect o f  this normative order is the social production o f a dis-em powered 
category called “w om an” . Poverty is the fundamental element o f  the normative base o f sexual 
coercion. Poverty originates in unequal command over both economic and political resources. 
Bereft o f  political resources and economic assets, w om en’s capacity for independent decision­
making is stultified an d  arrested. Men, like women face poverty , but fo r women, the structural 
deficits accruing from poverty are accentuated by gender. Thus apart from lacking control over 
empowering assets the woman lacks control over her body, sexuality and reproductive 
endowments. The dis-empowering normative order in which women subsist, is reified and 
mystified through ideology and routinized through culture. The cultural “indoctrination” o f females 
into subordinate roles is sustained through the socialization process.
The Superstructure o f Sexual Coercion
On this normative base emerges a superstructure o f overt sexual violence. This “superstructure” 
globally includes routine wife- beating, stabbing, burning, deprivation o f food, solitary 
confinement, constant denigrations, insults, public humiliation and m urder (Njovana and W atts 
1996; Khan et al. 1997).
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The Nasarawa State AIDS and Culture Study (NASACS)
Nasarawa State was created out o f  Plateau State in 1996. Located in North-Central Nigeria 
between Latitude 7° and 9° North and Longitude 7° and 10° East, Nasarawa State is home to about 
3 million Nigerians. In addition to a large Christian population, it is the location ot the three 
Emirates o f Keffi, Nasarawa and Lafia. Bordered to the north by Plateau and kaduna States, to the 
south by Benue State and to the west by the Federal Capital Territory (Abuja), Nasarawa State is in 
the heart o f  central Nigeria and right at the epicenter ot N igeria s rising HIV/AIDS epidemic. The 
neighboring Benue State had by the years 1999-2000 the highest HTV prevalence in central N igena 
(FMH 1999). Next to Oturkpo in Benue State Lafia, the Nasarawa State capital was the second 
“hotspot” for HIV/AIDS in North-Central Nigeria.2
The AIDS and Culture study findings reported here was inspired by an earlier study of the 
public perception o f condom use as protection against STI/HIV. The latter indicated that the people 
o f Nasarawa State had serious “misgivings” about condoms to a point where some thought 
condoms themselves cause AIDS! (Alubo 1998) NASACS was designed to pursue the subject of 
public perceptions further, by targeting a very strategic section o f the population, m arried 
government employees o f the Nasarawa State Civil Service Commission and the Local 
Government Service Commission. The study design focused on married government employees, 
because married persons are already familiar with sexual matters. Those who had participated in 
the earlier study mentioned pointed out the reluctance o f unm anied women in discussing sexual 
matters. Virginity for women is highly valued in Nasarawa State and female “virgins” are not 
expected to  know or talk about sexual matters. We stum bled on the issue o f th e  “H ousew ife’s 
Dilemma” serendipitously. Our mission was to find out attitudes about protected sexual behavior, 
mainly the use o f condoms in the face o f the HIV epidemic. But as we listened to women and men 
in the focus group discussions and looked at the data, it became clear to us that we had stumbled on 
a serious moral conflict among Nasarawa State married female civil servants. Not only did they 
have a high degree o f knowledge about HIV and how it is transmitted, we were almost shocked to 
note that they could do literally “nothing” if the transmission route was their husband. W e 
encountered a deadly arithmetic: Infected husband = death o f a wife. W e had to begin a new 
literature review as interest now went beyond attitudes to condom use to the subject o f  spousal 
infections and HIV risks within the context o f marriage and the family. Here may be found the 
secret for understanding the bush- fire fury o f the spread o f H IV/AIDS in Africa. Rather than 
appear as the disease o f a sexual sub-culture, it is the sexual disease o f  the mainstream heterosexual 
culture and progresses through routine adult sexual activity rooted in centuries old gender roles.
Most o f the 1026 respondents in the survey carried out were between 20-50 years, the m ajority 
between ages 20-41 (69.4%) and almost equally divided between men and women.( See Annex 1 
below for details o f the sample and survey and focus group discussions organized). All said they 
had heard o f HIV/AIDS. Radio and television were the main media through which most had heard 
about HIV/AIDS. Nasarawa State is a new and predominantly rural state, created in 1996 and is yet 
to develop a publishing and newspaper culture. Radio and television proved to be an effective 
mode of communicating HIV/AIDS information.
We wanted to find out attitudes towards HIV/AIDS. So, we asked the question:
“How would you feel if  a doctor says you have AIDS?”
The prevailing attitudes observed were dread, fear and among others a fatalistic resignation to 
the situation it an HIV positive diagnosis should evei be made concerning them. The Focus Group 
Discussions helped to express what the interview schedules could not fully communicate. People
, A research proposal for a study of “Socio-Cultural Obstacles to Protected Sexual Behavior” was approved 
by John D. & Catherine T. Mac Arthur Foundation in the \ ear 2001. This grant funded what became the 
•Nasarawa State AIDS and Culture Study (NASACS).
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spoke o f  the secrecy and stigma noted to be associated with the whole HIV/AIDS question. A male 
discussant in Group 3 said:
I will not tell my people because I don’t want them  to insult my children. Ihey  will 
say to them ‘Y our father died o f  H IV /A ID S’ and cause my children many problems.
To avoid this, I will not tell people.
Another male discussant said:
1 will be shocked and will think about my wife, ‘Is she too infected?’ But I will not 
tell the world what has happened to me. I w on’t have the courage to do that. But till 
the end o f  my life all I will do is pray and pray and pray.
A female discussant narrated her experience thus:
Let me tell you my experience. There was a time I was very ill and became very thin. I 
had chest pains and people were avoiding me. They thought I had AIDS. 1 was 
actually suffering from severe heartburn.
W e also wanted to explore perceptions o f vulnerability. So we asked the question: “Can you 
ever catch AIDS? ” Surprisingly, most o f  those who thought they could get HIV, thought they could 
get it m ainly through contam inated blood products and instruments (38%). Only 15% thought they 
could get HIV through sexual intercourse, and 39.6% thought that bybeing faithful to their spouse, 
they were invulnerable to HIV/AIDS.
To assess thoughts on HIV/AIDS prevention we asked the question: “H ow  can HIV/AIDS be 
prevented?" An overwhelming 85.9% m entioned “marital faithfulness” as the best way to prevent 
HIV infection. Only 5% m entioned condom use. M arried persons generally prefer marital 
faithfulness as protection from HIV/ALDS. (This is confirmed by results o f  Demographic Health 
Surveys in Benin, Central African Republic, Chad, Eritrea, Mali, M alawi, M ozambique, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zam bia and Zimbabwe).
W hen we asked the question: “Condoms have been described as effective in preventing AIDS, 
what do you think?” Nearly 50% o f the sample said they did not believe in the effectiveness o f 
condom s in HIV prevention. Only 35% vouched for the effectiveness o f  condoms.. We explored 
this subject in the focus group discussions. A male discussant in Group 1 said:
As for m yself since I was born, I have never used a condom. I don’t like them. As a child 
o f God, I m arried  25 years ago and I have never had sex outside my marriage. W hen 
people talk o f  AIDS I know I can never get it unless it comes through the air we breathe 
or water we drink. If  it is through sex, I can’never get H IV ...I don ’t like condoms and I 
have nothing to do with condoms.
A nother discussant in Group 1 said:
“I don’t think using a condom is a guarantee. W hy not ju st stay o ff having sex outside?”
In Group 3, the m ixed male and female group, some o f  the responses were even more heated:
A male discussant said:
“I condem n the notion o f condoms. I stick to faithfulness. Even before the W orld Health 
Organization I will tell them this!"
Part o f  the reason people had negative views about o: Join use was their perceived poor quality. A 
male discussant said:
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As far as 1 know condom is not the best way for protection from AIDS, lh e  ones in the 
market are not reliable. They are not strong and can easily tear or be broken. Based on the 
ones I have used in the past, condoms have proved they are not good material for 
protection from HIV. The ones in the market cannot give protection from anything”
Another male discussant said:
1 have used many condoms. Most ot those 1 used got torn. Unless belter ones aie made 
they are not good for protection from AIDS
Another discussant noted:
My only observation here is that the government should regularize the making o f 
condoms. There are inferior quality condoms in the market. 1 he federal Government 
should contact manufacturers to ensure good quality condoms.
We wanted to find out what people actually do. So we asked a behavioral question: “Now that 
AIDS has become a common problem, has your sexual behavior changed?” Only 1.9% ot the 
sample reported condom use as evidence o f behavior change in response to the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic. 17.7% o f the respondents reported not requiring any behavior change as they have 
always been faithful to their wives. However 75% o f the sample reported “I now sleep only with 
my wife.” This suggests their action is behavior modification in response to the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic.
The Role of Sexual Intercourse in Marriage
The questions here were designed to explore the aspects o f  sexual intercourse; who initiates sex 
and who decides what protective measures need to be taken by couples in the face o f the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic. We asked this question:
“What in your opinion is the major role o f sexual intercourse?”
An overwhelming 76.5% described procreation as the principal function o f  sexual intercourse. 
This attitude sets the stage for what the role o f women is in marriage and the family.
Who Initiates Sex?
We believed that the issue o f who should initiates sexual intercourse, would unravel some o f  the 
issues o f sexual power relations in marriage. So the question was asked: “Who should initiate 
initiates sexual intercourse?”
Though a significant minority (42.8 %) thought either o f  the partners could initiate sex, over ha lf 
o f both women and men believed the initiation o f sex should be left to the man. We further 
explored the issue by asking the question: “In your experience who . . .IT '
1 his question was asked to test actual behavior. This time two thirds o f  both women and men said 
the man initiates sex in their personal experience. In the focus group discussions, more light was 
shed on this matter. A male discussant in Group 1 said:
“My wife is very shy. So I initiate it. M ost o f  the time she will try to resist, but in the end 
she will submit.”
*
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Another male discussant said:
The m atter o f  initiation depends on the arrangement between the man and wife. But it is 
better for the man to initiate it because he is the one who brought the woman into the 
house.
A female discussant in Group 2, thought a man should initiate sex because a woman initiating sex 
portrays a ‘"bad character” :
W hen men see women, they get aroused so it is men who are supposed to initiate sex. If 
as a m arried woman you should ask for sex, it will look one kind. The man will say you 
are too sexy. He may ask, ‘W hy is she initiating sex? May be she is already used to it’ 
and you don’t want him to know you know about sex.
This statement was followed by a roar o f  laughter by the women.
In the m ixed male and female group, Group 3, a female discussant said cynically:
Since the men say they are the head o f  the house, they should initiate sex. In a way, it is 
nature. A woman cannot just come and say ‘O.K. L et’s have i t ’ M ostly, the men initiate it 
because for some men, m erely seeing a woman is enough.
We asked another question to further explore the issue o f  sexual power relations:
“W hat happens when the woman refuses to have sex?”
M ost people, both women and men (56.5%) replied the man would be “Very angry!” A m inority 
m entioned unhappiness and even possible violence. A female discussant in Group 2 said a 
consequence o f  refusing to have sex is that:
The man will beat you and refuse feeding you and will leave the house. W hen that 
happens, you will look for him  to have sex with you.”
In Group 2 a female discussant said:
The man would be angry. You know its nature and you have committed an offense by 
refusing to have sex. The man would be angry with her.
Another female discussant said:
I f  a wom an has a genuine reason, that' is good. But if  she has no genuine 
reason. ..huh...hell! Only God would save her because many things would happen.
Another female discussant said:
There are men that if  you refuse to have sex with them that is when you will know that 
you are in trouble.
A female discussant said:
Some men when they are on ‘heat’ they will not tolerate anything, even when you are on 
menses, so allow him even when you are on menses
To buttress the point a woman said:
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1 have a friend that her husband enjoys her when she is having her menses. I told her she 
should be very prayerful because he is always sexy.
A female discussant in Group 3, the mixed group related her exp<. i ience.
He will be angry...W hy should 1 say ‘n o ’? I am in Lafia, he is in Jos. After all those 
weeks he will have the urge. So why should I say ‘n o ’. If  I am well, why should I deny 
my husband. He will be very angry.
A wife described her case thus:
Even if  I explain the situation to him, he will be angry. If I say I am tired , he will ask 
‘W hy?’ So he will be angry.
In the same group, another woman said:
In my own situation, once I refuse, he will be angry with me. If  I demand anything in the 
house, he will tell me to get it from the lovers who are satisfying me outside. If I should 
lay a complaint o f sickness, he will ask ‘What sickness?’ So if the sickness is not in the 
private part or requires hospital admission, he will demand submission to sex. Other than 
that, nothing else will do for him.
In the all male Group 1, a male discussant said:
Under normal circumstances, if  it is not menses, I will suspect her. I may have offended 
her or else I will be veiy annoyed.
Another male husband in Group 3, said:
I will ask her why. If she has a genuine reason, like she is tired, I can understand. But if 
there is no genuine reason, I will not take it lightly. She w on’t have any reason to reject 
me.
We then asked the men: “Supposing you don’t see any ‘good reason’ in her refusal, what would 
you do?” A discussant said:
It takes me time to get annoyed, but when I am annoyed, any request the woman has will 
not be entertained. It will not be entertained because she has refused to take to my 
command. Now she has provoked me to anger and I will find a way o f retaliating. I will 
ignore her. There are measures I will take against her...
The responses indicate that when wives want to say “N o” to sex, they immediately come under 
social and “psychological ’ pressure. The “social pressure” emanates from their structural 
vulnerabilities and lack o f economic security. The “psychological pressure” rises from fear o f  the 
man s anger, and fear of the economic-emotional sanctions” he could impose. These include being 
ignored, denied emotional support, the withdrawal o f material sustenance and in some cases 
physical violence. These “fears” compel, constrain, and “squeeze” out a “Yes” from her, 
irrespective o f what she wrants or feels when her husband is negoti ating sex.
Can a Housewife Protect Herself W hen a H usband  is U nfaithful?
lo  explore the issue o f protection for housewives in the - h t  o f the HIV/AIDS epidemic, we asked 
this question: ‘If a husband is unfaithful, how can an protect herself?” M ore than a quarter
0
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said she should insist that he use a condom. 18% said she should stop sleeping with him  until he 
becom es faithful. Only two percent thought she should divorce him. Responses such as- “She 
should stop sleeping with h im  until he stops his infidelity”; “Only God can protect her”; “She 
should pray for him and counsel him ”; “She should advise him to go for a medical test”; 
“Unfaithfulness is hard to detect”; “She should wain him to desist from such conduct”; “She should 
take antibiotics to protect h e rse lf’; “She should report him to theii parents, pastor or Im am ” and 
answers like “I will not stop sleeping with him”; “She has no right over her body,”- range from 
expressions of ignorance, fatalism and capitulation to the m an’s will, even when the situation could 
be a high risk to her sexual and reproductive health.
We asked the women: “W hat would you do i f  your husband insists on having sex even if  you 
suspect he is sleeping with other wom en?”
M any women report (39.2% ) they can do nothing about a husband’s involvem ent in a sexual 
network. While 33% said they would stop sleeping with an unfaithful husband. The 9.2% saying 
they play “delay tactics”; the 1.2% saying they “will report him  to their parents”; the 5.1% that said 
they will “pray and counsel him ” indicates 54.7% o f the female sample will sleep with an 
unfaithful husband.
The FGDs were again helpful in throwing more light on the subject. In the all female group, Group 
2, a discussant said:
If my husband insists on having sex, I will tell him that whatever happens to me, I will 
never forgive him. I will tell him the right thing because some men can force themselves 
on you.
Table 1
W hat would you do if  your husband insists on having sex 
even if  you suspect he is sleeping with other wome n?
Responses Female
(N=509)
There 's nothing I can do, he is my husband 39.2
I will refuse to sleep with him 33.0
I will, play delay tactics & avoid him 1 9.2
I will request we go for HIV test r 0.5
I will give him  condom  to use 8.0
I will report him  to our parents 1.2
I will divorce him 1.6
I will pray for him  & counsel him 5.1
It is against our religion for a wife to refuse her husband 
sex
0.2
No response 2.0
Total
!O
I
L2i
Another wife said:
The husband o f  a woman I know told her that if  she did not want it, there were m any 
outside waiting.
A discussant expressed her fears this way:
I cannot tell him I will not have sex because I fear divorce. I will ask God to protect me.
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Another female forlornly declared:
There are men that if  you refuse to have sex with them, they may even beat you. Even il 
you say you don’t want it, he will talk to you with power, and will use that power. He 
will force you-because I cannot tight him, there is nothing I can do.
A woman discussant put it this way:
I cannot tell my husband that he should not have sex with me. Because sometime ii you 
tell him ‘N o’, he will tell you he has 10 more like you outside. He will tell you. ‘11 you 
are not ready, pack and leave my house!’ You just have to manage it anti pray to God to 
protect you .. Because I heard ol a woman whose husband died o f AIDS. Because ot her 
faithfulness, even when she was tested, she turned out to be negative. So I will leave my 
life to God so that He will protect me. This is easier for me than to tell my husband I will 
not have sex with him. If he sends you packing out o f the house, where will you go? Are 
you sure you will get another husband who has no AIDS? ... Do you tell him to use a 
condom? So there is no way to protect yourself!
Another concluded the matter this way:
I will have to accept and give m yself to him. I will talk to him, but I will have to accept 
and give m yself to him.
We asked a question we hoped wall explore the issue o f protection thoroughly. The question was: 
“Can a w oman ask her husband to use a condom if she suspects he is unfaithful?” Surprisingly 
80.4% responded: “Yes!” both women and men. We then asked the men this question: “How 
would you react if  your wdfe asks you to use a condom?” Apart from the 30% who said its “O .K ” 
with them, the 67.61% who claimed, “they would be offended”; “feel accused o f infidelity”; “don’t 
believe in condoms”; “will be curious” “will suspect her o f infidelity” and “I will beat her,”- 
indicates husbands would not approve o f such a situation. In the FGDs we got more insight into the 
matter. In Group 2, one woman said:
Condoms nearly broke somebody’s marriage. A woman told her husband to use them.
Later her husband asked her whether she had any illness. He began suspecting her and 
asked her to pack her things and leave his house. Their parents had to intervene.
A female discussant in Group 2 said:
To tell your husband to use a condom? He will suspect.. .It will be very difficult.
Another wife said:
The men will tell you there is no pleasure in using a condom and there is noting you can 
do and you cannot accuse him.
In the all male Group 1, one man, said:
h o u s e aSkS mC t0 USC 3 COnd° m 51 Wil1 susPect her- That maY bring problem s into the 
Another husband admitted:
I find it difficult to speak here. I am a Christian and I am born again. If  my wife wakes up 
one morning and asks me to use a condom, then I know there is a problem.
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A man noted:
I am  a harsh man and don’t take rubbish but I allow my wife to speak her mind. In our 
culture it is a man who brings up such issues...A s my colleague has said, the marriage 
will break up.
W e then asked the all male group, Group 1: “What if  you suspect your wife o f  infidelity, will you 
use a condom ?”
A discussant replied:
I will divorce her right away! 1 will not tolerate it! Because o f  my personal experiences 
with condoms, I will not use it but divorce her right away!
Another noted:
This condom  thing I have never mentioned it in my house.
“Pack and leave my house!” The Fears o f the African Housewife.
The African housewife is a human being living in a state o f  suspended animation, in constant 
fear o f  her husband’s dreaded verdict, “Pack and leave my house!” To avoid this verdict she will 
have sex against her will, sleep with a virally loaded mate and share her husband with a sexual 
network. The verdict, “Pack your load and go!” may imply the following: D ivorce or separation; 
loss o f  economic support and material sustenance; loss o f status and honor as her father and 
brothers may not welcome her back since bride-wealth may have been paid; the loss o f access to 
her children; loss o f food source and shelter; movement into commercial sex work to make ends 
meet. Behind this devil o f  “ losses” lies the deep blue sea o f a possible spousal HIV infection. Fear 
o f  these “losses” could overpower or surpass the prospect o f  death from HIV. This is the African 
H ousew ife’s dilemma.
Challenging Vulnerability with Em powerm ent
The poor have no negotiating power. As long as women are bereft o f economic assets and 
access to avenues for the accum ulation and consolidation o f tangible wealth in their own name, 
their ability to make healthy reproductive health choices will remain severely limited. Studies have 
noted that econom ically independent women can and do negotiate the terms o f  sexual intercourse 
(Elias and Heisel 1999: Orubuloye et al. 1993; George and Jasnal 1995). M arriage and the family 
are some o f  the pillars o f  culture. Culture is dynamic and must grew if it would rem ain relevant. 
Prevailing gender roles, rooted in culture and economics need to address its present inability to 
constructively engage the “W oman Q uestion” in Africa. This is an issue the custodians o f culture 
m ust address. Government, leaders o f  ethnic groups and communities, the judiciary and civil 
society m ust rise up to the challenge o f  developing new conceptual frameworks for re-defining the 
roles o f  wom en in m arriage and the family, if  the African female is to survive the 21st century. The 
place to begin this re-conceptualization is in the domain o f economic production and property 
relations. A w ay  t:o begin  this m ay  b e  through th e  reform ulation o f  1 aws o n  the o wnership an d  
distribution o f family property. The first steps must therefore be administrative, judicial and 
legislative.
Thus w om en’s access to land should be codified and formalized in law. Such laws should 
guarantee w om en’s c ontrol o f  1 and in e quality w ith m en i n t he h ouseholds o f  their p arents a nd 
husbands. There is also the need to formally codify ai formalize the rights o f  women in marriage. 
These laws should be focused on issues already reco u n t/ d in many conventions and docum ents on 
the rights o f  women. W omen should be allowed by » own houses as part o f  their inheritance
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from their fathers and be the inheritors by law o f the houses o f their husbands when the latter die. A 
husband and his wife or (wives) must have the same rights with respect to the ownership, 
acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment and disposition o f property in marriage.
Agriculture i s the main employer o f women in Africa. W omen should be assisted to obtain 
loans and other financial resources for investments in business and agriculture. Such loans should 
attract women friendly interest rates.
To enhance their access to and ability to manage resources and power in society, women must 
be guaranteed full access to education to the highest levels. All enrolm ent discrimination by parents 
and schools must be made illegal. W omen’s organizations should pursue the enhancement o f the 
visibility o f women in public affairs, public institutions and agencies where laws are formulated 
and implemented.
W omen’s Right o f Protection
Marriage need not be a death sentence. Where a woman can prove that her husband’s 
extramarital affairs endanger her health, there should be laws allowing her to protect herself 
without loosing material support for herself and her children. Such rights should include the right to 
continued support in the areas o f food and shelter.
Violence and the threat of using physical force against a spouse must be addressed by the laws 
o f African states and governments. If  it is a crime to assault someone on the street, then assaulting a 
spouse at home must also be recognized as a violent crime against another human being. Rape is 
rape whether it is spousal or not.
Re-Orieiiting Male Attitudes: FOREMAN
While measures are taken at the level o f the law and legislation, attitudes that denigrate and 
promote violence against w om en must become the target o f re-education progjams. One o f th e  
outcomes o f NASACS is a non-Govemmental Organization (NGO) called FOREM AN— Forum for 
the Re-Orientation of Male Attitudes in Nigeria. This organization, which is still on the drawing 
board has the vision o f promoting the ideology that empowered women are a society’s greatest 
asset. The doctrines o f FOREMAN are expressed in some o f these themes:
• The best mothers are empowered mothers.
• Empowered women make better wives.
• Men cannot de-humanize women without de-humanizing themselves.
• The man is the “Lion o f the house”— but true lions protect the pride. They don’t kill
their wives with HIV.
• Real men are gentle men.
• Women don’t “fall” for brutes. They “fall” for gentle men.
• Real men don’t beat women. They beat HIV!
• When you are dead, no one can protect your children better than their mother- “Write
it down in your will!”
Attacking normative sexual violence through the law, legislation and education would make 
African housewives better equipped to resolve the Housewife’s Dilemma.
«
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Appendix
M ethodological Decisions: Interviews and Focus Group Discussions.
The study used Structured Interview Schedules (SIS) with Open Ended Questions (OEQ). 
Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were used to elicit free and detailed responses. The sample was 
drawn from the official register o f  the Civil Service Com mission and Local Government Service 
Com m ission (21-22). The staff strength o f  the State Civil Service was 8,706 when NASACS 
began. Local Governm ent employees numbered 7,392. This produced a sampling frame o f 16,098. 
The Nasarawa State Civil Service has a total o f  32 m inistries, boards, bureaus and commissions. 
Adm inistrative bodies with a staff strength o f 125 and above were p referred. This com pensated for 
the d^proportionate ly  1 ow n umber o f fe m a le s  a s t he S tate C lvil S ervice is c om posed o f  7 8.7% 
males and 21.3% females. Adm inistrative bodies with more than 125 workers stood a better chance 
o f  having m ore females. This criterion brought down the bodies eligible for entry  into our sample 
to ten. (10) th ese  adm inistrative bodies served as the clusters o f  the study. Governm ent employees 
were then classified into four (4) strata or cadre mainly: Junior S taff Cadre (Grade Level 01-05); 
Intermediate S taff Cadre (Grade Level 06-08); Senior S taff Cadre (Grade Level 09-13) and 
M anagerial Cadre (Grade Level GL 14-Above). Based on the num erical strength o f each strata, it 
was decided that out o f the 26 married males and 26 m arried female respondents required from 
each m inistry or board, 20% would be drawn from the M anagerial cadre; 25% from the Senior staff 
cadre; 25% from the Intermediate cadre and 30% from the Junior staff cadre. Based on this 
arithm etic, we expected to interview 260 married male respondents and 260 m arried female 
respondents, thus producing a total o f 520 respondents from the state civil service.
Local Governm ent staff were classified according to the strata and cadre used in the case o f the 
state government employees. The Local Government Service had five clusters. These are the 
Personnel/Finance, Works, Agriculture, Social Services and Primary Health Care departments. The 
W orks department was taken out o f  the sample frame because o f  the total absence o f women. We 
were able to interview 78 men and 75 women (total = 153) in Nasarawa Eggon Local Government; 
67 men and 61 women (total =128) in Akwanga Local Government, while 139 men and 86 women 
were interviewed (total = 225) in Lafia Local Government Area. In total, we interviewed 506 local 
governm ent employees. Data was collected by officers o f the State M inistry 'of Health, most o f  who 
are Com munity Health Officers and senior nursing personnel. The field work proceeded after a 
training and induction workshop. There were three (3) Focus Group Discussions. Group 1 was the 
All M ale Group. Group 2 was the All Female Group, while Group 3 was the M ixed M ale/ Female 
Group. Each group had between 8-10 discussants. A total o f  (1026) interview schedules were 
successfully administered.
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F A M IL IE S P O R T R A Y E D  IN W E ST  A F R IC A N  FI C l  IO N  
Kari Dako, Moussa Traore and Helen Yitah
Marriage and family ties appear to pose persistently unresolved pioblerns in W est African 
societies and as a result literature (fiction as well as non fiction) keeps returning to these topics and 
keeps looking at them from different angles. This paper is about fictional portrayals o f  marriage 
and family ties. The discussion is based on the premise that two non-African religious concepts o f 
the institution o f marriage and thus family are in juxtaposition with various traditional concepts and 
practices. We will take examples form Francophone West African literature to spotlight the conflict 
between Islam, and the tradition as reflected in some novels from Senegal, Guinea, and Mali, and 
we will take Ghanaian Literature to exemplify how Christianity, the M arriage Ordinance and 
tradition produce conflicts in English speaking West Africa.
According to Northern and Western perceptions, th e  institution ot marriage is central to th e  
whole concept o f the family. M eanwhile the family is whatever torm is perceived as being founded 
on smaller conjugal units in which the basic players are the male and the female spouses. This idea 
is o f course profoundly different from West African customary notions whereby descent and 
parenthood are the central building blocks o f kin groups, and marriage is merely a m echanism  for 
regulating reproduction and legitimising filial ties. We will demonstrate that fiction portrays 
marriage and therefore the family in West Africa as being in a process o f  change, but change that is 
conceived as worrying, to some extent a destabilising process and most o f  the time not desirable. 
Traditional concepts, beliefs, and practices are attacked from without by ‘m odernity’ and by new 
religions, Islam and Christianity, and from within by other-ethnic practices. Transferences taking 
place within this atmosphere are constantly brought up in the novels -  indicating serious societal 
dilemmas that need constant reassessment.
Traditionally, polygyny was practiced and was pervasive in most o f  Sub-Saharan Africa. Islam 
came and restricted the number o f wives to four -  provided the man loved all equally and could  
provide equally for them. Colonialism and Christianity came and demanded monogamy. Fem inism  
came and demanded monogamy and promoted female autonomy and independence. T raditional 
marriage practices w ere influenced b y  fonns adapted from  th e  practices o f  neighbouring e thnic 
groups. I here is accordingly a syncretic weave ot marriage and fam ily  patterns perm eating the 
continent. These are the realities that literature attempts to portray and assess.
Francophone West Africa is predominantly Islamic and it is an area where traditional marriage, 
Muslim marriage and  m odem/official m arriage co-exist in synchronic interrelation, b u t i t  is th e  
distortion of the M uslim m arriage with its implication for family life that is the more recurrent 
theme in the francophone novel. \ e t  when a marriage falls apait, a solution to the conflict often 
has to be sought in ‘alien’ system s:
Les marabouts consulterent le Saint Livre des lois coranique, d ’autres reviserent le 
“Farata et le Sounna”, les ordres et les ordonnaces qui unissent et desunissent. (Ousmane 
Voltaique: 153).
(The mallams consulted the Holy Book o f Koranic Laws, the others revisited the Farida 
and the Sunna, the orders and the  o rd inances th a t un ite  and d iv ide).
-  the view that the Ordinance is divisive we also see in Anglophone literature.
W hereas the early Francophone novel, such as C am ara Laye’s The African Child , presented a 
romanticised idyll of polygynous family life, a paradise where even the snake, his father’s tame
t
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totem, is benevolent, later novelists explore the inherent culture conflict o f  contem porary Islamic 
Africa. The novelists attempt to make the reader distinguish between the prescribed divine or 
religious attitudes and the individual or personal actions and conceptions. Marriage and family life 
in Islamic W est Africa are supposed to be anchored in the Islamic rules and regulations, but there is 
a discrepancy between marriage as practised and marriage as prescribed in the Koran. So that even 
though W est Africa as a whole has practised polygyny from the earliest times, polygyny is 
portrayed as an Islamic practice in Francophone literature. Islam is thus the apologia for the 
continued maintenance o f the male dominated sta tus quo. Yet the portrayal is o f  a male-oriented, a 
patriarchal Islam, an Islam that allows a man to get married to up to four wives. Even though the 
Koran states that a man is allowed to get married to a maximum num ber o f  four wives “only if  he is 
sure he will be able to avoid injustice among his w ives”, and even though the Koran then concludes 
w ith the point ot view “that every man should get married to only one w ife” (Koran: 4:3 entitled 
‘W om en'); patriarchal W est Africa prefers its own interpretation o f  the Holy Book. As Tam sir says 
in So L o n g  a Letter:
. ..  it is fate that decides men and things: God intended him to have a second wife, there is
nothing he can do about it. (37)
In Ousm ane Sem bene's X ala , el Hadji Abdoul Kader Beye is newly adopted into the class o f 
“les capitaines” because he has ju st m arried a third wife and this means that if  he gets m arried to 
four wives, he jo ins the class o f the “les com m andants” , that o f  Souleymane in Sembene 
O usm ane’s Voltaique. M arriage in the W est African Francophone novel is a com pletely m ale- 
dom inated matter, as Mariama Ba says in So L ong  a L e tter  ( and which echoes Ama Ata A idoo’s 
grandm other in C hanges) “ ... a woman must marry the man who loves her but never the one she 
loves.” (59)
A father decides to give his daughter in marriage to a man, or a man may send m essages to 
another man whose daughter he would like to marry. This is relevant to both traditional and Islamic 
societies. Echoes o f  former practices are seen in for example Seydou B adian’s Sous L  ’O rage, 
which provides one o f the few instances where the reader is shown a m arriage in traditional M ande 
society. Pere Benfa calls Tiemoko and his brothers for a consultation because Famagan has been 
sending m essages to “ask for the hand o f ’ their daughter Kany. But this traditional arrangem ent is 
not necessarily a happy one: in ‘Lettres de France’ in Sembene O usm ane’s Voltaique, Nafi laments 
her unhappy marriage: everything was initiated by her father who orte day showed her a picture o f  
a man living in France for many years who wanted a wife from Africa.
M oney is really the deciding factor behind these arranged marriages. A man whose fame and 
wealth increases may choose to take a new wife, and a father may choose to give his daughter in 
m arriage to a wealthy or prom inent man. The woman is thus com m odified in terms o f beauty and 
youth, an object to be acquired by the new  husband and a means to achieve recognition and wealth 
by the father. In this context, the husband has to live up to expectations and cater for his wife/wives 
and the children, and he has to struggle to play his role efficiently. El Hadji Abdoul K ader Beye in 
Sembene O usm ane’s X a la  starts out as a mere school teacher, then becomes a petty trader and ends 
up as a rich businessm an dealing in exports and imports. W ith his wealth he marries three wives, 
builds a villa for each o f  them, buys a car to convey his children to school. Unfortunately, ju st like 
M odu Fall in M ariama B a’s So L o n g  a L e tte r , polygymsts end up in a dilemma, as their financial 
com m itm ents becom e so immense, or in their efforts to impress or pam per the favourite wife they 
amass such debts, w ith the result that they cannot cope with any o f their commitments. It is this 
situation that Francophone literature exposes. The short-sightedness and immaturity o f  men who 
overstretch them selves financially in order to maintain several families and thus compete in the 
arena o f  m achism o, and the wom en who in the final analysis are the ones who have to straighten 
out the mess. These are main themes in the Francophone no The woman who is supposed to be 
protected and cared for, now becomes the carer and the prote ctor. Francophone literature abounds 
in examples o f  the strong female figure, the woman whv ays the m an’s role. Ram atoulaye and
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Alssatou are such wom en in G o d ’s Bits o f  Wood and So Long a l etter  respectively. As was said o f 
Ramatoulaye:
She h ad always b een q uiet a nd u nassum ing a nd g entle w ith t he c hildren: a 11 he s treet 
fountain she never took part in the argum ents,... (74)
But then something happens to R am toulaye; her fam ily faces starvation ,
...Ramatoulaye was not a man ... W here, then, had this violence been bom ? ... ‘It had 
been bom beside a cold fireplace, in an em pty kitchen.’ (74).
There is a role reversal: it is the women who are the provicers, not the men. The women in 
Francophone 1 iterature e xpose the m e n a s s  hallow a nd w  ithom s ubstance; w hile t he w omen a re 
held up as the ideal who have had to assum e the male role in addition to the female role and 
struggle to feed their families. They attain a level o f m aturity thar cannot be attained by men w hose 
only aim in life has been to join the club o f  “les capitaines" and “les com m andants” .
Divorce is almost non-existent in the Francophone W est African novel, and this may be traced 
to the Islamic rules: a couple who intend to separate are given 4C days to reconsider their decision 
before implementing it, and during this time most couples patch up. But the real issue that 
discourages divorce is the refund o f  the bride pnee, w hich often amounts to huge sums o f  money. 
For the wedding o f Abdoulaye and Sakinefou in D evant L Histoire, by Sembene Ousmane. 8 cows 
and 16 sheep were slaughtered -  to this must be added a large sum o f money. The woman has been 
sold and cannot redeem herself.
In Ghana “He is marrying A bena” does not mean that a \vedd:ng is taking place soon, nor do we 
necessarily have to consider, “He is not m arrying her any m ore.” as incorrect usage. From a 
pragmatic point o f view, both sentences are absolutely acceptable. Marriage in Ghana is not an 
event that starts at 3:30 p.m. on a Saturday afternoon and ends an hour later. Nor is it the brief 
meeting o ffam ilies  to n e g o tia te  the term s o f  th e  union. M arriage i s a process, n o t a n e  vent. 11 
involves other people, not ju st a man and the woman he hopes to mate with. So if  “Kwadwo is 
marrying Abena”, it m eans that they live together or hope to live together, though not necessarily in 
the same house, and Kwadwo will name A bena’s children and both will have to relate to the wider 
family (affines) o f the other. They will have undergone a traditional cerem ony in which gifts are 
exchanged before witnesses, so that these same people can be called upon to intervene should the 
union encounter difficulties. Kwadwo and Abena m ight later decide to marry under the 
‘Ordinance’, which means that Kwadwo may now not take another wife, as this would be deemed 
bigamy, and marriage under the Ordinance m eans that K w adw o’s wife and her children have 
definite rights as to inheritance. Abena w ould  now discard her former surname and assume her 
husband’s name with Mrs. in front. The couple may, i f  they can afford it, decide to have a big 
church wedding -  the bride dressed in white lace and with a white veil.
Marriage is traditionally an organization o f  one’s whole life, and it involves procreation and 
caring for those who need to be cared for: children, the old, the widowed, the sick. Yet today we 
are in a culture contact situation and family and marriage are in contact with many extra-traditional 
concepts, so that the institutions o f old are under attack from all sides and are thus redefining 
themselves.
Written literature in Ghana has from the beginning taken family and marriage as one o f its 
maj°r themes. This includes the output o f  the first generation of Gold Coasters to write in English: 
Casely Hayford, Mensah Sarbah, Kobina Sekyi and Hutton e\v who wrote in the second half of 
the 19th century and the early decades o f the 20th century. This ea i y  literature deals with the threat 
posed to the Gold Coast m ale by new  and alien Christia am C inance (monogamous) institutions 
°f marriage. The traditional w ay is held up as an ideal that m p oduce good husbands and wives
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and therefore need not be replaced by any new forms o f marriage contracts that after all do not 
enhance a relationship in any way. Far from it, the m odem  Christian cum Ordinance m am age is a 
disruptive force. In the traditional system, according to these Cape Coast intellectuals, the role o f 
the husband is to protect and the role o f  the wife is to obey -  the new  system creates a wife who 
can protect and thus disobey and a man who therefore must obey.
G hana’s first novel, M arita: or the F olly o f  L o ve , by an author writing under the pseudonym, 
‘A. N ative’, and serialised in the Gold Coast newspapers W estern Echo  and later the G old  C oast 
E cho  from January 1886 to January 1888, describes the disastrous consequences that befall African 
men who enter m arriage according to the colonial M arriage Ordinance o f  1884. This law 
drastically changed the status o f  the women who now' got m arried ‘legally’ or in church. When the 
Gold Coaster was encouraged to marry ‘under the O rdinance’ he was supposed to enter a 
m onogam ous and life-long marriage. According to ‘A. N ative’ this type o f m am age transformed 
good, w ell-behaved Fante wom en into nags and termagants ready to usurp the domestic reins o f 
their husbands.
My w ife , th e  obedient 1 oving g irl, th e  p ride o fm y  1 ife, th e  so lace o fm y  evil day s i s 
turned into the very incarnation o f a curse in my own house and I  cannot sen d  her aw ay  
on accoun t o f  an oath I  took  a t the cerem ony. -  1 am doomed by my oath to cariy this 
incubus, this w om an about with me. (M a rita : 86)
The main thrust o f  the novel is thus the subversion o f  traditional m arriage by Christianity and 
the M arriage Ordinance. This sentim ent is again found in Casely H ayford’s E th iop ia  U nbound  
(1911) l n w hich Tandoh-Kum a a nd h is w ife, E kuba, b attle i t o ut in L ondon, h e, a p rofessional 
aim ing to be invited to Governm ent House, wronders how he can bring his uneducated wife, Ekuba, 
along, a wife to whom  he is yoked, but who will most likely embarrass him and be a liability in his 
career prospects. The author then lets Kwamankra, the protagonist, propose an alternative to the 
Christian m onogam y, nam ely the return to the traditional system o f  polygyny!
The Ordinance is also a theme in Kobina Sekyi, w'ho lets a fisherman in The B linkards  make the 
following comment: “W onders never cease! W hat has m arriage to do with the Governm ent?”
Then comes R.E. Obeng, not the highly educated coastal intellectual o f  the type A. Native (J. E. 
Casely Hayford or Jam es Hutton Brew) or Kobina Sekyi, but an inland Akropong-trained teacher. 
H is novel E igh teenpence  (1942) has family, m arriage and the wom an w ithin m arriage as m ajor 
themes. The ideal is here not the traditional marriage. Obeng, although he him self practised both 
polygyny and serial monogamy, always appeared as a good Presbyterian to the outside world. 
Konaduwa, the female protagonist in his novel, is not the m alleable traditional wife. She is a 
harridan who clearly dem onstrates that i f  a woman sets out to destabilise the sta tu s quo, neither the 
traditional authorities nor the colonial administration can deal with her. Obeng obviously is not o f 
the same sentim ent as A. Native and Casely Hayford who are looking back to the ‘good old 
polygynous days’ w ith nostalgia. Obeng lives ‘the good old days’ and has experienced its positive 
and its negative sides. He thus investigates the western ideal o f  marriage, as he must have read 
about i t i n c ontem porary p opular 1 iterature a nd V ictorian n ovels, t o s ee w hether t hat m  ight n ot 
rather be a preferable type o f  union for an educated Gold Coaster. The author juxtaposes the 
traditional contractual polygynous marriage, with the Victorian mode o f  m onogam ous marriage, in 
w hich the nam eless and faceless and voiceless woman cleaves to her husband and thus neglects her 
w ider family to serve her lord and m aster in all. It is the reader who in the end must make the 
choice o f w hich type o f arrangement is the more desirable, if  any o f them.
M abel Dove Danquah, writing in the 1940s and 1950s, one o f  the early, but by no m eans the 
first, Gold Coast wom en authors, western educated, yet onsciously em phasising her ‘A fricanness’, 
in one o f  her short stories, A nticipa tion , tells the tale oi Adaku, Om anhene o f Akwasin, who 
cannot keep track o f his num erous wives. I he com ication o f the female is here clearly
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demonstrated as part o f  the traditional system, an argum ent later taken up by Amma Darko, writing 
in the 1990s and 2000s, and brought to its logical conclusion in her w ritings.
“This dancer is totally different,” thought the Chief; ‘‘she will be a joy  to the palace.” He turned 
round to the linguist:
“I will pay one hundred pounds for her.”
“She might already be m arried, Nana”
“I shall pay the husband any m onies he dem ands.”
The linguist knew his Omanhene: when he desired a woman he usually had his way. (in ed. 
Busby:224).
The Chief does have his way -  he proposes to marry this beautiful creature, and receives 
acceptance from both the woman and her parents. His new  bride is a woman who has been his wife 
for two years already.
The author, M abel Dove Danquah, was married to the famous J.B. Danquah, lawyer, historian, 
anthropologist, writer and politician, who quite openly practised the ‘good old polygnous w ays’ in 
spite o f his education, exposure and position in society.
During G hana’s next literary period: the im mediate post-Nkrumah years, there was a sudden 
proliferation o f novels. Ama Atta A idoo’s title o f  her collection o f  short stories (1971) echoes the 
spirit o f the age: there is No Sweetness Here. M arriage and family are treated in both the 
autobiographical novel such as Selorm ey’s The Narrow  P ath , which exposes the wrangle between 
the wider fam ily’s dem ands o f  a traditional union and the Chris :ian marriage that is expected o f  a 
Christian teacher in the com m unity, and these same themes are treated in the novels o f 
disillusionment, such as Armah's The Beautyful Ones are Not Yet Born, in which the man suffers 
the verbal assault o f  his m other-in-law. who has assumed the traditional role o f  advocate for her 
daughter and whose materialism  the protagonist cannot stomach, because he cannot fulfil the 
traditional role o f the husband as the provider. In A w oonor’s This Earth M y Brother Amamu is 
destroyed by being tom apart, trapped in a m odem  marriage, whereas all his other values cleave to 
his traditional roots. W riting in the 1980s, Kojo Laing has a whole series o f unusual unions 
scattered through out his works, Search Sweet Country’ and Woman o f  the Aeroplane -  hardly any 
fulfilling, all limping along in limbo.
Then comes Ama Ata Aidoo with Changes. This is an important book on being a woman in 
Ghana. We will not call it a feminist novel -  it is not -  it is a book that looks at marriage and family 
and male-female relationships with brutal honesty. It unravels traditional concepts, it strips the 
modem concepts naked and it leaves the em ancipated African woman abandoned and alone, paid 
off with a new car but short-changed in everything else. She has lost both husbands. She has 
abandoned her only child, having sacrificed it for her own gratification. She has had to present her 
best friend Opokuya with a car to keep her friendship.
As Ama Ata Aidoo lets E si’s grandm other say in Changes:
My lady Silk, it is not a question o f  this type o f  marriage or that type ol marriage. It was 
not a question o f  being an only wife or being one o f m any wives. It was not a question o f 
being a wife here, there, yesterday or today. ... it was just being a wife. It is being a 
woman. W hen we were young we were told that people who were condemned to death 
were granted a wish on the eve o f  their execution. ... Anyhow, a young wom an on her 
wedding day was som ething like that. She was made much ot, because the whole 
ceremony was a funeral o f the self that could have begn.'{Changes'. 110) (emphasis ours)
And Esi’s best friend Opokuwa muses:
«
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In a polygam ous situation, or rather in the traditional environm ent in which polygamous 
m arriages flourished, happiness, like most o f  the good things in life, was not a two- 
person enterprise. It was the business o f all parties concerned. And in this case it should 
have included the first wife o f Ali whom Esi had not even met! (98).
‘L ove?... L ove?’ says E si’s grandmother: ‘Love is not safe, my lady Silk, love is 
dangerous. -  Ah my lady, the last man any woman should think o f marrying is the man 
she loves.’ (42).
The irony o f  Changes is Esi, the modern, educated woman belittling the security o f  the 
m onogam ous Ordinance m arriage and opting for the traditional po.ygynous union. But in life you 
cannot have your cake and eat it. Esi m arries her first husband, Oko, out o f  sym pathy for him  (he 
had relentlessly pursued her for many years). She thus thinks she can call the tune and have it all 
her way. t ie r  husband raping her and then walking away like a king who has conquered her, shocks 
her to her innerm ost being, how could the husband she thought she could manipulate behave like 
the traditional husband.
... who demands all o f  you and all o f  your time. ... the one who eats his wife 
com pletely and pushes her down with a good gulp o f alcohol. (109).
But Esi, on account o f her education and financial independence, is not am enable to the 
imposition o f this traditional role, the ‘funeral o f the s e lf .  In Changes the more things change the 
more they rem ain the same. In spite o f all her independence, Esi ends up as a discarded second 
wife, husbandless and childless.
Amma Darko, a younger novelist writing in the 1990s, implicitly lam ents the loss o f  the 
institutions o f  family and m arriage as places where loyalty, loving kindness, trust and compassion 
may be nurtured for the good o f  man and woman. She gives traditional m arriage the final blow. 
She deconstructs traditional marriage. In Beyond the H orizons Mara is sold to her husband, Akobi, 
for a few heads o f  cattle and some trinkets and once sold, she is A kobi’s to do with in whatever he 
finds profitable. M ara is made to prostitute herself with Akobi acting as her pimp. Amma Darko 
thus poses the question: “in what way does traditional marriage, as M ara’s fa ther practises it, differ 
from the relationship: prostitute / pimp that her marriage to Akobi turns out to be?” Thus while 
being presented with traditional marriage, as seen through the m aterialistic eyes of M ara’s father, 
we are also confronted with the metamorphoses o f these same tendencies as they unfold through 
A kobi’s perverted perception o f  a wife. In her second novel, The Housemaid, Amma Darko goes 
even further. Fam ily and m arriage no longer have any relevance and have m ore or less ceased to 
exist, as have all human com passion -  where some loose filial relationships remain, these are a 
means to be exploited for gain. The future is barren and bleak, when even intra-fam ily loyalty is 
sacrificed for material expediency. As E fia’s mother and grandmother scheme to benefit from their 
daughter’s position as housem aid in Accra:
'T he gods and ancestors o f  this village o f ours designed everything. And your going to 
live with her is an essential piece o f that design. So hear me! Be subservient, hum ble and 
very dependab le ...’
‘Good advice, M other!’
‘Then get yourself pregnant.’
‘W -h-a-a-t?’
‘You both heard me right. Efia, you wili live with her, win her affection, become 
indispensable to her. So that when you innocent!) becom e pregnan t... ’
‘Innocently? How does she become pregnant intn ritly?’ E fia’s m other asked.
‘By pretending she was forced into the sexual at he old lady replied. (46-47)
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‘So what is in it for us?’ asks the father. ... ‘What are we getting out o f  our daughter’s 
going away to the city to serve somebody ? (43).
Ghana has destroyed the tamily: there is no future for Ghana.
And so Kwadwo is not marrying Abena any more.
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T E N U R E , H O U SIN G  A N D  E N V IR O N  M E N ! A L  M A N A G E M E N I  
A M O N G  F A M IL IE S IN T H E  G R E A T E R  A C C R A  
M E T R O P O L IT A N  A R E A  (G A M A ) O F  G H A N A
Jacob Songsore, Gordon McGranahan and Marianne Kjellen
Abstract
In the preamble to the Habitat Agenda ( UNCHS 1996), access to saie and healthy shelter 
was recognised as essential to a person’s physical, psychological, social and economic w ell­
being. And yet no investment in land or property is safe unless the rights to ownership ot that 
land are stable and secure. Whilst this proposition is generally valid, this argument tends to 
oversimplify the dynamic relationships between tenure housing and environmental 
management among families in the post-colonial African city.
This essay argues that tenure alone, by itself, may be inadequate as an explanatory 
variable and may be subsumed under the degree o f planning in the community and zoning 
regulations, the provision o f in-house environmental services, and the relative wealth and 
power o f its residents that enhance access to scarce resources. The urban poor live beyond 
the pale o f the law while the urban elite make the laws and determ ine penalties for breaking 
them. In many countries o f Africa, the dividing line between legal and illegal is one which 
has been inherited, largely unaltered from their colonial past.
The paper provides a historical review of state policies and the housing and 
environmental crisis, examines the patterns o f land and house tenure, and investigates the 
relationship between house tenure and housing and environmental services. It also examines 
the relationship betweeen tenure and house maintenance and environmental managem ent 
with special emphasis on the low income informal housing market ^  ith shared facilities and 
explores the relationship betwen crowding at these shared facilities and health.
The results from this case study tend to suggest that the wealth and power o f  households 
together with location are more important in determining environmental outcomes rather 
than tenure. The study shows that centrally directed and controlled housing program m es and 
state subsidies have tended to benefit those who could best compete in the free market to the 
exclusion of the urban poor, who are consigned to a deprived life in the informal housing 
sector with few environmental services. All tenure groups in the upper end o f  the housing 
market are united by their privileged acess to housing and environmental services, whilst 
those at the lower end are bound together by their poverty and the state policies o f  social 
exclusion.
Introduction
The HABITAT II Conference had two main themes; 'Adequate shelter for a ll’ and ‘Sustainable 
human settlements development in an urbanising world’. Neither o f these is possible w ithout the 
rationalisation o f  1 and tenure systems. I n t he p reamble t o t he H abitat A genda ( UNCHS 1 996) 
access to safe and healthy shelter was recognised as essential to a person’s physical, psychological 
social and economic well-being. Sustainable development is not, however, only a social objective 
No investment in land or property is safe unless the rights to ownership o f  that land are stable anc 
secure. A lack o f  security o f tenure leads either to no investment or else to the pursuit o f ranid anc 
substantial rates o f  return that in the longer term are unsustainable (Dale 1997: 1622-1623)
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Am biguity in land ownership can create insecurity, underm ining the incentives for 
environm ental managem ent and service provision in housing units (W orld Bank 1993). 
Conversely, ju st as residents in settlements with insecure tenure may be loath to invest in 
environm ental m anagem ent and infrastructure, the government may be equally unwilling to allow 
the provision o f environm ental services by utility agencies (M cAuslan 1986:50; Payne 1997). De 
Soto (1989) has therefore argued that any policy, which results in half or more o f  a city ’s 
population suffering from insecure tenure is grossly inefficient arid unjust. Yet there is a great 
variety in the proportion o f people in different cities who are tenants. There are those cities where 
less than 10 per cent o f  the population are tenants whilst there are others where more than 80 per 
cent are tenants (M itlin 1997). A lthough rental accommodation is very high in some cities o f  the 
South, much literature on housing is dominated by a discourse on owner housing. This reflects in 
part the predom inance in the literature o f  the Latin American experience o f land invasion, 
occupation, consolidation and improvement, and also partly because o f  the general belief that 
ow ner occupation encourages housing improvement (Tipple and W illis 1991; Abrams 1964; Turner 
1968, 1976).
W hile this proposition is generally valid, this argument tends to oversim plify the dynamic 
relationships between tenure, housing and environmental managem ent especially in the case o f 
post-colonial African cities, in which space-economies are characterised by the articulation o f 
social spaces, o n e  m odern an d  deliberately planned and th e  o ther excluded from  a n y  deliberate 
exercise o f land use planning (Kironde 1995; Larbi 1996). These binary divisions and 
contradictions w ould seem to be related more to class and power rather than tenure, as the same 
tenure categories do exhibit different am enity values and levels o f  environmental m anagem ent 
depending on the sphere o f the urban residential space in which they are located.
1'enure alone, by itself, may be inadequate as an explanatory variable and may be subsumed 
under the degree o f  planning in the community and zoning regulations, the provision o f  in-house 
environmental services, and the relative wealth and power o f  its residents that enhance access to 
scarce resources. As M cAuslan puts it:
There is an enorm ous gap between the lifestyles and prospects o f  the *urban poor and the 
urban elite; there is also an enormous disparity o f power between the two groups and 
betw een their relationships to the organised processes o f  municipal adm inistration and 
policy-m aking. The urban poor live beyond the pale o f the law. Their whole life is one long 
illegality, while the urban elite make the laws and determine the penalties for breaking them 
(M cAuslan 1985: 114).
In many countries in Africa, the dividing line betw een 1 egal and illegal is  one w hich has been 
inherited, largely unaltered from their colonial past.
This essay provides a historical review o f  state policies and the housing and environm ental 
crisis, examines the patterns o f  land and house tenure and investigates the relationship between 
house tenure and housing and environmental services. It also examines the relationship between 
tenure and house m aintenance and environmental management with special em phasis on the low 
income informal housing m arket with shared facilities and explores the relationship between 
crowding at these shared facilities and health.
M ethods
The quantitative data employed in this study derives from a city-wide broad spectrum sample 
survey o f  households in GAMA with regards to the en iron mental problem s they face within the 
home or neighbourhood (Benneh et al. 1993). 1 his olved a detailed survey o f  a 1000 
representative households together with physical tests o f quality and exposure to air pollution
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for ft subset ol 200 households. I his survey allowed an analysis oi the relationship between tenure, 
housing and access to environm ental services.
This was com plem ented by a qualitative survey using focus group discussions and in-depth 
interviews in  a sam ple o 1 households in Iow  incom e, m iddle an d  h igh  incom e neighbourhoods. 
The selected low incom e aieas included Nima and Ashaiman in the high density low class migrant 
areas with a high level o f  tenant fam ilies ( roomers). Jam estow n, M am probi an d  Old Ashaley- 
Botwe in the high density indigenous, m edium  density indigenous and rural fringe o f indigenous 
Ga settlements respectively. Extended tamily housing and general home ownership are higher in 
these low income indigenous Ga settlements. South La Estate was selected as a low-middle income 
settlement and the Airport Residential Area as the high class residential area. Both rental housing 
and home ownership are com m on in these middle-high income areas. Since access to housing and 
environmental services by G A M A ’s lamilies is segmented on the basis o f wealth with tenure as a 
subordinate factor in determ ining environm ental outcomes, this qualitative survey allowed for a 
nuanced analysis o f  the dynam ics o f  tenure and environmental m anagement at the lower and upper 
ends of the housing market.
State Policies on Land M anagem ent and Housing Delivery: The Legacy of History
Founded in the 16th century as a small coastal fishing village close to the eastern shore o f  the 
Korle Lagoon, Accra soon becam e a pre-em inent European trading centre in the 17 century with 
the establishment o f  num erous European trading forts. In 1877 the British, having established 
themselves as the sole colonial pow er in the then Gold Coast (Ghana), decided to transfer the seat 
of British A dm inistration from Cape Coast to Accra. This event w'as o f  seminal importance in the 
growth o f Accra and the town grew rapidly but in a generally unplanned m anner (Dickson 1969: 
259). After independence, a new planned industrial sattelite township o f Tema was developed.
The Greater Accra M etropolitan Area (GAM A) includes the Accra M etropolitan Area in 
addition to Tem a M unicipal Area and Ga District. These 3 districts have become physically and 
functionally one single urbanised area. It is the national capital and m ajor industrial growth pole 
with a 2000 population o f  2.7 m illion, projected to reach the 4 million mark by 2010. As a colonial 
town, the colonial state had an im portant role to play in its overall growth and evolution by laying 
the institutional basis for urban developm ent, planning and management.
The colonial system  o f  land adm inistration, through the system o f indirect rule, m inimized the 
extent to which the colonial state interfered with land ownership. Consequently land was and still 
is, collectively ow ned by a com m unity. “So the colonial administration had to acquire compulsorily 
every piece o f land it needed for developm ent and pay compensation. This practice led to two main 
kinds o f land ownership in the country: custom ary ownership and state land ’ (Larbi 1996: 198; 
Kasanga 1995; Kasanga et al. 1996). Private ownership o f land is a vestigial category. Land use 
planning was then lim ited to state lands under European occupation.
The duality o f  residential d ifferentiation took the form o f  the co-existence o f th e  ‘European 
Town’ and th e  ad jo in ing  A frican T ow nship. T h e  European Town, which in  the case ol coastal 
settlements was never far from the sea, was wherever possible built on an elevated site. As a result, 
the name ‘R idge’ came to be used interchangeably with the European I own (Dickson, 1969.282- 
287). These areas were being built using im ported European builc.ing m aterials and housing design 
and standards for European officials in administration and business. They were built by diiect 
government action and they were retained for government ownership (Songsoie 1989. 5).
By contrast, the A frican Town was very often devoid o f  social services and rational planning, 
with houses som etimes packed together in one big contusion, although the African elite were 
beginning to adopt European housing styles. Planning ml mention in the indigenous sections ol 
town w as dictated b y ex p e d ie n cy , e specially fears o f the  outbreaks o 1 epidem ics resulting 1 tom 
labour influx and increasing crowding. For example, the i x. tension ot primary health measures for
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Europeans an d  th e ir servants to th e  A frican quarters w ere guided b y  E uropean self-interest and 
began after the outbreaks o f  plague and yellow fever in Accra and the Colony (Songsore 1989: 7).
The housing policies o f the colonial state did not hinge on the provision o f mass housing 
but rather focused on the provision o f subsidized rental bungalow  housing for the 
colonial bureaucracy. In addition to this the colonial state acquired and serviced land 
m ainly for the granting o f  leases to the more affluent strata o f  the A frican population. 
Access to these plots was determ ined by one’s ability to build an expensive and modem 
European style house. This was to lay a firm basis for the access to subsidized housing by 
the privileged in society (Songsore 1989: 8).
W ith a few exceptions, the provision o f  low income housing and land acquisition for such 
activity was left for the free market. This stands in sharp contrast to British policy at home where 
m unicipal or council housing was provided specifically for the poor (Ospina 1987: 13). To 
com pound the problem  o f  the m ajority o f  urban dwellers was the complem entary and oppressive 
set o f  exotic building regulations that were established in the early 1920’s and 1930’s, that made 
house building unnecessarily costly for the poor (Songsore 1989: 9).
Post-independence governments continued this historical role o f  the state as a regulator and 
developer o f  urban housing. Post-colonial planning and developm ent o f  GAM A followed the 
colonial pattern. Though the barriers to segregation were removed, the fundamental principles, 
laws and procedures o f  planning remained the same (Larbi 1996). In the main, planning was 
concentrated on state land to the neglect o f  customary lands and state housing delivery agencies 
focused on providing expensive housing in government estates for the elite. As a regulator, the 
state continued to frustrate the efforts o f low income strata o f the population in providing 
appropriate housing for them selves by maintaining the inappropriate building codes, seeking 
palliation for the housing crisis o f  the poor via rent control (Songsore 1989: 10-12). In Ghana, the 
transition process towards a liberalised economy under structural adjustm ent and the dynam ics o f 
the urban housing market also favours the provision o f high and m iddle incom e housing for the 
wealthy in A ccra’s suburbia. T h e  bottom 60 to 70% o f the urban  population, who cannot own 
costly housing are the losers, as the state and private developers shy away from the unprofitable 
low income segment o f  the housing market.
M ost o f the land in the M iddle Class Sector (MCS) and the High Class Sector (HCS) are state 
lands with a few areas held under custom ary tenure. By contrast virtually all the low income 
residential sectors a re h eld u nder c ustomary t enure. These include t he H igh D ensity L ow C lass 
Sector (HDLCS), High D ensity Indigenous Sector (HDIS), M edium Density Indigenous Sector 
(M DIS) and the Rural Fringe (RF). About 80% o f  the population o f  the city live in these low 
income areas. T h e  state as the landowner has been concerned with addressing the housing and 
environm ental m anagem ent needs o f  the rich. By contrast the areas held under customary' tenure 
have been neglected in terms o f  infrastructure although they have provided a more accessible 
source o f  land for low income housing by the indigenous Ga people and those m igrants located in 
the bottom  rungs o f  the social hierarchy. In both low and middle to high class residential areas o f 
the city all the ranges o f  house tenure— private, rental and family housing can be found. Class and 
the degree o f planning rather than tenure have combined to create these social areas o f varying 
environm ental quality with tenure playing a subordinate ro le  as we seek to dem onstrate in th is  
paper. Before we explore this proposition further it is vital to examine the house tenure profile o f 
the city.
Patterns of H ouse T en u re  in GAM A
Data from the m ajor representative sample survey o f 1000 households in GAM A show a clear 
evidence that overall, rental tenure accounts for abou 50% o f  the total housing supply in the 
m etropolis (Table 1). Unlike in other developing counti i squatting is not a significant category as
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most people have some form o f  title to the land either as formal leasehold o f state and family lands 
or informal ownership or leaseholds o f  family, clan or stool lands. Although most respondents in 
focus group d iseussions favoured o wner-oceupation only a few  o f  t hem s ucceeded in o wning a 
house especially among the urban poor. Even among the poor indigenous Ga people, family 
housing in the core areas is fast becoming the only viable alternative as high building costs and 
restrictive regulations now preclude the construction o f houses w ith traditional building materials. 
However, unlike their m igrant counterparts some still have easier access to lands in the rural fringe.
Table 1: Percentage o f Households by House Tenure
Tenure No. o f Households Percentage
Renter 499 49.9
Owner 343 34.3
Family Houser (Relative) 122 12.2
Token Rent 31 3.1
Squatter 5 0.5
Source: Stockholm Environment Institute and University o f Ghana, Household
Environmental Data Base, 1991
Overall, whilst 55% o f  male headed households were renters only 37% o f female headed 
households rented. As many as 44%  o f female headed households were owners w ith another 17% 
living with a relative as opposed to 31% o f male heads o f  households who were owners. This is 
understandable in view o f the fact that most female heads o f  households were found in the 
indigenous Ga com m unities in the HDIS, MDIS and the RF (Songsore and M cGranahan 1996: 16). 
In these communities, families and stools have allodial title to land thereby reducing the cost o f 
home ownership especially in the past when most buildings in these areas were built with largely 
traditional construction materials. Family claims to accom m odation are so deeply ingrained in 
Ghanaian culture that the Rent Act, 1963 allows the eviction o f  tenants if  a room is required for a 
family m ember (Tipple and W illis 1991). There are many people especially women who have the 
right to demand accommodation in the family house.
The highest concentration o f home owners is located in the HDIS (49% ), RE (48% ) and MDIS 
(44 %) which are am ong the poorest areas o f  the city. Also, in the HCS one finds about 48% o f 
households as owner occupiers and in the MCS about 43% are owners. The HDLCS is a very poor 
area with a high concentration o f  m igrant groups. It has 68% o f all households as renters.
Table 2 s hows t hat f  or a 11 w ealth g roups e xcept f  or t he w ealthiest 2 0%, r ental t enure i s t he 
largest group ranging betw een 61.5 to 50.5. House ownership increases with wealth w ith ownership 
accounting for 51.5% o f  all households in the'w ealthiest group. By contrast, family houses as a 
category tends to be highest am ong the poor where it is an important survival strategy accounting 
for 18.5% o f households in this group and declines to 8% for wealthy households.
Age o f household head tends to be related to the degree o f  hom e ownership. For those heads o f 
households aged 60 years and above, 70.1% were owners, 23.8% renters and 6.1% staying with 
relative. This is understandable as home building is an incremental process which is often realised 
at the later stages o f  the dem ographic cycle. Access to land and housing inputs for the delivery o f 
housing wras also easier in the period before the economic crisis o f  the late 1970’s so it is likely to 
be the older generation who benefited m ost from state housing policies o f  previous governments 
and informal home construction in the low income areas. Younger migrant households with the 
least commitment to life in the city were also more likely to be renters than owners. For example, 
recent mig-ants w ith about 5 years or less residence in (1 \M A  had 75%  o f their members as renters 
as compared with 49%  renters for those migrants w ho had lived in GAM A for 6 or more years. To 
put it differently, 64% o f those w hose origin is outside cc a were renters as compared to 37.4% o f  
those households who had spent their whole life in Ac
*
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Evidence from  other cities would seem to suggest that owners are likely to be older, to 
have m igrated to the city at an earlier age, and to have lived in the city longer than 
tenants. These features support the notion that migrants to the city em bark on a trajectory 
which, through time, leads at least some o f them to ownership (Tipple and W illis 1991:
36).
This evidence for GAM A is corroborated by data from Kumasi, the next largest city after 
GAM A in Ghana (Tipple and W illis 1991: 36).
Table 2: T ype o f H ouse Tenure (%) by W ealth Quintile
Tenure 1
Poorest
W ealth Quintile
2 3 4 5
W ealthiest
Renters 52.7 61.5 50.5 51 34.3
Owners 26.8 24.1 31.9 37 51.5
Relatives in Family 
Houses 18.5 11.2 12.9 10 8.1
Token Rent 1.5 2.1 4.8 1.5 5.8
Squatters 0.5 1.1 - 0.5 0.5
Total 100 100 100 100 100
(Sub-Sam ple Size) (205) . . A m (210) . . . (200) (198)______
Source: Stockholm Environment Institute and University of Ghana, Household Environmental Data Base, 
1991.
Results from focus group discussions and in-depth interviews in  GAM A suggest an almost 
universal preference for owner housing for all social areas and groups. Felicia, a tenant in Nima 
within the HDLCS does not have any hope o f owning a house but would want a two-bedroom
house for her children for their security. As she puts it: “who would not want his or her own
accom m odation. W e just cannot afford to build a house that is why we are renting” .
A few people, especially elderly women preferred family housing because o f support from  their 
kinsm en, w hile some m igrants who had a short term view o f their residence in GAM A saw renting 
or squatting as the most appropriate solution to their housing needs. Some have argued that the 
extensive renting found in W est African cities is related both to m igrant strategies involving the 
desire to invest in hom e areas where they hope eventually to return to and the nature o f  traditional 
tenure vesting control over urban land in the hands o f a few people (Rakodi 1995).
Tenure and Access to Housing and Environm ental Services
As indicated earlier, it would seem that in GAMA, it is division o f class and the access to 
institutional resources not tenure which determine both access to and the quality o f environm ental 
services a household enjoys as rental housing is the dominant form o f  tenure for all wealth groups 
except th e  wealthiest stratum . Besides, whilst owner housing is a very large tenure category in 
indigenous areas, because households are generally poor, their access to  and the quality o f 
environm ental services they enjoy is ju st as poor as in migrant, low income, residential sectors o f 
the city, where ren ta l housing is dominant. T he  range o f issues under discussion here relate to  
tenure and house type, and tenure and access to environmental services.
Tenure and House Type
The dom inant type o f  housing in Accra is the single-storey traditional com pound house. This is 
the m ost popular single category o f hous ig for renters and people living in family houses,
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accounting for 79% and 87% respectively o f  households residing in the two tenure groups. It is 
also alm ost as im portant as single family detached houses for households who live in their own 
houses as shown in Table 3. The compound house is dom inant in low income residential areas, 
including both m igrant areas where renting is popular and indigenous areas where home ownership 
is common. Single family detached housing is the popular house type for both wealthy owners and 
renters.
Table 3: Relationship between House Type and Tenure ( %)
House Tenure
House Type Renters Owners Relatives in Family Houses
Single Fam ily Detached 16.8 48.7 9.8
Compound House (M ultifamily) 78.6 46.9 86.9
Multifamily 2 Storey 4.2 4.4 2.5
M ultifamily 2+ Storey 0.4 - 0.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
(Sub-sample size) (499) (343) (122)
M ost households who are renters or living in family houses live in one room with another 
significant share living in two room s often a cham ber and hall. Even a significant share o f  house 
owners (42%) have no more than 2 rooms. However, the largest share o f  owners (58% ) have three 
or more rooms.
Table 4: Principal Source o f Drinking W ater and House Tenure (%)
House Tenure
W ater Source Renters Owners Relatives in Fam ily Houses
Indoor Piping 29.5 48.4 19.7
Private Standpipe 23.0 21.6 41.0
Communal Standpipe 7.6 5.5 9.0
Vendor 36.1 19.8 24.6
Other 3.8 4.7 5.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
(Sub-sample size) (499) (343) (122)
Source: Stockholm Environment Institute & University of Ghana, Household
Environmental Data. Base, 1991.
Tenure and Access to Environm ental Services
It would seem from  the empirical evidence below  that tenure is a poor independent variable 
explaining access to environm ental services as compared to household wealth or residential sector 
o f the city categorised on the basis o f  wealth and degree o f  planning (see Benneh et al. 1993; 
Songsore and M cGranahan 1993; 1996; M cGranahan and Songsore 1994; K jellen, Bratt and 
McGranahan 1996). The environmental sendees discussed include access to water supply, toilet 
facilities, and solid waste disposal facilities. The presence o f potable w ater supply and toilet 
facilities were ranked as first and second in terms o f environm ental services Accra households 
would want in a house when deciding on their housing choice. Yet potable w ater supply and 
sanitary services remain problem atic for households living under all tenure regimes. Table 4 shows 
the relationship between tenure and drinking water supply Although m ost households rely on the 
piped system for their w ater supply, the quality o f se n  ce is very uneven and supply erratic 
throughout the system. W hereas an average o f  35% o f all households in GAM A have access to
«
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indoor piping this percentage rises to 48% lor those households who live in their own homes; the 
values for the other two tenure categories fall below the average for GAM A. Private standpipes are 
significant for all tenure categories but more especially for the relatives in family houses who form 
a m ore im portant tenure category in the indigenous low income residential sectors where it is the 
m ost im portant single source o f  water supply. By contrast w ater vending is the single most 
im portant source o f water supply for renters. Yet for all tenure groups water supply is within 
reasonable distance from the house with 93% o f households having their w ater source either within 
hom e or less than 99 meters from the house.
As is to be expected, the type o f  toilet facility in use is related to access to water supply. The 
intra-urban disparities in type o f  toilet facility in relation to tenure show that whilst flush toilets 
are the m ost popular type o f  facility for owners, the pit latrine is the single most popular toilet 
facility for renters and people living in family houses. The pan latrine, i.e. the oldest sanitary 
technology in use exists for all tenure categories at the lower end o f  the housing m arket within low- 
incom e neighbourhoods in GAM A (Table 5A). As it is to be expected it is among house owners 
that there is the least inconvenience in toilet use. Those who experience inconvenience in toilet use 
are a significant category especially among the low income households living in rental 
accom m odation and family housing (Table 5B).
Solid waste disposal remains one o f the most intractable problem s within GAMA. Only 12% o f 
households who are owners had a home collection service, 10% for renters and 5% for people in 
family houses. A s a  resu lt m o st households in G A M A  experience problem s d ue to  the careless 
dum ping o f  waste. About 50% o f renters experienced problem s with the careless dumping o f  waste. 
M ost households stored their solid waste within the home with open container storage being the 
m ost im portant except for the owner category where storage in closed containers is the most 
im portant storage practice accounting for 44.6% o f the households in this category.
Table 5: Relationship between Aecess to Toilet Facility and House Tenure (% )
A. Toilet Facility Renters
House Tenure
Owners Relatives in Family Houses
Flush Toilet 25.6 48.1 55.4
Pit/KVTP 48.1 30.6 54.1
Pan Latrine 23.2 16.6 16.4
Other/N o Toilet 3.0 4.6 4.1
B. Inconvenience in Toilet Use
No 56.7 74.6 65.4
Yes 43.3 25.4 34.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
(Sub-sam ple size) (499) ' (339) (122)
Source: Stockholm Environment Institute & University of Ghana, Household
Environmental Data Base, 1991
Results from further qualitative work presented below suggest that at the lower end o f  the 
housing m arket w ithin t he r esidential s lums, s ome h ousing i s o wned b y r esidents w hose s ocio- 
econom ic position is sometimes only m arginally better than tenants. For example, environmental 
sendees are poor in both indigenous low income areas with a high levels o f  home ownership and 
family housing and the low income m igrant areas where rental tenure is by far the dom inant form 
o f tenure. In these areas, irrespective o f tenure, environm ental services tend to be shared. By 
contrast, at the upper end o f the housing m arket where housing provisioning is for the wealthy all 
environm ental services are provided in-house whether the housing is tenant occupied or owner 
occupied. Here the building standards are high and do c< inform to the building regulations. W ealth 
and location rather than tenure determ ines access to mental services.
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Tenure, Home M aintenance and Environm ental Management. 
Tenure Groups in GAMA: A Qualitative Appraisal
Drawing on the results o f  our qualitative research and from the work o f  Tipple and W illis in 
Kumasi (1991) it is possible to distinguish six broad house tenure categories on the basis o f  tenure 
and degree o f planning or amenity value (Table 6). This m ore complex structure will help us 
understand why the three broad tenure categories used in the quantitative survey have not been 
very helpful in explaining access to environmental services. At the upper end o f  the housing market 
which broadly coincides with the planned areas in GAM A, most households have access to self- 
contained dwellings or apartm ents with the exclusive use o f  environmental services such as 
kitchen, bathroom , toilet, piped water etc. Relatives in family house are most likely to be recently 
arrived kin coming to the city or grown up children who are yet to move out to an independent 
existence. The distinctions between owners and renters is blurred by the fact that one person may­
be both landlord and tenant; tenant in subsidized government or company housing and landlord 
who has rented his property at high m arket value to a private company or a wealthy individual.
Table 6: Categories o f House Tenure in GAM A
Degree o f Planning
Tenure Planned U nplanned
Owners 1) Owners in High and M iddle Class 4) Owners in Informal Low Class
Residential Areas with Exclusive Residential Areas mostly using Shared
Access to Environmental Services Environmental Services
Relatives 2) Relatives in High and M iddle 5) Relatives in Informal Low Class
Class Residential Areas with Exclusive Residential Areas m ostly using
Access to Environmental Services Shared Environmental Services
Tenants 3) Renters in High and M iddle Class 6) Roomers in Informal Low-
Residential Areas with Exclusive Class Residential Areas
Access to Environmental Services m ostly using shared Services
In contrast these are the poor urban dwellers in unplanned informal settlem ents at the lower end 
o f the housing market. W ith a few exceptions the typical house type is the comm unally occupied 
compound house, where both landlords and tenants or owners and relatives in family houses share 
in-house environm ental services when they are available, or as is more often the case use public 
toilets, bath-houses, taps and waste dump containers provided at the com m unity level. In the few 
cases where planned housing units have been provided by a state agency for the labouring poor, the 
model o f  housing is often sim ilar to the single room or cham ber and hall units occupied by 
households in poor unplanned areas, with shared communal facilities provided at the 
neighbourhood level. This model o f housing can be found in a few places such as Com munity 1 
and Tema M anhean in the planned industrial township o f  Tem a or in police barracks for the junior 
ranks.
Home M aintenance and Environm ental M anagem ent at the Lower End of the H ousing 
M arket
In the deprived low income neighbourhoods, the family elder or head is to the indigenous 
com m unity w hat the petty or slum landlord is to the room er (tenants renting one room or a chamber 
and hall) in the m igrant areas. There are however m ajor differences as the landlord’s relations with 
the tenant are largely cash m ediated with the state setting the regulatory framework, while the 
relations w ithin the extended family context are dictated by custom  which is also becom ing cash 
mediated. In both cases there is a cooperative relationship between either tenants and their 
landlords or family elders and m em bers o f  their extended nily although this is not devoid o f 
conflict.
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M ost family elders, relatives, tenants and landlords alike agree that the rights o f  landlords and 
family elders or heads relate to setting the rules for home maintenance and environmental 
m anagem ent in the house under their ownership or care.
According to convention, landlords are responsible for undertaking m ajor repairs and external 
decoration or painting o f  their property but few care to or have the means to undertake any major 
repairs as m any are retired se lf builders who rely on the limited rent income to survive. Tenants are 
com pelled in their own interest to sometimes undertake m ajor repairs to their room s such as 
repairing leaking roofs or cracks in the wall in addition to whatever internal decorations they may 
wish to undertake by them selves such as fixing a ceiling, painting and carpeting the floor or 
replacing wooden windows with louvre blades. As one tenant in Nima puts it “what do landlords 
do apart: from collecting rents” . M ost tenants were how ever willing to invest in m aintaining the 
house so long as it will be deducted from the rent charged especially where cordial relations exist 
between the tenant and his landlord. In the ‘T aabo’ line o f  Ashaiman, where there is a slum 
upgrading scheme underway, with the fear o f the dem olition o f  some houses, tenants have often 
refused to help their landlords pay the charge o f 580,000 cedis for acquiring title to land including a 
redevelopm ent fee as most tenants expressed the fear o f  having to move out o f  their present rented 
houses as some will be demolished to create access roads.
In a situation o f acute housing crisis as exists in GAMA tenants often have to live with sharp 
practices o f landlords. For example, most landlords now dem and tv>o to five years’ rent advance 
from tenants in contravention o f the rent regulations. This demand is no longer in dispute given the 
neo-liberal environm ent where free markets have become the accepted norm  under structural 
adjustm ent. The Rent A ct 1963, A ct 220 states among others that it shall be a crim inal offence for 
any person to demand more than one m onth’s rent in advance, in the case o f  m onthly tenancy or 
more than six months as a condition for the granting or renewal or continuance o f  the tenancy. 
The act also provides that it shall be a criminal offence for any person to dem and or receive more 
than the recoverable rent notwithstanding any agreem ent to the contrary. This act which was passed 
in the era o f state endeavours to control the free play o f  m arket forces, in order to avert undesirable 
social consequences, has now become redundant.
Paym ent o f  rent advances is no protection against future rent increases as* the story o f  the battle 
between the landlord and his tenant in the box below captures.
Tenant, landlord in tussle 
By Rejoice Becky Sarpong
M iss M aud Esi Klu, a seamstress, must have regretted advancing 0300,000 to her landlord, 
M r Ernest Sarkodie Acheam pong to complete a part o f  his house at D ansom an for her to rent.
A fter com pleting the house, Acheam pong is asking M s Klu to pay four times the original rent 
o f  08,000 agreed upon or quit the house.
According to M s Klu, in 1993, she gave Acheampong 0300,000 to convert a kitchen and a 
platform  into two rooms for her to rent at a rate o f 8,000 a month.
She claim ed that since she came to the house, she had been giving money to A cheam pong to 
pay light and water bills since he is not working, but he failed to pay some o f  the bills, which led 
to the disconnection o f  light and water to the house since 1996.
M s Klu lam ented “I fetch w ater from outside and iron my things in friends’ hom es” .
M s Klu said she has m anaged to tolerate Acheampong all this while but this time she has had 
to report his conduct to the Rent Contr ol Office
A t the rent control office where the case is being heard, Acheam pong adm itted having taken 
the m oney from M s Klu but insisted she m ust qu it because people are ready to pay more. 
Hearing resum es on Tuesday, Decem ber 9, 1997
Source: Mirror, Saturday, December 6, 1997 p.3.
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Utility charges, where these utilities do exist in-house such as electricity and water bills or toilet 
removal charges for pan latrines or septic tanks, are shared among users according to laid down 
guidelines set in the particular house compound (Songsore and M cGranahan 1996). The 
maintenance o f  these services or construction o f  new ones are shared by all users including the 
landlord where he is resident. Where these services do not exist in- house tenants and landlords 
rely on water vendors in the case o f  w ater and public toilets and bath houses where access is based 
on the pay as you use principle.
In a sim ilar manner, the family head or elder like the landlord is responsible for house 
maintenance with the assistance o f family members and revenue derived from sale o f  family lands 
where applicable or m oneys raised during funerals and outdoorings. Utility charges are shared 
among the heads o f nuclear households occupying room s within the family house. W hilst tenants 
are compelled to pay through threats o f eviction, relatives in family houses may refuse to pay 
because o f the m isuse o f common funds by elders or they may com plain o f  poverty. In terms o f the 
condition o f  housing, there is therefore very little difference in level o f m aintenance between 
extended family houses and rental units as poverty serves as a constraint on effective home 
maintenance in both cases.
Environm ental managem ent functions are undertaken by w om en in all cases with the assistance 
o f children (for details see Songsore & M cGranahan 1996; Songsore & M cGranahan 1998). This is 
a daily cycle o f  activity which cannot be avoided even by tenants w ith a short term view o f  their 
stay in the city . Contrary to popular opinion among the urban elite, the poor households in slum 
neighbourhoods have a high level o f appreciation o f the environm ental problems that affect their 
well-being and were also generally w illing to pay something towards an improvement o f the 
service in spite o f their poverty ( Songsore & M cGranahan 2000. pp. 10-11).
Home M aintenance and Environm ental M anagem ent at the Upper End o f the Housing 
M arket
At the upper end o f the housing market are the planned, m iddle to high class residential areas 
where the elites reside. These are a carry over from the colonial policy o f separate developm ent 
between Europeans and Africans. This dualism  has acquired a class character as centrally directed 
and controlled housing programmes and state subsidies including rental subsidies have tended to 
benefit those w h o  cou ld  b e s t compete in th e  free m arket. M uch o f the housing in  th is  segm ent 
consist o f  single dwellings built as bungalows or apartments in storey buildings where services are 
for the exclusive use o f the household e.g. flush toilets, piped water, electricity, kitchen, bath 
house, garbage cans etc.
M uch o f  the housing in this segment are government built and owned dwellings for the use o f 
senior civil servants and other senior public servants. Others in this broad category are owned by 
companies and corporations for le tting  to employees. A growing share o f  th is  housing  stock is 
privately owned and either occupied by the owners or, as is often the case, let to private individuals 
or major em ployers for rent, determined at the free market rate by agreem ent between owner and 
renter. The differences between tenures are much less fundamental than the com m onality o f  shared 
privileges in the exclusive use o f  environmental services and location in plush and planned 
neighbourhoods. Indeed it is not uncommon for one and the same person to be a tenant living in 
government or com pany rented housing enjoying subsidized rents and at the same time a landlord 
who has rented his property to another corporation, com pany or individual for which rent is paid in 
dollars or is dollar indexed.
In the case o f repairs and maintenance, the Public W orks Departm ent (PW D) is responsible for 
the repairs and m aintenance o f all government ow ned bungalows and flats. They do routine and 
periodic m aintenance as well as necessary extensions J  renovations. All forms o f  m aintenance 
work are undertaken including repair o f  taps, w at r closcis, locks, roofs, walls and the rewiring o f 
all premises. M ost other public and private organisations ive estate agencies or departm ents that
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m aintain all their facilities and buildings. These units also see to all internal maintenance o f  all 
prem ises rented by the organisation for its senior staff.
The occupants however pay for all amenities consum ed-electricity bills, water bills and garbage 
collection etc. No subsidies and rebates apply here except for visiting consultants and top 
executives.
Tenancy agreements w ith p rivate  1 andlords within this segment o f  the housing m arket often 
involve formal contracts. The regulations, although codified, are quite sim ilar to the informal rules 
at the lower end o f the housing market discussed above. As a general rule both tenants and 
landlords abide by their duties and because rents are very high the landlord can build on the basis 
o f  rent incom e if  he has other sources o f income. The Rent Control Law, 1986 (PNDCL138) is 
specifically addressed to w orker housing and not to de-luxe housing owned by the elite. At the 
upper end o f  the market rents are determ ined by what the m arket can take. M ost housing is in a 
good state o f repair. The only problem  group is the housing owned by government and some other 
parastatal organisations. Because o f the strict austerity program m e under structural adjustment, the 
governm ent has been unable to maintain its housing stock recently as only token rents are paid 
which do not provide adequate resources for home maintenance by the PW D and other estate 
agencies o f some parastatals.
Environm ental m anagem ent is undertaken by housegirls, garden boys and others under the 
supervision o f  the female hom em akers. Since most environmental services are in-house there is 
often indifferent relations w ith neighbours as the com m unity based organisations involved in 
environm ental m anagem ent so com m on in informal settlem ents are totally non-existent here.
Crowding, Shared Environm ental Services and Health  
Crowding in Informal Settlements
In the absence o f  any coherent government policy to address the housing needs o f  the urban 
poor, inform al sector builders both in the low income indigenous com m unities and m igrant areas 
have stepped in to meet the housing needs o f the urban poor. This informal sector builds in 
defiance o f  regulations on land leased by stools and families in a m anner accepted by government 
but not conform ing to planning or building regulations (Tipple & W illis 1989:16). Com pound 
houses built in this m anner and using low cost, partly traditional building materials and technology 
in the past allowed low incom e households to build for them selves with some rooms to rent to 
outsiders. The data from GAM A suggest that about 79% o f  all renters live in these informal 
com pound houses; 87% o f  all relatives in  family houses an d  47% o f owners a Iso 1 ive i n these 
com pound houses. Overall, about 67% o f  all households live in these single storey traditional 
com pound houses, o ccupied by several households often s haring sanitary and k itchen facilities. 
About 35% o f  all households in GAM A live crow'ded in one room  and another 33 % in two rooms.
The Housing Needs Assessm ent study notes a mean occupancy rate o f  2.9 persons per room  in 
GAM A w hich is above the UN recom m ended standard o f  2.5. On the average, occupancy rates for 
the low class residential areas were above 3 with the highest figure o f 4.4 persons per room 
occurring in Jam estown within the HDIS (Housing and Urban Developm ent Associates 1990, 1: 
65-66). Housing stress as measured by the degree o f pressure on the .use o f housing and its 
associated infrastructural sendees was quite high in informal settlements (Housing and Urban 
Developm ent Associates 1990 2: 53-57).
This housing crisis for the poor has been exacerbated by the rent control policies instituted by 
governm ent over the years by shifting private ca al away from low-incom e housing investment 
(Tipple 1987: 5). The following consequences ot d elsewhere ( see M alpezzi and Rydell 1986; 
Tipple and W illis 1989) did occur in GAMA:
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• As rent incom es declined in real terms, slum landlords tended to withdraw investment from 
their houses by foregoing m aintenance and improvements or shifting these costs onto tenants;
•  Some landlords removed their room s from the residential rental sector using them for their own 
occupation or for members o f  the extended family and as is now more often the case 
converting those along street frontages into shops; and
• New investm ent by petty landlords in rental housing cannot be undertaken. This is often 
exacerbated by rising land and building materials costs. In a situation such as in GAM A where 
the population continues to grow combined with a stagnant housing stock the occupancy rates 
and other m easures o f  crowding becam e intensified.
As a result o f  rising land and building costs and this dis-investm ent in low-income housing, 
hom elessness which used to be hidden has now become open in both the old crowded high density 
indigenous areas such as La, Jam estown, Ushertown, Old Teshie and Old N ungua and in the high 
density' low class migrant areas such as Nima, M am obi, M adina, Sabon Zongo, Sukura and 
Ashaiman. The num bers o f  the homeless are on the increase, partly due to rising unem ploym ent 
and eviction o f  indigent tenants coupled with acute housing shortage for the poor. This is consistent 
with the overall observation that poverty is on the increase in GAM A, up from a mere 9% in 
1987/88 to 23% in 1992 (Ghana Statistical Service 1995). This has however recently declined to 
4%. N otwithstanding these rosy statistics, poverty is rife in GAM A (Songsore 2003).
The homeless can be found on street pavements, markets, kiosks, and uncompleted buildings. 
A s quatter s ettiem ent, c ailed ‘ Sodom a nd G om orrah’ h as d eveloped o n a  landfill s ite a long t he 
Korle Lagoon where about 22,000 people, (some o f  whom have been evicted by the city authonties 
from A ccra’s CBD) now reside under constant threat o f  further eviction by the city authorities.
Crowding, Sharing and Health
It is therefore evident from the above analysis that residents at the lower end o f the housing 
market, irrespective o f  tenure, will be most affected by problem s o f ill-health that are related to 
environmental disam enities and crowding. Evidence from the quantitative data illustrates the links 
between residential sector where households live and their health status, using childhood diarrhoea 
and acute respiratory infection (ARI) symptoms together with, respiratory problem symptoms 
(R P S )fo r  the female principal homemaker. The evidence indicates th e  relative disadvantage o f 
living in residential sectors that are considered low class with regard to health status (Songsore and 
M cGranahan 1993).
Table 7 also clearly illustrates that in all cases, indicators o f  crowding or sharing o f 
environmental services were associated with a higher diarrhoeal prevalence rate than the average 
prevalence rate o f  13.4 for GAMA. M ost o f  the crowding indicators or indicators o f  sharing o f  
facility were related to the water sanitation complex.
The i ndicators o f  crowding im plicated in children’s ARI symptoms and respiratory problem 
symptoms o f  female principal hom em akers are more related to intense contact due to crowding or 
poor m aintenance o f  building rather than to environmental disamenities. They are related to room 
and bed crowding, leaking roofs and the close bonds between mother and child which promote 
transm ission o f  respiratory infections from one to the other.
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Table 7: Indicators o f Crowding/Sharing and Childhood Diarrhoea Prevalence
Indicator Size o f  Sub-sample Tw o-week Prevalence o f 
D iairhoea (%)
W ater
1. Use Communal Standpipe 50 42.0
2. W ater Source out o f  House 270 19.6
3. No Tap in Home 375 16.3
4. Use o f  Vendor 165 13.9
Sanitation
1. Children Defecate Outdoors 145 26.2
2. Tim es when inconvenient to
use public toilet 199 23.6
3. Toilet unclean 209 19.6
4. Toilet Sharing with >10hh 261 18.2
5. Use Communal Pit Latrine 241 17.0
6. Pay for use o f Public Toilet 344 16.9
7. Use in-house communal
Pan Latrine 113 15.9
Total sub-sam ple for GAM A 537 13.4
Source: Songsore & McGranahan, 1993.
Conclusion
The results from this study tend to suggest that wealth and power o f  households together with 
location are more im portant than tenure in determining environmental outcomes. Centrally directed 
and controlled housing program m es and state subsidies have tended to benefit those who could best 
com pete in the free market, to the exclusion o f the urban poor, who are consigned to a deprived life 
in the informal housing sector with few environmental services. All tenure groups at the upper end 
o f  the housing m arket are united by their privileged access to housing; and environm ental services, 
while those at the lower end are bound together by their poverty and the state policies o f  exclusion.
Crowding and intensified sharing o f housing and environmental services for all tenure groups in 
the inform al low income settlements are related to increased environm ental health burdens, 
especially among children and adult women., who spend m ost o f  their time at hom e or m anage the 
home environm ent.
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G H A N A , T H E  F A M IL Y  A N D  E D U C A T IO N
Jack Goody
In reviewing achievem ents ol earlier studies o f  the family in Ghana I begin w ith the informal 
observations o l travellers and adm inistrators. I mention one that has been especially im portant to 
me and that was the observation of the Dutchman, Bosnian (1705) that contrary to the position in 
European Law, Africans inherited unisexally, that is, males from male, females from females. 
Focussing on the agricultural systems, I later tried to elaborate the contrast with Eurasia in my book 
Production and Reproduction  (1976).
A m uch later contribution was o f  a more scholarly kind, and here I refer to the work o f R. S. 
Rattray (1916, 1923, 1927, 1929) on the A sante with their matrilineal system. Ther were earlier 
studies o f matrilineal people, like Lafitau on the Iroqois, but the Asante were and are still a large an 
important kingdom, with a rich cultural heritage and a com plex trading network. Matrilineal 
succession operated at the political level and matrilineal inheritance at the domestic one, giving a 
very particular slant to familial relationships, especially that between a man and his m other’s 
brother but also between husband and wife. The political and religious aspects were discussed by 
Dr. Danquah (1922; 1928; 1944) and Professor Busia (1951; 1954), first chairman o f  the sociology 
department at Legon, but my concern is with the family.
The person who contributed most to the study o f  domestic relations was directed to Ghana (the 
north in this case) by Rattray and was the teacher o f many o f anthropologists who have worked in 
Ghana since that time. M eyer Fortes trained at the London School o f Economics under 
Malinowski and it was from him that he got his interest in matrilineal societies. M alinowski 
employed his Trobriand m aterial in an attempt to show that F reud’s Oedipus Complex was not 
universal and he entered into a vigorous debates with the psychoanalyst and biographer o f  Freud, 
Ernest Jones. But Fortes did not first come to Ghana to study the Asante. Fortes had trained as a 
psychologist in Cape Tow n and when he came to London he worked, among other things, on 
aspects o f  sibling relations in the East End with the psychiatrist, Emmanuel M iller, who had in his 
turn been a pupil o f  the psychologist-anthropologist W. H. R. Rivers, at Cambridge Fortes knew J. 
C. Flugel, a psychoanalyst at University College, London, who wrote a psychoanalytic study ot the 
family. He introduced Fortes to M alinowski, whose courses Fortes began to follow. His proposal 
to carry out fieldwork in the Gold Coast, as Ghana was known at that time, was submitted to the 
International African Institute and was to be directed to a psychological study ot the African 
family. For this end he consulted R attray and settled on working among the Tallensii o f the 
Northern Territories, who had strongly patrilineal lineages.
Fortes did study the political organisation and the operation oi the clan and lineage system but 
his major contribution, to my mind, was the analyses o f  domestic groups in a book, he entitled The 
Web o f  K inship  (Fortes 1949). He also gave a particular impetus to studies on indigenous 
education, but his main w ork was on the ‘fam ily,’ in which he took pains to show that even in this 
patrilineal society, the m other was o f m ajor importance in a variety ol ways, in offering care to her 
own children (and som etimes those o f  her co-wife— also of course her children in the local 
classificatory term inology), differentiating among her po lygynous husband s children by offering 
different m atrilineal ties w ith her natal lineage, and w ith  the children s mother s, brothers), 
maintaining her links w ith her siblings and her parents. 1 he em phasis was on the bilaterality of the 
domestic group, on the family in a conjugal sense, on w hat he called complem entary filiation , as 
the familial and kinship ties outside as well as w ith in  the po ti a ly dominant, unilineal domestic 
groups.
/
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For me this analysis was later important because it em phasised certain structural sim ilarities in 
family groups which go a long way to explain recent changes. When he came to study the Asante, 
in a social survey carried out after the Second World War, he then stressed the role ol the father in 
this predom inantly m atrilineal society. (Fortes 1948; 1963; 1970).
Partly as a result o f  his psychological training, partly as a result ol his sociological 
observations, Fortes laid emphasis on the developmental aspects o ? both individuals and domestic 
groups. The latter work was particularly influential and the work o t a num ber ol his students and 
colleagues w as brought together in a volume entitled The D evelopm ental Cycle o j Domestic 
Groups ( J. Goody ed. 1958). It was an approach that perm itted the dynam ic analysis o f  census 
data. Rather than working only with average household size, it perm itted the analysis o f the 
formation and dissolution o f dwelling groups, farming groups, consum ption groups, conjugal 
groups and enabled one to see how these constellations varied in different units, that we were not 
dealing sim ply with average size but with an array o f varied structures, with different percentages 
o f  sim ple and more com plex elements. That approach, which has still not been fully absorbed in 
m any studies, trying for example to contrast East and W est, was also significant for the working 
out o f  provision o f  public housing. Looking at the percentages o f  specific  kinds o f  household 
rather than w orking w ith averages.
These em phases were im portant for some later students o f the family in G hana who were also 
his students, either directly or indirectly, for example, Esther Goody (1969) and Christine Oppong 
(1974). The former was also originally interested in m atrilineal societies but found that that the 
G onja o f northern Ghana stressed equally the maternal and paternal ties in a bilateral sym m etry (E. 
Goody 1973). She concentrated on two aspects, firstly the phenom enon o f  fostering, and secondly 
w hat she called terminal separation (o f spouses). Fostering turned out to be a very widespread 
W est African practice, by which kinsfolk originally sent children to their siblings to rear. In a 
series o f  com plex psychological and sociological tests she found little difference in the life courses 
o f  c hildren b rought u p b y k insfolk a nd b y p arents (E. G oody 1 969). The G onja also p ractised 
term inal separation in which women past the menopause left their husbands (in what m any would 
see as ‘divorce’) to return to live with their natal kin. It was a type o f  union that again had to be 
understood in terms o f the developm ental cycle.
Christine O ppong’s (1970; 1971) work originally centred upon the m odernisation of 
m atrilineal families and the changes in conjugal ties. Since then she has broadened into a whole 
variety o f dem ographic, gender and domestic studies o f  the differentiation o f w om en’s roles and 
their relationship to children’s health and other problems. (Oppong 1978 (ed.); 1983 (ed.); 1987 
(ed.); 1994 (ed.); 1996; 1999; 2000; 2001.)
I could continue to look at the child-centred work o f research workers such as Kaye, the social 
psychological studies o f Gustav Jahoda and others, the dem ographic analyses o f  Addo, Gaisie and 
m any others. M uch o f the work that followed has been concerned with developm ental, health and 
dem ographic issues, and these receive further attention in the other papers in this volume. But I 
would now  concertrate on a particular aspect o f the changing family in the present, that I think 
com bines some o f the interests o f earlier Ghanaian studies. And in this context one o f  the points 
that arises out o f these earlier studies is that whatever the wider soci o-political aspects o f  the social 
structure, and they are /aried, there is always, as W. J. Goode pointed out -in his well-known work 
Wo? Id Revolution and Fam ily Patterns, (Goode 1963) some kind o f conjugal family at the core and 
that to me has great relevance for the global changes that are taking place at the dom estic level.
I w ant to consider briefly the relation between the family, education and demographic 
processes. And I want to focus not so much on the context o f  education, w hich is relevant for 
family and dem ographic change, but on the unintended consequences o f  the process o f  education. 1 
have been writing o f this at more length and here will treat the question in a rather sum m ary way.
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I he background i s th is. One o f th e  m ost rem arkable transform ations that h as  been  taking 
place not only in Ghana, but throughout Africa and throughout the world, is the demographic 
transition. Throughout the world, though more slowly in Africa, we have evidence that the 
dem ographic transition is occurring at a rhythm  much faster than happened earlier in Europe. The 
dem ographic transition is characterized by an initial decline in mortality, leading to considerably 
higher rates of population growth, but followed eventually by a decline in fertility, and leading in 
the west, not simply to replacem ent but to yet lower levels o f  fertility, marked by increases in the 
num ber of one-child and no child families. This decline in fertility means that the child- 
dependency ra tio s  improve, opening  u p  the probability  o f  fewer o r  b e tte r schools and w hat h as 
been called the “dem ographic bonus’ which, if  managed well, can lead to considerable socio­
economic developm ent. Eventually dependency ratios for the old will increase, posing problem s in 
developing countries, w ithout advanced national welfare programmes, which have already 
experienced a decline in the three generational family. Or will such considerations lead to fewer 
no-child families than in econom ically advanced countries? Young adults may well have to bear 
this consideration in mind. The latter development has not yet happened in Africa, but if  it does 
(its rather a m atter o f  when) it will have important repercussions on society, since they cannot like 
Europe m eet replacem ent with immigration. (In Sweden they are talking o f legitimising pom  
videos on the TV to encourage fertility!). We have to try and explain this extraordinary state o f 
affairs, w hich I had thought would be very delayed in Africa, not in particularistic terms but in the 
most general ones.
This developm ent is taking place, not simply in industrialized and urban settings (o f the 
W est), but eveiyw here, even in Africa where economic change has been very much slower than 
many expected. M ortality fell for a num ber o f  external reasons, the lessening o f  local feud and 
war, increased production even with the hoe (as a result o f the importation o f  cheap iron), some 
m edical facilities and sanitary measures. I want to add one other elem ent to this list, that seems to 
have affected not only the drop in mortality, but the later decline in fertility, as well as radically 
altering th e  family, m arriage an d  k insh ip  in  other w ays. I re fe r to education, which unlike th e  
economy has been spectacularly successful in Africa (as elsewhere in the world since the Second 
W orld War).
Africa is still m ainly agricultural. You may not find much ecohomic growth in African 
villages, and sparse m edical facilities. By definition urbanisation and industrialisation, which were 
the factors that were seen as prom oting the demographic transition in Europe, have been o f limited 
significance. But one alm ost universal factor in A frica’s villages is an institution that everyone will 
immediately recognize; the school, imported in its present form from Europe, although ot course all 
written civilisations had their own. These are particular, not only because ot the content ot the 
lessons but because o f  the school furniture, the lay-out o f  the classrooms, playground and wash 
room, the school books and above all the neatly dressed school children, whose parents have had to 
find th e  m oney  to  p a y  fo r  a um form -for exaihple, khaki trousers, b lue skirt, an d  w hite sh irt o r  
blouse.
I want to illustrate the im pact that this development has had on two aspects o f  life, hygiene 
and family relations, from a recent autobiography I have edited by my late friend and co-author, 
S.W .D.K. (Kum ) Gandah o f  B irifu in N orthwest Ghana (to be published by the Institute o f African 
Studies, Legon).
He attended the new  school o f  Lawra in the northwest in 1943. First there was exercise and a 
bath (twice a day). ‘W hen the roll was taken at the flagstaff, Mr. Henkel (the Headmaster) 
inspected each ch ild ’s nails and hair to see that they were cut short and also that each child s teeth
and uniform  were kept clean  Everyone’s teeth were inspected to see they had been properly
cleaned after breakfast and after lunch’. If they were not clean, then the compound prefect was in 
trouble-and so were you. Canings all around,
87
Research Review  Supplement 15 (2004) 85-92
The pupils were in bed by 8:00 pin., and awake at 5:30 am. ‘On Saturdays we washed 
clothes at the pond’. Nor did it stop with personal cleanliness. 1 he school com pound had to 
be kept clean and fee from all rubbish, especially when there was any festival or ceremonial 
like the Coronation o f George Vth. That insistence on cleanliness even applied to the home. 
W hen the headm aster came to visit K um ’s father, he was always on the look out.
I f  he came to our house and found the surrounding area or the top o f  the palace dirty, we 
were in trouble. He would ask us to return to school the next day even though the others 
were still enjoying their freedom. Knowing that he was likely to visit our house at any time 
during our holidays, we did all we could to clean the top o f the jaalace and its surroundings 
reasonably well every morning.
D uring this particular holiday, Mr. Henkel had visited Birifu and found that the palace 
was littered with leaves and rubbish blown about the H arm attan wind. He immediately 
ordered us to return to school... W hen we arrived we were the only pupils there and every 
m orning we were asked to clean the entire school grounds as well to fetch som e fire-wood.
Later on he writes:
Although Mr. Henkel was no longer in Lawra to interrupt out holidays i f  we did not keep 
the p alace c lean, t he h abit o f  g etting u p a t d awn t o sweep th e  e ntire surroundings o f  t he 
palace stayed with us. So early on this particular m orning ju st before dawn, I got up and 
went down with some o f  my illiterate members o f  the family, and there were over two 
hundred children o f  the chief, participated in the same rituals o f  cleanliness as the 
schoolboys.
School had a halo effect on the behaviour o f all their generation, which was particularly 
effective when the example was being set by ihe children o f  the chief.
Two points about this incident; there were no servants in LoDagaa compounds. The women 
and children had to do m ost o f  the chores around the house, and here the school children played a 
prom inent role, spurred on by the example o f  the school and the possible disapproval o f  their 
headmaster. The school children were even taught to m onitor each other, some being appointed as 
‘prefects’ or rather as ‘chiefs’, thus m imicking the political system itself. D iscipline was strict, not 
only because o f  their peers, who took the place o f  siblings and even o f  parents. Non-school 
children w o u ld  b e pressed  t o f  ollow t heir e xample o f  r egular b aths, o f  c leaner c lothes o f  tidier 
compounds.
Secondly, the incident illustrates the change schooling wrought upon the family. The father 
no longer yielded the same authority over his children as before. C learly this was the case when 
they were actually attending prim aiy boarding school, but even at home an authoritarian father like 
the ch ief o f  B irifu had his authority affected not only by the standards drilled into the children at 
school (cleanliness for example), but also by the actual interference o f the school teachers, though 
this was m oie likely in rural rather than urban areas. 1 he father’s authority was over-ridden by the 
school teacher s. It was the latter who ordered them back to school before their m ates and the father 
that had to beg for a little leniency. M oreover, the treatment at school was m uch harsher than in 
the house, especially as far as being beaten was concerned. Hence the efforts o f  some children to 
run aw ay arid reclaim  their ‘ freedom ’.
It was not dissim ilar when Joe Appiah, the lawyer and a leader in the Independence 
movem ent, attended the long-established M ethodist Secondary School o f  M fantsipim  at Cape 
Coast. He was separated from his maternal grandmother to whom  he was veiy  close but his 
grandfather came to take up residence in a home he possessed nearby. The discipline was very 
much like an  English boarding ( ‘public’) school and placed an enormous em phasis on uniform, 
hygiene and cleanliness.
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One may ask, as this institution was already established in 1861, why was there no influence 
on m ortality, leitility  and the family ol the kind I am postulating? It certainly did have an influence 
but it affected only a small m inority ol the population in the coastal areas. It was mass schooling 
that make the great difference.
Another majoi lcature is the division of the sibling group or the peers into educated and 
uneducated. As I have rem arked, the educated ones certainly influenced the others. But there was 
a considerable division between the two. I he uneducated could not aspire to any position in the 
governm ent or in the bureaucracy generally. 1 hey were destined to remain as farmers,- usually hoe 
farmers, or to be labourers o f one kind or another. The others could be M Ps, teachers, lawyers, 
doctors, army officers and so on. 1 he class structure began to emerge within the sibling group.
So there w ere inevitably some who felt superiority on the part o f  the educated and some 
jealousy or resentm ent on the part o f  the others. For example, when Kum was teaching in Lawra, 
the headmaster,
suggested to the teachers that we should give some o f  our spare time in the evenings to 
teach the unfortunate people ol the town who could neither read nor write.
Initially a lot of enthusiasts enrolled. They were divided into those who could speak English 
and those who knew ABC and others. I took a class o f  about four or five, who, due to their 
Koranic training, could be considered literate but not in the English or W estern style’.
The newly educated tried to raise up their colleagues.
But the solidarity betw een was also drastically affected by the subsequent differentiation o f 
jobs and the growing consum erism . The educational system broke up the solidarity o f  the family, 
reducing the authority o f  the father, splitting brother from brother, perhaps between husband and 
wife. It did that particularly because the jobs it had to offer did not exist at the village level. One 
virtually had to go away to work.
O f course the m obility o f  which Oppong refers in a recent paper was not only caused by 
education. The non-literates travelled to jobs in mines, in farms, in labouring work throughout the 
country and this activity, prom oted by colonial penetration, had similar effects. Except that the 
non-literates were m ore likely to go on short-term migration and in any case could easily return to 
the village w here they could claim  land for farming. Education dispersed the population in a more 
definitive way. Indeed not only throughout country but internationally too.
The obvious problem  with the decrease in mortality and initial population growth is that the 
process begins by increasing dependency ratios fo r  the young. This is to  say , children increase 
relative to the adult population. So if  you want to maintain the same proportion ol children at 
school the country is faced w ith a greater expenses but the same num ber o f adults to tax. And 
parents have to support m ore children. Equally the eventual decline in fertility releases resources 
for im proving schools and hence the equality’ ol the work force, if  that is a significant factor.
Parents and governm ents may o f  course react to the increasing growth by reducing the numbei 
o f children at school. But because o f  the superior status oi school children, both in a sibling group 
and in the w orld at large, there is likely to be pressure from some children themselves to attend, as 
happened in K um ’s case. N ot from all. Some will resent loss o f freedom that school involves, as is 
clear from the sam e narrative. But on whole, paren ts wall be forced into increasing sacrifices, of 
giving up on the help, w hich even young children can offer and  even without school fees, spending 
more o n  clo th ing , b o oks, food a n d  th e  consum er i ferns, w Inch children in  a com petitive sc  oo 
environment require. T h e  r e s u l t  i s  likely to be a decisio t the num ber o c l  ren.
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In other words, schools have decreased mortality by the em phasis on clean clothes and 
personal and household hygiene, more than decreased fertility by the increased costs o f  bringing up 
children in a school situation. The demographic transition is set in progress w ithout urbanisation, 
industrialisation and scarcely without modernisation, except the school itself. W hen that happens, 
there will be a decrease in child dependency ratios, since there is a larger num ber o f adults from the 
earlier fertility rise while the aged population has not yet begun to swell. Ih is  prom ises a 
‘dem ographic bonus’. In the following phase, the dependency ratio for the old will increase, partly 
because o f  greater longevity and partly because there are fewer younger folk to assist in looking 
after them. In Africa, that will be particularly problem atic, since there is too little economic 
strength to build up the extra-familial systems o f  old-age care, which characterize the developed 
econom ics. It will be another difficult phase for the extended family, which will have to be 
encouraged to cope. Education as we know it preceded industrialisation and intrusive urbanisation 
in Europe too. But it was not until very late (1870) that any attem pt was m ade to introduce 
com pulsory education and it was the widespread schooling that made a marked difference.
W idespread education may accomplish what western dem ographers, trained on M althus, have 
advocated to control the rise in fertility, that is, later marriage. Later m arriage m eans longer 
adolescence, with all its problem s and its own sub-culture. (In fact, as Lee et al have recently 
shown, it is quite possible for ‘traditional’ societies to control growth within marriage). Education 
prom otes consum erism  and expands the role o f  money in children’s lives. W hen there is a large 
gap between achievem ent in the economic and educational dom ains m ajor difficulties arise.
For there is another factor to be brought into the picture. I have indicated that throughout the 
w orld education has been very successful in establishing schools and recruiting children in a whole 
variety o f socio-econom ic situations. The new leaders o f  independent, ex-colonial nations were all 
educated men, some highly so, like Jomo Kenyatta or Kwame Nkrum ah, both authors o f  books. 
They wanted their peoples all to be schooled, partly for general reasons and partly so they could 
participate in national politics, w hich were based not only on literacy but on being able to read and 
write in a language, the colonial language, o f major circulation, English, French, Spanish or 
Portuguese.
D espite earlier hopes, the economy did not expand pari passu  w ith education. It could not 
provide the jobs which school or university leavers anticipated, since it was unlikely that they could 
return to what was still basically a hoe economy, into many rural areas, w ith low levels of 
production and plenty o f back-breaking labour. Cocoa plantations were different because they 
were cash crops, whose value varied with the world market. This m eant there was a gap between 
the literates who were being produced by the school system s and the num bers o f jobs. The 
adm inistration expanded in a variety o f  fields but this just meant there was less governm ent money 
to go round and wages fell. I would suggest that from this point o f  view the program me, pursued 
so overtly by the governments, the UN, religiotis bodies and other agencies, had very serious 
problem s.
As Adjepi points out, the discrepancy produced a floating population o f  the young who were 
basically a threat to political stability, since they would follow anyone who, realistically or not, 
prom ised them  jobs. The other outlet was overseas. Some m igrated from Ghana to oil-rich 
countries where wages were better. Others, because they had been educated in an international 
language, attem pted to em igrate abroad, legally or illegally, fh ey  em igrated to developed 
countries who increasingly failed to reproduce their population. There they often filled jobs the 
locals would not take and which were lower than their qualifications entitled them. Fifty per cent 
o f  trained health pei sonnel are reckoned to be working abroad. I he result was has been enormous 
loss to the exporting country, Ghana w hich has spent large resources on training the personnel and 
considerable gain to the developed world.
Even when there are no jobs they si 1 tenc to go to towns. The men leave wives, children and 
other fam ity behind them  and the w om en m ight turn to prostitution as well as to petty trading.
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Later m arriage which results from education (and other factors) can also be seen as related not only 
to the quality o t the workforce, where relevant, but also to extending adolescence, with its serious 
potential for drug taking, alcohol abuse and risky behaviour. 1 say where relevant because it must 
always be rem em bered that the m ajor civilizations o f  Eurasia achieved their earlier advances while 
literacy was acquired only by a minority. That situation o f minority, i f  you like o f  elite, literacy 
lasted some 5000 years. The new nations o f  Africa are pursuing quite a different and unexplored 
course ol w idespread if not universal schooling. Their adaptation to urban life may bring about 
m any ol the problem s O ppong (1999; 2000; 2001) has pointed out in an essay on the likelihood o f 
increasing infant malnutrition. Delayed marriage equally leads to greater illegitimacy and reduced 
birth spacing and the spread of disease. Increased divorce or separation and one-parent (usually 
m other-centred) families are in there too. Not all these ills are to be attributed to education, but it is 
as well to recognize that we are dealing with a package o f pluses and m inuses as far as education 
and the family are concerned. For good or for bad, the globalisation o f  education releases a potent 
force in the globalisation o f the family.
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P O V E R T Y  A N D  T H E  G H A N A IA N  F A M IL Y  
A. Afrifa
Abstract
1 his paper exam ines tour aspects o f  poverty: (1) the essence o f  being poor, (2) the 
physical, social and psychological consequences o f poverty, (3) the causes or origins o f 
poverty, and (4) poverty alleviation.
Basic to program m es o f poverty alleviation or elimination is understanding what 
keeps some people or families in a condition o f  perpetual poverty. Is it due to defects in 
the life ways o f  the poor (the individual blame or "culture o f  poverty" hypothesis), or is it 
due to the dysfunction and inequities in the social, political and economic institutions in 
the society ( system ic-blam e h ypothesis)? 11 i s a rgued h ere t hat a lthough p overty m ay 
have both individual and systemic origins, the latter (both internal and external) is 
preponderantly responsible for the continuing poverty o f  the poor, in many developing 
countries. Unless there is good internal governance and a serious international effort at 
changing the world econom ic order and sharing the potential equitably, poor countries 
and their im poverished people will continue to wallow in poverty. National and global 
governance m ust have at their core, human developm ent and equity.
O verview
How m any fam ilies in this country are in poverty? Is the num ber yearly growing larger? Are 
there each year more and m ore children going hungry? Are there more fathers whose utm ost effort 
may not bring into the hom e as m uch food as the family requires?
Certainly, these are neither sentimental nor fanciful questions. There are in this country 
countless families in precisely these conditions. If one considers the national minimum daily wage 
o f less than one US dollar and the price o f a loaf o f  bread at one -  third o f a dollar (33 US cents), o f 
the pervasiveness o f  poverty' in Ghanaian families becomes palpably evident. Thousand families 
who are in no sense paupers live in poverty .1 Those who are in poverty may be able to get a bare 
sustenance, but they are not able to maintain those necessities which will perm it them to maintain a 
state o f physical efficiency.
The necessities for maintaining physical efficiency or the physical health o f the average 
worker and his fam ily in th is  country are not difficult to  determine. T h ey  consist o f  adequate 
supplies o f  cereal food (maize, rice), tubers (cassava, yams), a m oderate supply o f protein (fish, 
meat, beans), clothing, adequate housing, some education, and sadly enough, sufficient freedom for 
the m other from  other w ork to enable her to perform properly her maternal and household duties. 
Surely, this standard is not an unreasonable one— sanitary housing, a sufficient supply o f  food and 
clothing.
All having to do w ith physical well-being is the very minim um  which the labouring classes 
demand.
Fam ilies living in poverty are in perpetual distress. 1 hey may never visit relatives or attend 
funerals in their hom e villages and towns unless they walk. 1 hey cannot save. 1 he children must 
not have the sim plest play things. The mother must never buy any pretty clothes for herself or lor 
her children. They m ust be content with “throw-aways Nothing must be bought but that which is 
absolutely necessary for the m aintenance of physical health. What is bought m ust be ol the
[A pauper is one who depends on charity for sustenance.
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plainest and o f the most economical description. Should a m ember o f  the family fall sick, she must 
be attended to by the quack doctor or by the itinerant drug peddler.
Thom as Carlyle, the Scottish essayist and historian aptly described poverty as “not the lack o f 
things but as the fear and dread o f  want. To live miserable, and not knowing why, to have dread ol 
hunger, to w ork soie and yet gain nothing is the essence o f  poverty.” This is precisely the 
circum stances o f  m any Ghanaian families.
Indeed, Karl M arx was right in asserting that the key to class structure is economics. The 
extent o f  an individual’s wealth determ ines his “ life chances’” and the chance to obtain things that 
are valued in society. The term “life chances” refers to the opportunities to live and to experience 
the good things in life.
Every year thousands o f Ghanaian babies go unvaccinated. against common childhood 
diseases. T he m ortality rate fo r  poor fam ilies is considerably higher than th a t o f  th e  non poor 
(GDHS, 1998). It is also docum ented that in every society, the poor have higher m ortality rates 
from specific diseases such as pneumonia, HIV/AIDS, cancer o f  all sorts, and others. Even more 
depressing is the observation that the poor have about twice the incidence o f clear-cut vitamin 
deficiency than the non-poor (W orld Bank Population, Health and Nutrition Sector Review, 1988). 
Diet deficiencies are an important cause o f  infant mortality and disease. If a pregnant m other lacks 
essential vitam ins and minerals often her child will be born prematurely. Prem ature babies are 
often at risk for a num ber o f intellectual neurological and developm ental disabilities. They are 
m ore likely to die during the first month o f life. Even in an affluent country like the United States 
prem aturity accounts for about half o f  all deaths that occur during this time.
The inadequate diets o f  the poor, determined in larger m easure by their economic 
circum stances, may explain why many poor children do not perform  well in school. These poor 
children are more likely to be hungry, weak, sick and even suffer from brain damage and mental 
retardation then the better -  fed children. The level o f educational attainm ent we reach is a crucial 
determ inant o f  our chances o f  income. But in our society today, educational opportunities are no 
more equally accessible to m ost poor children, at least not in terms o f  quality education.
Poverty, to be sure, is not a new phenom enon in our families. W hat is new is its pervasiveness 
and the increasing pauperization o f  a large num ber o f families. The cities are now chock -  full o f 
destitutes and beggars. There are too many adults in the system who are unem ployed or 
underem ployed. If  employed at all many lack the resources to cater for the basic survival needs o f 
their families. Reports o f poor families openly selling or auctioning their children because o f 
deprivation and hunger are not rare in the daily and weekly newspapers. How can uncles, aunts 
and other m em bers o f  the cherished extended family system take care o f their poor relatives’ 
children when they them selves have to sell their own children in order to survive. Poverty 
obviously is at the root o f  the breakdown in our traditional extended family and com m unalistic was 
o f life.
The gradual extinction o f  the extended family ideal not due to ‘m odernity’. It is not due to 
choice it is due to necessity— a condition brought about is by profound social and economic 
changes that have embroiled the country for the past decades. These changes have removed the 
traditional support systems that existed in the society, leading to a growing incidence o f child 
neglect, child abuse and domestic violence in many families.
One direct consequence o f  child neglect and child abuse is the births in our health facilities 
that are to teenagers, mostly from poor families and most under 17 years o f  age (Afrifa 1994). As a 
result, the dem ographic landscape o f  poor families is undergoing dangerous and socially 
unacceptable changes. An increasing num ber o f  infants and children in poor families are exposed 
to the risks o f  having a teenage mother, a youthful grandmother and a m iddle-aged great­
grandm other, who are usually still in their prime. Since these “young” grand and great-grand 
parents a re  yet to  biologically retire th ey  are sim ply not as available as th ey  used to be in  the 
‘golden’ old days— and the children o f  today are bearing the brunt o f  these dem ographic changes.
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Sadly, th e  idea o f  c hildhood a s a sheltered time, free o f  a nxieties, i s becom ing a nostalg ic 
luxury at present. M any parents -  as a m atter o f economic and survival necessities -  are simply not 
at home when the children return from school, if they go to school at all. M ost poor parents cannot, 
therefore, exert clay to day control over their children’s activities. Some parents, as a m atter o f 
survival encourage or connive w ith their children to enter the adult world precipitously or 
prematurely. O ur streets are like beehives -  multitudes o f  children and teenagers selling, peddling, 
stealing or soliciting. These children are being robbed o f  their childhood and adolescence by being 
exposed too early to the secrets and vagaries o f adulthood— violence, illness, death and sexuality.
There is no doubt that most o f  the poverty and ill health is still to be found among rural 
families. However, impoverished families are overwhelmingly a majority in urban areas. Urban 
poverty is grim m er and its entire context is quite distinct from rural poverty. Although the urban 
poor suffer from diseases related to poverty ju st as do the rural poor, the ecology in urban settings 
is often different from that in rural areas.
Em ploym ent opportunities require the poor to work in hazardous conditions on construction 
sites, in small industries handling toxic chemicals or exposed to fumes and dangerous particles 
from machinery. The need for employment also dictates the place o f residence forcing the 
individual and his family to live in polluted areas or areas exposed to disasters, floods and fire 
outbreaks. Thus, even  in a disaster, the socio-econom ic status o f th e  family m akes a very  rea l 
difference: the higher the economic status o f the family, the greater the probability o f  survival.
Unlike rural m others working in the farm with their children, or w ith the aid o f members o f 
the extended family, the urban poor mother, who is usually a petty trader in our busy and chaotic 
markets, has to leave her children at home, with a daily  meagre allowance to buy food on th e  
streets. Since street foods are often prepared and sold in unhygienic surroundings these children 
run the risk o f  contracting gastro-enteric diseases.
M oreover, the severest human deprivations arising from environmental damage are 
concentrated in the cities and affect poor families unable to protect themselves. Environmental 
aspects o f urbanization affect the poor in direct and significant ways. Housing conditions are 
woefully inadequate-often without sewerage, running water and garbage disposal facilities. Unlike 
rural families, poor urban families do not have physical spaces or streams for their use. Instead, 
they have air and water pollution from traffic and industries. Respiratory infections in small 
children are therefore more likely to occur among poor urban children. At th e  same time, the 
invariably h igh n um bers o f  hea lth  facilities in urban areas rem ain fo r m o st p a r t u nattainable o r 
unaffordable to urban poor families as they would have been if  they lived in the rural areas. The 
conditions o f life o f  poor urban families are made even worse by the breakdown o f  family 
structures and loss o f  social cohesion. In urban areas, the traditional mechanisms that govern and 
control behaviour no longer operate. Consequently sexually transm itted diseases (STD), child 
neglect, child abuse, child abandonment, m ental and emotional disorders become serious problem s 
for poor urban families, com pared to the levels among poor rural families.
There is an oft-quoted verse from the Bible that says “and the poor shall always be with us” 
(M atthew, 26:11). W hile this has been true, m ust it always be? Honestly there is nothing 
‘glorious’ or ‘p ious’ about poverty. In fact, our culture frowns upon poverty. Just consider some 
o f  our proverbs, wits and epigrams about poverty as com piled by the param ount ch ief o f  
Acherensua, A gyewodin Adu Gyamfi Am pem  (1998):
Poverty can be equated with insanity;
Poverty’s sibling is belittlement;
Poverty is a disgrace;
Any broth carrying the poverty tag is bitter;
The poor has no friend;
The corpse o f  the poor man is buried by the roadside;
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Necessity compels a monkey to eat hot pepper.
Clearly the psychological consequences o f  being poor cannot be under estimated in our 
society. The poor are rejected. They are looked down upon as lazy, and dirty. The poor are not 
wanted by the rich as neighbours, friends or colleagues. Being poor is degrading as well as 
uncom fortable. Being poor engenders feelings o f  hopelessness and helplessness, thereby leading to 
apathy or anger. In fact, one o f  the m ost important sources o f  anger is that p oor families see 
affluence all about them but no m atter how hard they try, they are unable to share in it. W orst o f 
all, the poor are aware that they are more likely to be arrested, to  be found guilty, and to serve 
longer sentences for a given violation than people o f  higher socio-economic status. Criminal 
behaviour is found throughout the social structure but the prosecution varies. It is the poor who are 
usually arrested. The judicial process does not seem to sort out the innocent from the guilty, so 
m uch as the well-to-do from the poor.
W hen the poor become helpless and hopeless, some desert thei:: families. Others escape their 
harshness o f  r eality t hrough m ental illness, a lcohol, drugs, r eligion o r w  itchcraft. S ome c ommit 
suicide or displace their anger and frustration on family members. The proliferation o f  churches 
(m any dubious), and the unprecedented high incidence o f domestic violence, spousal m urders and 
suicides in recent times, are indicative o f  the calamitous circum stances o f the Ghanaian family.
Two reports in the Daily Guide (September 11, 2002) further illustrate the fatal consequences 
o f  poverty :
(a) A 29-year-old housewife dead with the husband’s locally m anufactured p isto l... 
According to police sources the victim who was nursing a four month old baby allegedly 
stole (£46,000 (Six US Dollars) belonging to her mother-in-law. Police said when her 
husband confronted her, she admitted stealing the money. The husband then asked her to 
refund the m oney and she agreed. She entered their room and instead picked her husband’s 
loaded gun and shot herself.
(b) Com m itted suicide by drinking an insecticide. She was alleged to have stolen a traveling 
bag belonging to her late husband’s relative. On hearing about [he theft her father advised 
her to return t he b ag. O n t he s ame n ight o f  the s ame d ay, s he w as found d ead t he n ext 
m orning with a DDT container by her side.
These are some o f  the terrible alternatives which the distressed or some people in poverty accept in 
preference to public ridicule and humiliation.
According to Governm ent statistics 40% o f Ghanaians live below  the poverty line. W hy are 
so m any o f  us poor? W ho is to blame? The answer is not all that simple. For one thing, poverty is 
pandem ic. It exists in both rich and poor regions o f  the world. Despite A m erica’s riches and 
wealth, m illions o f  her people are ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-housed and homeless. W hy are some 
people so poor in a land o f apparent affluence? Some W estern conservatives see the fault in the 
individual poor. The fatal flaws within the poor that keep them and their children poor are believed 
to be a deviant value system ( ‘culture o f  poverty” hypothesis). The poor rem ain poor because they 
are lazy and also do not believe in hard work. Thirty years ago Edward Banfield, a distinguished 
professor o f urban government at Harvard, presented a conservative assessm ent o f  the poor. In his 
view, the poor are doomed by their hedonism  and the culture o f  poverty is such that it makes the 
slum s in w hich they dwell actually desirable to them.
As he put it:
A lthough h e  (th e  poor) h a s  m ore  “ leisure” than alm ost anyone, the indifference 
(“apathy” i f  one prefers) o f  the lower-class person is such that he seldom makes 
even the simplest repairs to the place thal h< lives in. He is not troubled by dirt and 
dilapidation and he does not mind the inadequacy o f  public facilities such as 
schools, parks, hospitals, and libraries; Iced, where such things exist he may 
destroy them  by carelessness or even by vandalism. Conditions that make the slum 
repellent to others are serviceable to hi i i several ways (Banfield 1974: 72).
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As Banfield sees it, the poor are the cause o f their own problem s and circumstances.
Surprisingly, many Ghanaians seem to share the “culture o f poverty” hypothesis. A study ol 
the attitudes o f  a cross-section o f the students at the University o f  G hana (Afrifa 2002) indicated 
that 45 per cent o f  the students did believe that the poor are partly responsible for their plight. As 
one student said, “Poverty as a phenom enon can be self-inflicted” . O ther culture o f poverty 
responses were:
Some people lack focus, attention and other tools necessary to break the poverty barrier.
M ost poor people don’t make any attem pt to improve their status as a result o f inherent
laziness.
Opportunities may be available to access and progress, but fail to do so because o f laziness,
carelessness and lack o f  foresight.
Many poor people do not try to improve themselves. They believe that once they are bom
poor, it was the will o f God to be poor, so they make no effort whatsoever.
The culture-of-poverty hypothesis has extremely im portant ram ifications for the way the war 
on poverty will be waged and the policy decisions that will be made or not made in dealing with 
poverty. It is therefore im perative to examine closely the rationale for beaming the poor for their 
poverty. The m ost common rationale is that the poor are doomed by their hedonism. They are lazy 
and do not believe in hard work. This simply is not true. M ost o f  the poor do work. They ju st do 
not earn enough to rise above poverty. Since the poor are commonly unskilled they must work at 
low -  paying menial jobs. They want to achieve, but they are blocked by the lack o f  opportunities 
and victimization by the more powerful. The poor cannot afford to send their children to school. If 
they go to school at all, they are more likely to drop out or fail. The degeneracy o f the adults 
infects the children and the foulest o f  our social m iseries is thus perpetuated from generation to 
generation.
Is it also not possible that the hedonism  or the present time orientation o f  the poor is a product 
o f  the hopelessness o f  their situation? It seems highly unlikely that the poor see little reason to 
com plain about the slums. W hat about the filth, the rats, the overcrowding, and the high infant 
m ortality? W hat about the lack o f jobs and opportunity for upward m obility? This feeling o f being 
trapped seems the prim ary cause o f  a hedonistic time orientation. Poverty may have both 
individual and system ic origins, but explaining poverty largely within a person -- blame framework, 
can be dangerous. It protects the established order against criticism, thereby increasing the 
difficulty encountered in trying to change the dominant, but corrupt economic, social and political 
institutions.
The poor people o f Ghana, to a large extent, are victims o f their own elites, public officials 
and leaders. Bad governance, corruption, bribery, thievery, social insensitivity, greed, self- 
aggrandizem ent, m isplaced and displaced socio-economic priorities, conspicuous, consumption, 
inordinate am bition and hedonism, have historically been the hallmarks o f  this section o f  society. 
Loans contracted for public works or poverty alleviation are squandered by public and government 
officials. Bank o f  Ghana officials steal millions o f  cedis from the bank’s vaults with impunity. 
The Bank o f  Ghana is the repository o f our financial reserves. How safe are our foreign deposits? 
Are the proceeds from exports -  gold, timber, cocoa, bauxite, pineapples -  and m onies borrowed 
from  the W orld Bank and donor countries well accounted for? The weight o f  sociological evidence 
suggests strongly that the inequities o f  society and the hedonism  o f  the elite and public officials are 
to blam e for the poverty o f  the poor, and not the hedonism or the defects in the life ways (culture o f 
poverty) o f  the poor. Unless the system is sanitized, or public officials, m inisters o f  state, party 
officials and the business men and contractors are held strictly accountable, the war on poverty will 
be a losing battle.
W e ought to be outraged by white-collar crim< and official corruption as we are w'hen 
assaulted and robbed by a stranger on the street. The prosecution and conviction o f  such nation 
wreckers and looters is most important, not only to den - further looting o f our scarce resources, but 
also because it would demonstrate the even handed n i " the law som ething that does not exist
97
Research Review  Supplement 15 (2004) 93-99
now. Obviously we cannot discount the contribution o f externa) (actors to the perpetuation o f 
poverty in Ghana. There is a parallelism  between the ever increasing poverty iri Ghana (and the 
Third W orld in general) and the ever increasing prosperity o f  the Developed or First World. Dr 
Kwam e Nkrumah, the first President o f Ghana noted aptly that, Africa itself is not poor. It is the 
people who are poor. They are poor because they have been exploited for so long by the Western 
W orld. Data gleaned from U N D P's Human Development Reports (1998; 1999; 2000) lend 
credence to this assertion.
The developed world shelters only a fifth or 20 per cent o f  the world population but 
contributes 86% o f W orld GDP and dominates 82% o f W orld Export M arkets. A historical 
analysis o f  world income distribution betw een the richest and poorest country was about 3 to 1 on 
1820, 11 to 1 in 1913, 35 to 1 in 1950, 44 to 1 in 1973 and astonishingly 72 to 1 in 1992. The data 
indicate that the average British family in 1820 had an income six times that o f the Ethiopian 
family in 1992. W ith a per capital income o f  $370, the average Ghanaian was poorer in 2001 than 
in 1957, four and a ha lf decades (44 years) after independence. The average real wage is a quarter 
o f w hat it was even in 1970 and 40% o f the population live below  the poverty line.
True, income is not the sum total o f human lives. It is also not an accurate predictor o f  poverty 
levels. Nevertheless the lack o f it can also mean the denial o f  what is necessary for the material 
well-being o f families. Yet, while the incomes o f families in the developed world keep on sky­
rocketing ours nose-dive every year.
The priorities o f  the developed and the developing worlds are not only starkly different but 
m ind-boggling. The provision o f basic education for the poor world will cost $6 billion. 
Am ericans spend $8 billion on lipsticks, pomade and other cosmetics. The poor world needs $9 
billion for the provision o f safe water and adequate sanitation. W estern Europe alone spends $11 
billion on ice cream. W estern Europe and America spend $12 billion on perfum es. This is the 
projected cost for the provision o f  adequate reproductive health care for all women in the 
developing world. W hile most families are under-nourished and m alnourished America and 
W estern Europe spend $17 billion on food for cats, dogs and other pets. Japan “blow s” $35 billion 
on business entertainm ent every year but the estimated cost for the provision o f basic health and 
nutrition for the people o f  the Third W orld is only $15 billion a year. In effect, Japan spends more 
than tw ice the amount required for the provision o f basic health in developing countries on 
business entertainment. Europe and America spends one and h a lf times on pet foods, and Europe 
alone spends eight times on cigarettes and cigars.
This is by no m eans the end o f  the inequities. W ide disparities in longevity exist and persist. 
The percentage o f  people expected to survive to age 60 and infant mortality rates decisively favour 
families i n the d eveloped w orld. I n t he d eveloped countries, a bout 9 0 p er cent o f  their p eople 
expect to survive at age 60 and only 7 out o f  1,000 infants will die before age 5. In the poor world 
h a lf o f  the population are expected to die before they are 60, while 94 (in some countries, over 200) 
out o f  1,000 infants will die before they are five years old.
These are the stark realities that distinguish families o f  the developing world and those o f the 
developed world. In developing countries as a group, ‘human poverty -  or deprivation in terms of 
short lives, illiteracy and a lack o f  basic services -  affects one quarter o f  the population. Sub- 
Saharan Africa and South A sia have the highest combined incidence o f  both human and income 
poverty, about 40 per cent. In sub-Saharan Africa, human poverty, and income poverty are 
increasing both in proportion and in absolute num bers’ (UNDP 1997).
In effect, poverty is a global phenomenon. The global expansion o f  trade and investment is 
proceeding at breakneck speed, but largely for the benefit o f  the rich and powerful countries o f the 
North. “Serious international action is needed to level the global playing field and create a robust 
safety net for the w orld’s poorest people” as noted by Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, head o f  the Human 
D evelopm ent Report Office o f  the U nited Nat; is. Unless globalisation is carefully managed, poor 
countries and their im poverished people wil l  become increasingly m arginalized.
As the drafters o f the Universal Declaration o f  Human rights noted, “A decent standard of 
living, adequate nutrition, health care, educatioi decent work and protection against calam ities are
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not ju st developmental goals -  they are human rights.” And, “Human Development is essential for 
full Human Development. But Human Rights ~ in an integrated world -  require global justice” 
(UNDP 2000).
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G E N D E R , T H E  F A M IL Y  A N D  M E N T A L  IL L N E S S
Juliet M itchell
I am  going to take the notion o f  mental illness in its broadest possible sense and look at its 
prevalence in relation to questions o f gender and the family, using certain tenets o f  psychoanalysis 
which seem  to me to provide a framework for a cross-cultural perspective. My focus is firstly on 
the psychological im plications o f  sibling relationships, which I believe have been absent from the 
paradigm s that are used to examine mental health. Secondly, and following on from the first, to 
consider the im plications for the gendering o f mental health o f the fact that our model o f  health and 
illness is based on the family.
The psychoanalytic tenets that are relevant to my comments are: first a profoundly anti- 
Cartesian p  ostulate that t he m ind a nd b ody a re n ot separate; the i n fan f s n ascent m ind e merges 
from the demands o f  the body in the context o f  the human world, and furthermore it always returns 
to this body as is exemplified in  a physical but non-organic hysterical sym ptom .1 The second 
relevant postulate is that mental i llness is  on ly  an  exaggeration o f  n o n n a l processes, it is n o t a 
different discrete state but on a continuum; hence the extremes o f  psychological symptoms o f ill- 
health can tell us about everyday mental life. Thirdly that infantile life is supremely im portant for 
all mental states, that we acquire the basics o f being acculturated humans in a staggeringly 
condensed way in our early years. One can see this most obviously in the acquisition o f  lore and 
language. Psychically, we all continue to carry our ‘pre-cultured’ infancy with us. In mental 
illness it is as though instead o f being contained - 1 feel like crying like a baby -  or indulged as, for 
instance, in those dreams in which we can fly just as we hoped to in childhood, this infancy breaks 
through but in a disguised manner: an hysterical blindness for what we do not want to see and 
sim ultaneously want to see too much. I am looking then at the origins o f  mental illness not as 
understood by neuroscience and pharmacology, but as understood as taking place in the family.
The human context for the growth o f the mind and its fall-oul or fall-back positions in mental 
illness is the family. Not the family in the simple sense o f  the social occupants o f  key positions -  
m other, father, grandparents, siblings etc., but the family as it is positioned within cultures or 
within hum an culture itself: the prohibitions and allowances o f kinship laws, o f  understandings o f 
death and life, o f  food and sexuality, to name the most obvious.
Psychoanalysis as a clinical practice and as a theory was “bom ” when Sigmund Freud 
changed his understanding o f  mental illness a nd i n p articular o f  hysteria (a mental illness very 
prevalent in the late 19th century), as having been caused by a sexual abuse by the father in the 
patien t’s childhood, to a notion that the child had desires which human cultures had to repress. The 
father stood in the place from which essential cultural prohibitions emanated. Later psychoanalysts 
em phasised the importance o f  the child’s earlier socialization o f  its needs in its relationship to the 
place o f  the m other. (I em phasise “the place” o f either parent, not because there can be others in
1 This is more than psychosomatic illness, more even than ‘you don’t need to be depressed to get a cold -  but 
it helps’. The body expresses the mind’s thoughts. My first analytical patient could not see my pregnancy -  
instead the pain of the unseen perception was experienced as a stomach ulcer, despite my interpretations that 
the growth was in my stomach not his, the matter began to get out of hand when his doctor suggested tests 
for stomach cancer. It was time not to help him to understand, but to insist on the difference. My patient, an 
adult male, was re-living as a symptom the games and id-, fications of a two-to-three year old, being both 
pregnant mother and suffering older child. The symptom had a contradictory meaning of both what he 
wanted -  omnipotently to be everyone -  and what he did not want -  his mother to be concerned with anyone 
other than himself.
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those places -  o f  course, there can -  but because this place contains the m eaning o f fatherhood or 
motherhood, the fantasies o f the mother, the m other’s (or father’s) internalisation o f the significant 
people and events in her/his life -  in other words, her (or his) psyche which, like the baby’s, is 
huge and contains m ultitudes).
The shift o f  focus from the laws o f the father to the satisfactions and frustrations emanating 
from the m other2 within psychoanalytic theory had a great impact on the em erging discipline o f 
developm ental psychology, just as this discipline, in turn, impacted on psychoanalytic theory and 
practice. But, apart from some im portant exceptions since the 1980s, the m ovem ent from father- to 
m other-dom inated explanations has been at the expense o f  siblings. In this it has in my view been 
ethnocentric. It has also been com plicit with gender ideologies around on the one hand work -  
allowing wom en to work in the paid work-force as though they had no gender -  and on the other, 
around reproduction in which it allows women to reproduce, care for children and carry out highly 
extended domestic w ork as though all they had was gender -  “th a t’s w om an’s w ork,” from  babies, 
to washing-up, to types o f  farming.
Returning in 1963 with his psychiatrist wife, Doris M ayer, to the Tallensi with whom  he had 
worked from 1934 to 1937, anthropologist M eyer Fortes in “Psychosis and Social Change” 
describes Tallensi family life in a way that indicates the pervasive influence o f  the psychoanalytic 
model (Fortes and M ayer 1965). He illustrates the child’s social world through a series o f boxes. 
The ch ild’s progress originates with the m other in the m other’s room, next in the father’s quarters 
w ith his half-siblings, and finally after about age five, w ith the wider clan o f uncles, aunts, cousins 
etc. This social configuration matches the internal schema o f  psychoanalytic pre-Oedipal, Oedipal 
and post-Oedipal neatly. But this model aside, Fortes’ and M ayer’s work instead underscores 
som ething different: what I will call the structuring, autonomous area o f  sibling relations. Tallensi 
parents still in the nineteen-sixties abstained from sexual relations with each other from the birth o f 
a baby until it could move and feed on its own. For the mother, birth-spacing was thus commonly 
from three to three and a ha lf years. The taboo is attached to the mother, though this is not 
explicitly discussed, presum ably for the father there were no prohibitions on sexuality itself. Thus, 
for the baby, it is quite likely that the nearest sibling who could chronologically be a “tw in” would 
have been a half-sibling with its own separate mother. However, it was expected that a new 
pregnancy and baby o f  the same m other would cause the other infant considerable disturbance and 
intense rivalry. But by the time this happened, as M ayer commented: “there wras already an 
extrem ely strong sibling and peer group in place; it was not uncom m on to see children o f between 
two and three years going around with their arms affectionately around each other’s necks.” 
Betw een the lines, M ayer is clearly curious as to whether, along with the strong parental care and 
affection, this lateral bonding does not contribute to the robust psychic health o f  the Tallensi. 
W hen working in a nursery o f  a M apam  Kibbutz in 1962 ,1 noticed the same intim acy in small peer 
groups o f  4 children o f  around two years old. Anna Freud, w orking with child survivors o f  the 
Nazi concentration camps noted that it was such peer-group bonding that enabled survival -  
however, she considered this to be not a normal but a social pathological structure formed under 
desperate conditions. I f  the sibling or substitute peer group can prom ote psychic well-being, it 
should logically also take its share in causing mental illness. I have looked through the literature 
for signs o f  this.
In the 1930s D.W. W innicott, a British psychoanalyst famous for the sensitivity, 
perceptiveness and originality o f  his observations o f infants and m others, was a practising 
paediatrician. He wrote for an audience of parents and fellow health-workers as follows:
You are taking the weights of a large number of children and it is easy to work out 
what is the average weight for any given age. In the same way, the average can be 
found for every other m easurem ent o f  elopment and the test o f  norm ality is to 
com pare the measurem ents of a child ih the average. Such com parisons make it
2 The mother’s social control is regarded not as rub id regulations but as deprivations and frustrations.
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very interesting information, but there is a complication that can arise and spoil the 
whole calculation. A complication not usually mentioned in the paediatric 
literature. Although from a purely physical standpoint, any deviation from health 
may be taken to be abnormal, it does not follow that physical lowering o f  health 
due to emotional strain and stress is necessarily abnormal. This rather startling 
point o f  view requires elucidation. Now take a rather crude example: it is very 
common fo ra  child from  2-3 years old to be very upset at th e  birth o f  a baby 
brother or sister. As a m other’s pregnancy proceeds or when the new baby arrives, 
the child that has hitherto been robust and has known no cause for distress may 
becom e unhappy and temporarily thin and pale and develop other symptoms such 
as enuresis, ill-temper, sickness, constipation and nasal congestion. If  a physical 
illness should occur at this time, e.g. an attack o f  pneum onia, whooping cough, 
gastroenteritis, then it is possible that convalescence will be unduly prolonged.
Joan aged 2 years 5 months was an only child when 13 months ago her 
brother was bom . Joan had been in perfect health until this event. She then 
becam e very jealous, she lost her appetite and consequently got thin. When left for 
a w eek w ithout b eing f  orced t o e at, s he a te p rad ically  n othing a nd 1 ost w eight.
She has remained like this, is very irritable and her m other cannot leave her 
w ithout producing in her an anxiety attack. She will not speak to anyone and in 
the night she wakes screaming -  even four times a night. The actual dream 
material not being very clear .... She pinches and even bites the baby and will not 
allow him  things to play with. She will not allow anyone to speak about the baby, 
but frowns and ultim ately intervenes. When she was put in a welfare centre she 
worried a great deal; ... and having no one to bite, bit herself, so that she had to be 
taken home after three days. She is scared o f animals. If she sees a boy on the 
cham ber she heaves until she is sick. If  given chocolate, she puts it in her mouth 
and keeps it there until she gets home then she spits it all out again. She constantly 
prefers men to women. The parents are exceptionally nice people, the child is a 
perfectly healthy and lovable child. (W innicot 1958 [1931]: 3-4)
W innicott never made anything o f  this, nor o f  some other scattered observations, except to note the 
overall benefit o f  siblings to the child as opposed to being an only child. Once he comments that a 
child needs first to have access to its hatred o f  a sibling if  it is :o achieve love o f  it. Hatred and 
rivalry for the one who deposes, or even the risk and thought o f  one who might depose, is, as the 
Tallensi apparently appreciate and W innicott emphasises, quite normal. But it also appears as a 
normal illness. I suggest that if  we were to transpose Joan’s normal childhood illness at the birth o f  
her sibling into her adulthood, we would have all the characteristics o f  one expression o f mental 
illness: eating disorders, depression, self-attacking, sudden violence, overwhelming anxiety, 
recurrent n ightm ares.. . .
At roughly the same time that W innicott was com m enting on childhood illness in a paediatric 
clinic in London, a British doctor, Cicely W illiams, was reporting on child health from 
observations at the C hildren’s Hospital, Accra, Gold Coast. Her first publication in The Lancet is 
on ‘K w ashiorkor’ and opens with these words: “The name “kwashiorkor” indicates the disease the 
deposed baby gets when the next one is bom ” (W illiams 1935: 1151). In  fact, younger babies 
occasionally get kw'ashiorkor and then it is associated with poor nutrition following the death or 
disappear ance o f  the mother. A protein deficiency disease found in maize cultures, i f  kwashiorkor 
is caught early, good nutrition can save the child. However in a fuller article on child health in the 
Gold Coast three years later, W illiams describes the idyllic lire o f  most small babies and the 
rejection o f  the older child:
A wom an has a lot o f  time in which she likes to be with a baby. First she washes it 
slowly, lingeringly. Then she alters the disposal o f  the beads with great precision 
and leisure. She powders i t . .. This meticulous love o f b small baby is in striking
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contrast with the neglect and indifference with which the older children may be 
treated. (W illiams 1938)
She goes on:
Up to  tw o  the ch ild  1 eads a thoroughly spoiled life, b u t th is  existence is rudely 
broken. His m other either has another baby or goes away with a husband and 
leaves the child to his grandm other... I have seen great rage and bitterness in a 
child who finds the place on his m other’s back is usurped by a new b ab y ... After a 
period o f  blind misery the child gets used to this. People are good to him. 
(W illiam s 1938)
Dr. W illiam s explicitly labels the advent o f a sibling a trauma -  suggesting the peevishness o f 
ill-considered articles by adults in the local press o f the period can be laid at the door o f  this early 
traum atic childhood experience.
By 1962 writing m ore fully on kwashiorkor once again, Dr. W illiams cites the w ork o f  A.P. 
Farm er in East Africa. Farm er found that there were 48 underlying causes in the 28 cases of the 
disease which she reviewed. Four o f these causes were poverty-related m alnutrition, 17 others had 
underlying m edical diseases, but,
social and psychological causes were responsible for 19 [and] another 8 were 
associated with ‘abrupt w eaning’ (W illiams 1962).
1963 was the year o f M eyer Fortes’ return with Doris M ayer to the Tallensi. In 1934-7, the 
time o f  his first visit, there had been one case o f madness, there were now  thirteen in the same 
social group. The Tallensi were quite clear as to what constitutes ‘ m adness’ and differentiated it 
from  eccentricity, mental deficiency and even strange behaviour. According to Doris M ayer, 
som ewhat to her disappointment, Tallensi ‘m adness’ translated seamlessly into W estern psychoses. 
One o f  the mad had a post-partum  depression, one was manic, one m elancholic, the rest all suffered 
from  schizophrenia. T oday, forty years 1 ater, we would probably label these 1 ast borderline or 
narcissistic personality disorders, as seventy years previously they would have been instances o f 
hysterical psychoses. There was no paranoia and M ayer contrasted, this w jth the observation by 
M.J. Field, who in 1962 reported a study o f 52 schizophrenics among the Akan: o f these 26 men 
were paranoid; 50?/o o f the women were depressed. A possible cause o f  the Akan disposition to 
paranoia and depression in adulthood is cited as the fact that in his/her childhood “the adored small 
child has to suffer the trauma o f growing up into an object o f  contem pt” (Field 1962: 30). The 
family system o f  pushing out the older child is similar to that described by W illiam s observing 
apparently m ostly Asante in the Children’s Hospital. Both East African and Asante behaviours are 
in strong contrast to the Tallensi, who help the older child with its expected intense sibling rivalry.
M y purpose in looking at these now old and certainly dated accounts by W estern observers in 
England and W est Africa, is to single out a neglected theme: siblings. N one o f  the observers 
them selves single out siblings as playing a role in the aetiology' o f mental illness or in the 
psychological dimensions o f illnesses such as kwashiorkor, yet -  as my selection shows -  the 
m aterial o f  their observation is striking in ju st this respect.
I indicated at the beginning o f  this paper that a psychoanalytic understanding o f mental illness 
came into being w ith the shift from believing a specific trauma o f  abuse in childhood resulted in 
later neurosis, to arguing th a t a general hum an traum a o f  prohibiting  a n  incestuous r elationship 
w ith your m other (or father) (the Oedipus Complex) is not properly internalised. The incestuous 
wishes and their failed prohibitions are revealed behind psychological symptoms. It is, o f  course, 
the arrival o f  a sibling that indicates that you cannot have what you want— your m other’s (or 
father’s) exclusive love. However I believe tha the sibling plays more o f  a part than as a trigger 
for this realisation. The observers I have used, a paediatrician, an anthropologist, a doctor and a 
psychiatrist, all note the childhood illness that bhng precipitates. W hat o f  adult mental illness?
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In Fortes and M ayer’s account (1965), the thirteen-fold increase in ‘m adness’ or psychosis 
over a thirty year period seems to be accounted for by informants and observers alike by the vastly 
increased migration to work in Southern Ghana.
The disruption to stability and the loss o f  a previous identity, even through temporary 
m igration, would seem to have been traumatic. W hat is this madness or psychosis o f the adult? 
U nderlying the many versions o f madness is, I believe, the loss o f  a sense o f  where one belongs, 
which is cognate with who one is. Specific traumata -  such as aspects o f wars or certain 
childbirths can trigger it -  for it to be entrenched it needs to make use o f  a trauma o f childhood 
which has not been adequately overcome. The sibling, I suggest, is this universal trauma— some 
cultures, some individuals, enable its overcoming better than others, but traum a it is. This is 
W innicott (1978), a paediatrician, but also a psychoanalyst, writing in the 1970s, still not making 
the presence o f  a sibling affect his theory, but having it thrust upon him nevertheless:
The m other said that there had been a great change toward ill health in the Piggle 
recently. She was not naughty and she was nice to the baby. It was difficult to put 
into words what the matter was. But she was not herself. In fact she refused to be 
herself and said so: “I'm  the mummy. I ’m the baby”. She was not to be addressed 
as herself. She had developed a high-voiced chatter which was not hers. (W mnicot 
1978: 13, my italics).
Like m any a schizophrenic, the Piggle has “vanished”, disrupting the acquisition o f  language: she 
no longer speaks with her own voice.
W orld-wide, siblings are on the decline. A fifth o f the w orld’s population has a one-child 
family p olicy; in nearly  e very c ountry o f  the W estem  w orld  reproduction i s below  replacem ent 
level; the higher the income and career level o f the woman, the less the likelihood o f  her having 
any children or more than one child. But a trauma removed is not the same as a traum a overcome. 
Trauma will happen throughout life, the degree o f this may be enough to drive anyone mad. A mad 
man uses a past traum a to give the present madness its form. The iiresolution o f a necessary 
trauma in infancy is a poor prognosis in the best o f circumstance. It remains to be seen how the 
one-child family will replace this necessary trauma o f the sibling.
But is this sibling traum a gendered? The answer to this will vary enormously cross-culturally, 
although it is unlikely that any culture will be completely gender indifferent. The question o f 
where Africa m ight stand in this opens up an interesting issue. Unlike economically stratified 
societies, such as China and India, female infanticide is, as far as I am aware, unknown on the 
continent. H istorically both w om en’s heavy agricultural contribution and practices o f bride wealth 
and continuing respect for reproduction and a general pronatalisrn have helped the girl-child to be 
valued along w ith the boy-child. Not so the mother. The situation faced now in sub-Saharan 
Africa is one that has haunted W estern feminism since its inception in the seventeenth century. Put. 
reductively, it is, to echo what we have heard about gender and W est African literature, the 
problem  not o f  being a first wife, a second wife, a divorced wife or a widow -  but o f  being a 
woman. For all the differences o f  the patriarchal ism between late M edieval, early m odem  Europe 
and contem porary polygynous sub-Saharan Africa, they have in common an ideology o f  a 
continuity o f  family and society. In the former the nation is the family writ large, in the latter the 
extended family is the society. In both cases there is a place for women and for men, that is, for the 
subjectivity o f  being a gender w ith a bio-social gender position. Women are subjugated to men in 
both family and society, but within this subjugation they can enjoy a certain autonomy in a distinct 
sphere. M odem  society on the contrary ideologically separates the family from the larger civil and 
political society. The citizen o f the state who votes, pays taxes etc., is an individual and as such is 
assum ed to be gender-neutral. But for reasons widely discussed but beyond the scope o f  this paper, 
the gender-neutral citizen is marked ‘m ale’; the civic society proclaims ‘liberty, equality and 
fraternity \  The ‘housew ife’s dilem m a’ is intrinsic to the contradictions o f a w om an’s position. In 
the family o f  Dr. W odi Tukura's paper (in this volume ; h ie woman is taken as naturally subjugated 
but she is a woman; under m odem  citizenship she continues to be subjugated and defined in the
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family but the family is considered outside civic polity. W ithin the larger socio-econom ic situation 
o f modern work and the concepts o f  citizen she is thus equal but marked ‘m ale’. This contradiction 
gave birth to feminism but remains its unresolved problematic.
W hat in terests me here about this dilemma is its enactm ent within t he concepts of mental 
health. M y thoughts here, as indeed throughout this paper, are both explorative and tentative, 
rather than sure and fully researched. However, in a long-standing, and well-researched study o f 
hysteria, I was preoccupied with the question o f why this very gendered mental illness -  hysteria 
historically and cross-culturally has largely belonged to women -  suddenly becam e degendered in 
W estern late nineteenth century neurology and in the em erging disciplines o f  psychiatry and 
psychoanalysis: m en c ould b e h ysterics. H owever, o nee m en a re s een t o b e h ysterics, h ysteria 
apparently disappears from dom inant neurologies and psychologies.
I now think that we have -  not surprisingly -  a parallel between conceptions o f mental illness 
and o f  personhood. The mentally ill person is expressing an inability to function within the norms 
o f society. He or she unconsciously ‘uses’ the traumata o f childhood as vehicles for the expression 
o f asociality — not to be able to speak, to eat, to love or to work. Everyone has one trauma they 
can use -  that o f  their desperate protest when another appears to be them  -  the baby on the 
m other’s back, knee or at her breast who occupies one’s place. Fascinatingly, Fortes comments 
that among the Tallensi a mad person is perceived as a-human and. this replicates a belief that a 
child is not human until it has a sibling -  presumably a sister and brother from the mother. W ithin 
the family and in societies which conceive o f themselves as families-w rit-large, or indeed where 
small societies and large families are co-extensive, wom en and m en equally can be mad or a- 
human. They may well have their own gender-appropriate m adness -  wom en will m ore-or-less 
m onopolise hysteria or depression; men obsessionality or paranoia.
How ever under conditions o f m odem  sociality, in the apparently gender-neutral workplace or 
gender-neutral polling-station o f  civic society, mental illness is apparently gender-neutral too -  
men as well as women can be hysterics. Psychiatry with its array o f drug treatm ents tries to model 
m adness not on the family with its genders, but on the civic gender neutral individual. Yet no 
sooner is this apparent neutrality established, than it vanishes. It is wom en who, defined as wom en 
only within the family, must use mental illness to protest the im possib ility 'of their situation. Men 
on the contrary are still men within the male marked gender neutrality o f  the state and civil society. 
They protest their a-sociality dom inantly within its terms -  they are crim inals. Everywhere in the 
W estern world, men make up the mass o f prisoners, women o f psychiatric patients. Every time a 
mental illness is relabelled to match the apparent neutrality o f  the modem state -  schizophrenia, 
borderline, narcissistic -  its p opulation w hich starts as m en a s w ell a s w omen r  apidly b ecomes 
predom inantly wom en once more -  approximately 65-85% o f the disturbed personality-types in the 
D iagnostic and Statistical M anuals (D S M s)a re  women. T hough m ore women in th e  W est are 
becom ing c rim inals, t hey c annot b e s o as w omen. The i ncidents o f t  wo w omen t hieves in D r. 
A ffifa’s account (in this volume), who stole from their in-laws for their families to survive and 
com m itted suicide because they could not repay what they had taken, are contem porary versions o f 
Ibsen’s D o ll’s House— as women they cannot be criminals, but as women thieves they cannot live. 
Their w om an’s law, the law o f  family survival is different and incom patible with the S ta te’s laws—  
the husband treats his wife as a child in a do ll’s house, someone not com petent to operate in civic 
society.
W ithin the family and within family-based societies wom en and men can be mad, they 
experience their present-day situation as untenable. T his releases the a-sociality o f  their infancy, 
when before the sibling arrives, they believed they were still the only king or queen o f  the castle. If 
instead o f  this, one is no-one, desperate depression follow s, along with the desire to break the 
taboos that render one more insignificant than one can tolerate. Once overcom e, through acquiring 
the awareness that there is a world out there, whether oi not we personally exist— then there is the 
possibility o f  walking around with our arms affection a > round each o ther’s neck.
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W ithin modern societies, w h ich  are based o n  the concept: o f  th e  individual rather than th e  
family, pharmacology has tried to bring madness within the neutrality o f the civic individual. To 
do so is to deprive it o f  possible meaning. It is only by situating madness in the family that we can 
start to understand it, but it is crucial that we see this family as more than a naturally gendered 
structure. The family is where gender and madness gets constructed as m eaning or 
m eaninglessness. The trauma o f the new  sibling (or the recognition that the older one was there 
when one yet d idn’t exist) is potentially an egalitarian one; girls and boys are indifferently subject 
to the situation. However, the male is able to be more violent as is the older child. Sibling 
violence intercepts with gender construction around reproduction and the lack o f  value placed on 
the m other even in cultures which value all children. Inequality between genders is because 
culturally child-care is assigned to women. This is nothing to do with who bears and gives birth, it 
is the m eaning we have assigned this which involves excluding men as equally reproductive. If 
K um ’s father to whom  Jack Goody referred, had had on an hourly basis to look after his more than 
200 children, the world would have had another story to tell.
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E P IL O G U E : G L O B A L IZ A T IO N  A N D  C H A N G E -  
A F R IC A  IN  T H E  C H A N G IN G  W O R L D  O F  F A M IL Y  S Y S T E M S
Goran Therborn
Several encounters have taken place during the course o f  this sem inar and round table. The 
encounter o f biom edical science and social science has been about considering socio-cultural issues 
in biomedicine. In this encounter, there has been a reflective consideration o f gender perspectives 
o f the issues being examined.
In my introductory essay 1 highlighted:
Three M ajor Global Processes:
1. A controlled low level o f fertility which started from 1750 and will end after 2050.
2. Large scale destruction o f patriarchy, rule by older men whether fathers, uncles, grandfathers, 
older brothers etc.
3. Secularization o f sexual behaviour and informalization o f marriage.
These three processes have been changing human society and are still in progress. They have also 
occured in three m ajor waves historically.
We can classify the waves as follows:
1. The first wave o f change started from late 19th century until the onset o f  World W ar 1. It centred 
in Europe with large scale fertility decline.
2. The second wave was centred in Eastern Asia since W orld War II.
3. The third wave is the movement which took place in the third quarter o f  the Twentieth Century 
and is world-wide.
Five m ajor family systems exist now: African, European, W estern, South Asia and East Asia. All 
o f  them have a num ber o f  variants.
Features o f  the African Family System include:
■ Exceptionally strong valuation o f fertility
■ Intellectually, socially, and culturally intriguing patriarchal systems with a considerable amount 
o f  female autonomy. This m eans that the European explanation o f patriarchy has to be redefined.
" An enormous universal marriage with significant difference between marriage and non-m arriage 
and m arital and extramarital sex.
Patriarchy and non-m arital sex are problems o f  the African family.
Where are the world's fa m ily  system s going? Into convergence, divergence, parallel paths or what? 
W hat we see is the persistent, pluralist, irregular specific paths in tangential directions. Patriarchy 
will continue to be undermined and challenged. Consider America, Iran etc. where changes in the 
family are taking place. The institution o f the family is not in danger but there will be more 
informal than traditional forms. There may not be any reversals. There will be persistent pluralist 
forms o f the family. W e must also take note o f the following:
1. No universal evolution or unilineal evolution is predicted by the theory o f demographic 
transition or conjugal m odernization rather a set of political waves that are interconnected.
2. The pace o f change has been uneven, fast changes followed by stagnation and sometimes 
reversal. M any patriarchal systems are making a leap forward
109
Research Review Supplement 15 (2004) 109-110
3. D ifferent agents ot change have been at work: the state and church (Europe), family planning 
(Eess Developed Countries). Sometimes change is from below: Scandinavia— by feminist 
movements.
W hat is to be done?
Four issues' o f  research investigation com ing out o f  this seminar:
1. The most pressing: systematic investigation o f sexual cultures. The fact is that we do not know 
very well in comparative terms what shapes sexual behaviour patterns and how they can be 
changed.
2. The dynam ics o f  pow er and dependence and independence o f gender.
3. 1 he possibility o t legal and other norms regulating sexual culture and gender and generations. 
W e need to look at how to frame norm ative change and also differences between public and 
custom ary practices.
4. Health insecurity— how to deal with it. W hat is the socio-cultural organization o f  health?
Editorial Endnote
The papers in this volume underline the need to study impacts o f  epidem ics on the economics o f 
caring and the growing differences between the poor, the not so poor and the better o ff families. 
They also once more confirm  the necessity for m ultidisciplinary approaches in the study o f families 
and for both micro- and m acro-perspectives, setting family relations and systems within the 
economic demographic and political transformations and processes in which they remain 
embedded.
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